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Abstract 
  
The financial remuneration of health workers (HWs) is a key concern to address human resources challenges in many 
low-income countries. Analyzing the entire set of payments available to HWs is critical to understand the incentives 
they face, their motivation and performance, and ultimately to devise effective health workforce reforms. In this thesis, I 
investigate these issues by exploring the complex remuneration of HWs in Sierra Leone, defined as all income 
sources, both formal (salary, allowances, performance bonus) and informal (per diems, top-ups, private practice, non-
health activities and illegal incomes). 
  
The study adopts a mixed-method approach. At central level, 23 key informants were conducted along with a 
stakeholder mapping workshop and a documentary review. At district level, 18 key informants were interviewed. 
Quantitative data were collected through a cross-sectional survey of 266 public HWs at primary healthcare level in 
three districts. Additionally, HWs were given a logbook to daily record their activities and incomes. Quantitative data at 
individual level were complemented with 39 in-depth interviews with a sub-sample of the same HWs. 
  
The analysis carried out in this thesis, first, sets the background to the complex remuneration by describing the 
incentive environment available to HWs as it developed during the post-conflict period, through policy-making 
processes at macro (central) level. It then investigates how the political economy dynamics between District Health 
Teams and NGOs at meso (district) level contribute to re-shape the incentive package. Moving to the micro (HW) level, 
I estimate the absolute and relative contribution of each income and I find that, while earnings from salary represent 
the largest share, HWs’ income is fragmented and composed of a variety of payments. Further data analysis shows 
that the determinants of the incomes are not in line with policies defined at national level and are influenced by the 
district of posting. Furthermore, the HWs’ narratives reveal the relevance of the features of each of their incomes (e.g., 
amount, regularity, reliability, ease of access, etc.) and the income use strategies through which HWs ‘manage’. 
Finally, I investigate whether the complex remuneration affects what HWs do or if there are other factors which 
constrain and/or influence HWs’ activities and service delivery. 
  
Findings from this research have important implications for how we go about (re)thinking financial incentive strategies. 
HWs’ income comes from a variety of sources, which they use differently. This questions the assumption of the 
fungibility of payments and highlights the potential consequences of increasing one rather than another of HWs’ 
incomes. Moreover, it is shown that the alignment of policies and incentive packages at central level may not be 
sufficient as dynamics at district level play a key role in influencing both HWs’ incomes as well as the activities they 
perform, thus effectively modifying incentive package and service delivery. From a methodological perspective, this 
thesis contributes to developing data collection and analysis techniques on the complex remuneration of HWs, which 
are relevant for a potential cross-country research agenda.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Rationale of the thesis 
 
Human resources for health (HRH) represent an essential component for the functioning of health systems (Chen 
et al., 2004; WHO, 2006). Training, motivating and retaining human resources is crucial for the improvement of 
health outcomes, especially in low-income countries where poor human resources availability and management 
have been recognized as key health system barriers (Campbell et al., 2013; McPake et al., 2013; Sales et al., 
2013). Despite the efforts to address the HRH issues, many low-income countries continue to face acute 
challenges concerning the recruitment, retention and motivation of an adequate health workforce, and such 
challenges hamper the improvement of health outcomes of their populations and the progress towards universal 
health coverage (WHO, 2006; Campbell, 2013).  
 
Given this context, ensuring the financial motivation of health workers (HWs) remains a key concern, both as a 
precondition for motivation (Franco et al., 2002; Chandler et al., 2009), as well as one of the core elements of 
effective HRH retention and motivation strategies (Buchan et al., 2000; Lehmann et al., 2008; Willis-Shattuck et 
al., 2008). The financial incentives in place for HWs should motivate them to enter the (public) health workforce, 
remain in it, be deployed where needs are, including in rural and underserved areas, and perform at their best 
(Sousa et al., 2013). In this sense, effective financial incentives are to be set both at a sufficient level, as well as 
in a way that is aligned with a country’s health needs and priorities (McPake et al., 2013). To complicate the task 
of devising financial incentive packages in many low-income countries is the fact that there is evidence that the 
remuneration of HWs is not composed of a single type of payment (e.g., salary), but includes different 
combinations of payment mechanisms, sources of funding, contractual agreements and task requirements.  
 
So far, most of the empirical literature on HWs remunerations has tended to be limited to the analysis of certain 
incomes or to the separate study of each revenue (such as informal incomes, top-ups, or per diems in the 
examples above), and there is a dearth of research looking to the entire set of HWs’ remuneration 
simultaneously, exploring the dynamics and consequences of their interaction. Additionally, little quantitative data 
exists to estimate the total remuneration of HWs in Africa (Macq and Van Lerberghe, 2000; Witter et al., 2007; 
McCoy et al., 2008), beyond qualitative evidence and anecdotal reports (Roenen et al., 1997; Smith, 2003; Muula 
and Maseko, 2006; Vian and Bukuluki, 2011). However, there is a growing recognition that such complex 
remuneration may affect in several ways the recruitment, retention and motivation of HWs. From a policy 
perspective, a better understanding of the HWs complex remuneration is essential in order to devise effective 
incentive packages to address HRH challenges and improve the performance of health systems. The body of 
work carried out for this thesis aims to provide a new look to the issues related to the multiple remuneration of 
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HWs, considering them simultaneously and looking at the causes and consequences of the complex 
remuneration of HWs. 
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
 
Part I of this thesis provides an introduction to the topic, by review the existing literature and outlining a research 
agenda on the issue of the complex remuneration of the HWs (Chapter 2). It then defines the specific research 
questions addressed in this work through empirical research in Sierra Leone (Chapter 3), and provides details 
about the research context and the study setting (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 focuses on the study design and 
methods adopted for quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. 
 
Part II presents the empirical analysis carried out for this thesis which moves from macro (central) to meso 
(district) and then micro (individual HWs) level. Chapter 6 sets the background of HRH remuneration in Sierra 
Leone. Chapter 7 looks at how the HRH remuneration policies are implemented in practice and explores how 
dynamics at district level shape the incentives for HWs. Finally, Chapters 8 to 10 move the focus to the individual 
HW level. Firstly, the remuneration of the sampled HWs is estimated, which will be needed in order to assess the 
existence and extent of their complex remuneration (Chapter 8). Secondly, the complex remuneration is further 
explored, by analyzing the individual and facility-level determinants of HWs’ income, and by investigating the 
financial and non-financial features of the different payments, and how they affect the income use and HWs 
motivation (Chapter 9). Thirdly, I explore the potential of the complex remuneration to influence the activities that 
HWs do and, thus, service delivery (Chapter 10).   
 
Finally, Part III provides an overall discussion of the thesis, by highlighting the main findings of the research, 
pointing to the limitations and drawing conclusions in terms of the methodological and knowledge contribution of 
the thesis as well as its implications for policy (Chapter 11).  
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2. Setting the research agenda on HWs’ complex 
remuneration  
 
2.1 Preface 
 
The first research paper included in the thesis expands the points raised in the introductory chapter and clarifies 
hypotheses, objectives and implications of a research agenda on the complex remuneration of HWs. The article 
provides an overview of the literature which critically discusses the evidence available on the issue of the 
remuneration of HWs and highlights the gaps, in particular with reference to the comprehensive and simultaneous 
analysis of all of the HWs’ remunerations. The publications reviewed for this article include broad bodies of work, 
both referring to relevant theory, such as agency, as well as applied to HWs in low and middle-income countries: 
health economics literature on provider payments mechanisms, including Performance Based Financing, work on 
HWs’ incomes and financial coping strategies, also in relation with corruption, illegal activities, moonlighting and 
dual practice, and literature on system-wide effects of global health initiatives (with a focus on the effects on 
HWs). The literature was not systematically search, but starting from seminal work in each area, the key relevant 
references were explored. Secondly, the paper identifies a series of hypotheses concerning the HWs’ complex 
remuneration, its causes and consequences, at different levels of the health system and both within and across 
countries, and it proposes the corresponding research questions on which further research is necessary. 
Importantly, the paper not only sets a novel research agenda on the complex remuneration of HWs, but it also 
seeks to highlight the key policy implications and applications of this agenda. 
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Introduction
Human resources for health (HRH) represent an essen-
tial component for the functioning of health systems [1]
and play a key role to accelerate progress towards uni-
versal health coverage [2-4]. However, many low-income
countries face challenges with reference to availability of
health workers, which is the supply of qualified workers;
distribution, that is, recruitment and retention of health
workers where they are needed; and performance, which
is the productivity and the quality of their work [5]. The-
oretical research has explored the factors underlying
health workers’ motivation [6,7], and empirical studies
and systematic reviews have looked extensively at the
factors (or combination of factors) that improve recruit-
ment and retention and enhance motivation. They find
that the possible strategies are multiple and include
financial benefits (pay and other benefits, such as pension,
insurance, accommodation), indirect benefits (subsidized
transport, food, child care) and non-financial benefits
(access to training, social recognition, supervision, etc.)
[6]. While some studies suggest that a payment or salary is
an essential precondition for the motivation of health
workers [8], others argue that non-financial incentives
can be highly effective, especially for the attraction and
retention in rural areas [9,10]. Yet, most scholars agree
that “bundles of interventions” addressing multiple factors
and combining financial and non-financial incentives
work better than interventions limited to one single type
of incentive [10-13].
In this article, we focus exclusively on the financial com-
ponent of incentive packages provided to health workers
and specifically on health workers’ remunerations and rev-
enues. We argue that, while there are various bodies of lit-
erature in health economics and health policy and systems
research in low-income settings that look separately at
some of the incomes and examine the effect of each on
health workers’ motivation, there has been a general lack
of attention to the “complex remuneration” of health
workers in a comprehensive way, including the whole of
the financial incentives and revenue sources available, and
to how the different incomes may interact. Indeed, in
most low-income settings, the remuneration of health
workers is not composed of a single type of payment but
includes combinations of payment mechanisms, which
differ by source of funding, contract agreements, features
such as regularity and inclusion of “deferred” compensa-
tion (pensions), and task requirements. The thorough un-
derstanding of the entire remuneration of health workers
and each of its components, as well as the acknowledge-
ment of its complexity by researchers and policy-makers,
is extremely relevant in order to devise effective overall in-
centive packages.
This article first describes the perspectives taken by
the existing economics and health system literature on
HRH remuneration in low-income settings and then in-
troduces a broader approach to the study of health
workers’ financial incentive environment which has thus
far been little explored. The article concludes with some
reflections on the policy and research implications of
our proposition.
Perspectives on HRH remuneration in the existing
literature
The remuneration of workers, along with the related is-
sues of incentives and motivation, have been discussed
and analysed by different bodies of literature, both theor-
etical and empirical – the latter focused mostly on high-
income settings. One of the most broadly adopted
conceptual frameworks to explore the role of remuner-
ation and incentives in defining behaviour in work rela-
tionships is “agency theory”. Agency theory studies a
setting where a “principal” delegates authority to an
“agent” who is working on behalf of the principal to per-
form a task. Because of her imperfect information on
the agent’s effort and skills, the principal devises con-
tracts that include rewards or sanctions (usually in the
form of a financial remuneration) to elicit the desired
behaviour [14]. Mainstream economic models predict
(under a series of assumptions, including that of “ma-
terialistic self-interest” of individuals) which type of in-
centives should be included in the “ideal” contract
(for example, piece-rate payments, fixed salary or a mix),
applying concepts from institutional economics, such as
“high-powered” and “low-powered” incentives [15,16].
Most recently, economic work began expanding the
microfoundations of agency theory to allow for non-
rational behaviour and social preferences of individuals.
Going beyond revenue and effort as the sole explanatory
factors, behavioural models add psychological factors to
the agent’s utility maximization problem. These factors
include inequality aversion, teamwork, and professional
and identity norms and have been explored by theoret-
ical and empirical literature [16,17]. The complex
process of the motivation of health workers and the role
of factors beyond the financial remuneration (including
intrinsic determinants, the work context and the broader
societal culture) has been acknowledged widely, and
their study crosses many disciplinary boundaries, includ-
ing economics, psychology, organizational development,
human resource management and sociology [7]. While
we do not aim to present a systematic review of the vast
and varied research available, in order to provide a basis
for our argument, we focus here on a selected portion of
the health economics and health policy and system re-
search literature, which looks at health workers’ financial
incentives in low-income settings.
In some of the health economics literature, health
workers’ remuneration arrangements are seen as “provider
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payment mechanisms” targeting individuals, under which
health workers could be receiving a salary, a fee-for-service
payment, capitation or a payment based on their perform-
ance. The empirical literature on the incentives created by
the different types of payment has been reviewed by many
[18-23]. Its focus is found to be predominantly on high-
income countries, as fewer, if any, economic analyses have
been performed in low- and middle-income settings. It is
generally implied that health workers in low- and middle-
income countries receive a salary for their public sector
activities and are paid a fee-for-service for their private
ones [24].
Yet, the actual composition of their remuneration is
much more complex, as shown by empirical work car-
ried out in low-income countries. Indeed, these studies
point out to the fact that the categories of income
sources defined in the health economics literature, and
their mutual exclusivity, are less relevant in those con-
texts. Roenen et al. [25] identified 8 categories (and 28
sub-categories) of medical and non-medical income-
generating activities, ranging from agro-pastoral and
commercial work to secondary jobs within the public
sector (for example, teaching), per diems and premiums,
private practice and informal incomes, such as gifts from
patients, and appropriation of public resources. In prac-
tice, very few studies have quantified the overall remu-
neration of health workers presenting information on
each of these components. These papers generally over-
look the complex remuneration and its potential conse-
quences on health workers’ motivation as an issue in
itself and focus on other questions, namely the impact of
changes on HRH (including their income) with the
introduction of a fee exemption scheme [26,27], the ad-
equacy of health workers’ income and the fiscal and
macroeconomic aspects of health workers’ remuneration
[28] or the strategic tools available for policy-makers to
control health workers’ behaviour [29].
Other research has focused on the income of health
workers in order to explore their individual “financial
coping strategies”, that is, the ways workers deal with
their financial needs. This body of work aims at asses-
sing the adequacy of the public health workforce salary
in comparison to alternative work [30] or at investigat-
ing the consequences of the coping strategies on the
public health system, in order to devise policies to re-
duce the need to adopt such strategies [31-33], or to put
in place performance-based bonuses sufficiently high to
incentivize health workers and compensate their in-
creased efforts [34]. Along similar lines, a diverse body
of literature focuses on those sources of income that are
considered “informal” or downright “illegal”, looking at
dual practice and moonlighting [35-39] as well as activ-
ities within facilities, such as charging under-the-table
fees and selling pharmaceuticals [31,40,41]. The main
objective of these studies is to attempt the, obviously diffi-
cult, assessment of the level of each of those incomes and
to discuss their implications in terms of the distortions
they can create on the main public job (for example, com-
petition for time and absenteeism) and on the governance
of the health system.
Other studies have focused on the widespread practice
of external organizations of paying salary supplementa-
tions (“top-ups”) and “per diems” to health workers. Al-
though meant to reimburse real expenses, per diems are
usually paid well beyond the level necessary to cover the
actual costs on the activities concerned, and they have
attracted much criticisms because of the distortions and
abuse to which they are subject and the increase in cor-
ruption that they may cause [42-46]. From their perspec-
tive, international donors are aware of the critical role
they play by providing unofficial supplements to health
workers’ salaries. The open discussion held at the 1998
International Conference in Lisbon [47-51] is particu-
larly useful in this respect. However, little empirical work
exists to measure this impact and its consequences. An
exception is the body of literature on the “system-wide
effects” of Global Health Initiatives which looks at in-
centives created by such programmes when they include
remuneration to health workers. It is found that, indeed,
Global Health Initiatives have contributed substantially
to salary top-ups and per diems paid mostly for in-
service training [52-55]. The main concern is the
evidence of their consequences in terms of “brain drain”
from public posts to NGOs and bilateral agencies [56-58],
as well as of additional workload, distortion from routine
activities and absenteeism in public (usually policy-
making) positions [59-61].
With the widespread introduction, in many countries
of sub-Saharan Africa, of performance-based financing
(PBF) schemes, which often entail a bonus for staff, an-
other payment is available for health workers. The core
concept of PBF schemes is to make use of incentives in
order to promote better health service coverage and re-
sults, by linking financial incentives to desired outputs
and encouraging increased effort [62,63]. Critics of the
approach have suggested that PBF schemes may
promote “gaming” practices, distortions in service deliv-
ery in favour of services included in the scheme and
crowding-out the intrinsic motivation of health workers
[64,65]. Empirical evidence from low-income countries
on how PBF schemes affect health workers’ motivation
is still limited, but some preliminary results are available.
The analysis of an early PBF scheme in Rwanda showed
the sharp increase in staff productivity [66]. In Benin,
with the introduction of two pilot PBF projects, health
workers report being more professional and respectful of
standards, but their motivation is limited by the perceived
unfairness in bonus distribution [67]. A quantitative study
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in the Haut-Katanga region of DR Congo finds that the
PBF scheme led to more effort from health workers
without crowding-out of non-targeted services, staff con-
flicts, gaming or free-riding. However, the scheme, be-
cause of the effect it had of reducing the overall
remuneration of health workers, led to a decrease in
their intrinsic motivation [68].
Most recently, research has explored HRH incentive
issues from a labour market perspective [5,69-71]. This
body of work argues that to address issues of maldistri-
bution, low retention and poor performance of health
workers, a shift of focus from health workforce planning
to other factors, such as labour market dynamics and
the behavioural responses and individual preferences, is
needed. The proposed approach looks at the national
and international market for health workers and at the
competing alternatives to public employment, such as
private practice and migration to other countries. Al-
though this work allows for the possibility of dual prac-
tice, the “price” considered for the health labour market
is represented by the “wage rate” and there is limited at-
tention to the existence and consequences of simultan-
eous, multiple incomes.
The complex remuneration of health workers: policy
implications
Although most of the studies reviewed above describe the
remuneration of health workers or rather some compo-
nents of it, with few exceptions [26,27,29,34], they do not
adopt a comprehensive approach reflecting the overall
financial incentives and encompassing all incomes avail-
able. Importantly, however, taken as a whole, this litera-
ture points out to the existence and relevance of the
phenomenon that we call “complex remuneration”, which
is the fact that health workers earn their living from a var-
iety of sources and activities. We believe that a broader
and more integrated understanding of the financial incen-
tive environment available for health workers is necessary
and of high-policy relevance. While the work done so far
tends to reflect on different incomes separately, further re-
search is needed on all these elements simultaneously.
Such research would allow describing and quantifying the
overall income and each of its components, including
their relative importance and their variation across indi-
viduals. Moreover, it could explore hypotheses (i) relating
to the causes of differences in income structure and levels
between individuals, as well as within and across countries
and their linkages with the fragmentation of the health
systems, and (ii) on the potential interactions between in-
comes, the incentives created by the complex remuner-
ation structure and their consequences on health workers’
motivation, behaviour and, more broadly, on the health
system performance.
From a policy perspective, the issues raised by the
complex remuneration pose numerous new challenges
in order to establish rational and aligned financial incen-
tive packages to recruit, retain and motivate the health
workforce. While some guidance already exists for devis-
ing health workers’ incentives and addressing attraction
and retention issues [72,73], under the assumption that
the overall income of health workers depends on various
and interacting factors beyond the ones that are usually
considered, such as individual education and type of
posting, the design of financial incentives becomes in-
creasingly difficult. Other elements and factors should
now be considered, such as the opportunities for exter-
nal payments or for medical and non-medical activities
beyond the main employment. The need for broader
consideration of revenue sources beyond the salary is
valid for any type of financial payment or strategy that
is to be introduced, from rural allowances to PBF bo-
nuses which have to take into consideration the overall
income of health workers in order to be sufficient to
produce an impact on motivation and, at the same
time, to avoid the “blurred” and ineffective incentives
created by the accumulation of various payments [67].
Moreover, the complex remuneration of health workers in
many low-income settings presents specific challenges in
that multiple payers and lines of accountability exist, with
potentially clashing agendas that influence the activities
health workers perform. This is different from multiple
payment systems in high-income countries, where a single
principal is more able to align incentives [74].
Policy-makers and their partners at the national level
are called to pay increased attention to the wider financial
incentive environment, as well as to engage in reflections
to inform HRH reforms going beyond the issue of salaries
and governmental allowances. The policy-making pro-
cesses must be supported by the collection of relevant
data (including qualitative) and the creation of an infor-
mation base on these issues. Additionally, the policy de-
bate at the central level should be framed within the
broader macrolevel context of HRH incentives (which in-
cludes issues such as caps on total wage bills) and should
take into consideration how microlevel strategies for the
motivation of health workers can be affected and at times
constrained by macrolevel conditions. Finally, beyond the
national level, it has to be acknowledged that some of the
incomes are subject to and influenced by local-level
dynamics (Bertone MP, Witter S: An exploration of the
political economy dynamics shaping health worker incen-
tives in three districts in Sierra Leone, submitted). For ex-
ample, private practice is usually more widespread in
urban areas rather than in rural ones, and depending on
the geographical distribution of donors and NGOs, per
diems, top-ups or other payments may be more common
or higher in certain areas of a country than in others.
Bertone and Witter Human Resources for Health  (2015) 13:62 Page 4 of 9
An agenda for research on the health workers’ complex
remuneration
Further research is needed in order to support policy de-
sign and decisions, tailored to the specificity of the con-
texts. An innovative agenda of health policy and systems
research would require exploring the complex remuner-
ation of health workers and refining the necessary tools
to capture it. The hypotheses that motivate such re-
search agenda are multiple, and the main issues and re-
search questions that could be explored under this
proposition are described below and in Table 1.
First, a description of the level of fragmentation and
complexity of the overall income in a country as well as
across countries would be extremely useful to explore
what are the revenues available to health workers, in-
cluding their absolute and relative levels. Such work
could focus on the causes and determinants of the in-
comes, looking at variables at the individual, facility and
geographical level (for example, which health workers
receive each income? Who receives more for each in-
come?). Furthermore, hypotheses on the consequences
of the fragmented and complex remuneration should
also be investigated. Different sources, levels and fea-
tures of each revenue – such as predictability, regular-
ity, link with deferred compensation (that is, pension
and increases with career progression), type of contract
(for example, performance-based or fixed), source of
payment and tasks required (for example, routine or
disease-specific and within facility or outside) – may
play a key role in affecting health workers’ behaviour
and motivation and therefore performance, in different
ways. Moreover, specific requirements related to in-
come component may affect time spent by health
workers on different activities (for example, top-ups for
disease/service-specific work may increase time spent
on those) and the presence at work (for example, in-
comes earned outside of the facility, such as per diems
or non-health-related work). These issues could be fur-
ther researched with a comprehensive approach. Other
key issues are the individual perceptions about the suffi-
ciency, fairness and transparency in the allocation of the
revenues [75,76], as well as social and cultural views over
certain incomes, all of which are likely to affect the motiv-
ation of health workers. For example, it is possible that, in
some contexts, the government salary may be a relatively
limited and unreliable source of income but perceived as
extremely important either because it is linked to pension
benefits and job security [76,77] or because health workers
assign a significance beyond its immediate monetary value.
In the DR Congo, Fox et al. found that this was the case as
receiving a salary is seen as a social recognition of the
health worker’s role [78]. Similarly, some revenues may be
low in absolute terms but they could enable access to
other “goods” (such as training or social status) or,
because of their regularity and predictability, could act as
income “stabilizers” and therefore be considered important
by health workers. A further unexplored hypothesis relates
to the potential interaction between income components.
If we consider the possibility of earning simultaneously dif-
ferent revenues, some incomes could play a role either as a
substitute for meagre official payments or as a comple-
ment to those, even when their level is sufficient. For ex-
ample, are revenues for activities outside of the health
sector, such as agriculture or business, earned to “make
ends meet”, or are those incomes available only to workers
who earn enough from other sources and are therefore
able to make further investments?
Turning to the overall revenue, it is likely that, given the
fragmentation, the total income may differ for health
workers even within the same cadre and level of educa-
tion. In this case, it will be important to assess the level of
income variability and investigate its causes. These differ-
ences could be a used as a motivation tool by incentivizing
health workers to work in rural areas or ensuring their
career progression, especially if remuneration is transpar-
ent and fragmentation reduced. On the other hand, these
differences may be a possible source of inequity between
individuals and demotivation. Research could explore by
which income component(s) differences in total income
are driven and/or whether these differences are related to
characteristics at the individual level, such as gender, or at
the facility level (rural or urban location) or at the geo-
graphical level (different districts or provinces). Based on
answers to such questions, it is possible to reflect on the
policy relevance of the income differences: are differences
justifiable and used to address availability, distribution and
retention issues, or do they cause unacceptable inequal-
ities? Are inequalities avoidable and policy-amenable? If
so, what are the policy tools to address them? For ex-
ample, a study of doctors in Viet Nam found that the dif-
ference in opportunities for financial revenues between
areas of posting favoured those in urban areas. The fact
that these differences mostly originated outside official
pay channels and were of large magnitude presented a
considerable policy challenge to address distribution im-
balances [29].
Another set of hypotheses concerns the difference in
the complexity of income composition that there may be
within and across countries. A question in this case is
whether the fragmentation of revenue sources and the
variation of total income for similar health workers have
local determinants and/or mirror the fragmentation of
the health system and increase in contexts where nu-
merous (external) actors are involved, such as in fragile
states/regions or where private practice is widespread.
The call for a novel approach focused on the overall
remuneration and including sources of income that are
both formal and informal also requires refining existing
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methods to elicit such information [79], as well as test-
ing and defining new ones. Informal revenues are ex-
tremely difficult and perhaps impossible to precisely
calculate because of the reticence of the health workers
to openly declare them and the absence of records.
However, some potentially useful techniques that allow
rough estimates have been explored [34,40]. Revenues
that are not harmonized but vary for each health worker,
such as top-ups and per diems, are difficult to collect
other than through individual surveys, given the diffi-
culty of obtaining disaggregated data from donors’ data-
bases. Mixed method approaches have also been found
Table 1 Main hypotheses of the proposed research agenda on HRH complex remuneration and possible research
questions
Main issues/hypotheses Possible research questions
Complexity/fragmentation of income sources • What are the different incomes available for health workers and the level and relative importance of
each income?
• To which type of health workers is each source of income available – including health worker
characteristics at the individual level (such as age, gender, level of education, years in the health
sector and role within the facility) and at the facility level (type of facility, rural/urban, size, location
within the country, etc.)?
• What are the individual- and facility-level determinants that define the level (amount) of each
income received/earned?
• How do the different incomes interact with each other? Are certain incomes used as a substitute
for the lack/low level of others or rather as complements?
• How are the different incomes used by health workers?
Consequences of the complex remuneration • What are the features of the different revenues (for example, present vs. deferred and stable vs.
irregular, performance-based vs. fixed), and how do these affect motivation and performance?
• How do health workers perceive their incomes, in terms of fairness, of being sufficient to motivate
them, of transparency on what influences them, etc.? How do these perceptions affect their
motivation and performance?
• What are the consequences of the income fragmentation on the motivation and performance?
(for example, does the accumulation of payments lead to “blurriness” and decrease effectiveness of
incentives?)
• How do different incomes and their fragmentation affect the time spent on different activities,
levels of absenteeism and accountability links to different payers?
Differences in total income across health
workers of the same cadre
• What is the measure of differences of income across similar health workers? (that is, same cadre/
level of education and type of post and role within facility)
• What are the drivers at the individual and facility level of these differences?
• What are the consequences of the inequalities of total income? Are they justifiable and have a
motivating effect (for example, incentivizing rural workers)? Or do they cause unacceptable
inequalities and hamper availability, retention and distribution, as well as motivation (for example,
urban workers or workers in some areas have more opportunities to earn some revenues from
private practice or donors’ support)?
Differences within countries • Are there income differences (both overall and for each component) between health workers in
different areas of the same country?
• What are the causes of these differences? (for example, rural/urban divide, different socio-economic
contexts, historical legacies, political economy dynamics at local level and presence of external
actors)
Differences across countries • Do health workers in some countries have more complex incomes than in others? Why?
(for example, different health system architecture and health system fragmentation, role of private
sector, existence of free health care policies, level of health funding and fragile/post-conflict settings)
• Are individual differences for similar health workers more important in some countries than others?
Why?
Designing financial incentive packages • Which tools and methods are needed to produce context-specific evidence in order to design
rational and effective incentive packages for health workers?
• What is the role of governments and their development partners in reducing inequalities and
fragmentation of health workers’ income?
• What are the policy implications of complex remuneration (for example, its effects on policy
options and effectiveness), and what are the options for addressing it?
• How are individual-level strategies for the motivation of health workers affected and constrained by
macrolevel conditions (for example, wage bills caps)?
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useful to better understand the level of each income and
the perceptions and views of health workers on their dif-
ferent revenues [34]. Overall, it seems that the ideal ap-
proach would entail a combination of different methods,
integrated into survey or interview tools that are prac-
tical and feasible to administer. Although collecting data
on incomes routinely would be of high relevance for
policy-makers, this possibility seems unlikely. As for the
interpretation of results, while it may prove difficult to
go beyond the context specificity of the findings of this
type of research, cross-country comparisons may help to
improve generalizability and find common patterns
across contexts.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued for an increased attention to
the wider financial incentive environment and a better un-
derstanding of the complex remuneration of health
workers, its determinants and the factors that underlie it,
as well as its wide-ranging consequences for behaviour
and performance. As recognized in the introduction, our
perspective is limited because of its exclusive focus on fi-
nancial incentives. In fact, we recognize that effective
HRH strategies consist of “bundles of interventions”,
which incorporate both financial and non-financial incen-
tives, and our proposition does not aim to underestimate
the importance of other non-financial motivation strat-
egies. However, precisely because financial and non-
financial incentives are complexly interrelated, remuner-
ation is an essential element of any HRH strategy. It can-
not be fully taken into consideration for policy-making
without exploring and understanding the overall complex
remuneration of health workers and the role it plays in de-
termining recruitment, retention and motivation, as well
as, more broadly, the performance of health systems and
the progress towards universal health care.
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3. Research questions and institutional setting of the thesis 
 
3.1 Research aim and objectives 
 
This thesis aims to look into the issue of the complex remuneration of HWs, in line with the theoretical proposition 
advanced in Chapter 2. In particular, in this thesis, I fully explore a subset of the research questions outlined in 
the paper (Bertone and Witter, 2015a).  
 
The primary aim of this research is to analyze the complex remuneration of primary HWs in Sierra Leone, explore 
its causes and drivers at different levels, as well as the consequences it has on the activities that HWs perform.  
 
The specific research objectives, and the steps taken in the empirical work, are the following (Table 3.1):  
1. Describe the official financial incentives available for HWs and how it developed overtime, by analyzing the 
HRH policies and policy-making processes at macro (central) level in Sierra Leone during the post-conflict 
period. 
2. Investigate the factors and dynamics between key actors of the health system at meso (district) level which 
contribute to re-shape the financial incentive package for HWs. 
3. At micro (individual HW) level, estimate the absolute and relative contribution of each income to the 
remuneration of HWs, by using and comparing different methods and tools. 
4. Analyze the complex remuneration of HWs, by looking at the determinants of the differences in remuneration 
between HWs and by exploring the views and satisfaction of HWs with their remunerations. 
5. Investigate the possible links between remunerations and activities performed. 
 
In order to examine these issues, empirical work was carried out between October 2012 and May 2014 in Sierra 
Leone, and data collection at individual level focused specifically on public HWs working in primary healthcare 
centers in three districts in the southern part of the country. It is important to note that fieldwork for data collection 
for this thesis was carried before the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) epidemic, which started in Sierra Leone in May 
2014 and therefore reflects the situation as it was before the outbreak. 
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Table 3.1: Overview of the research objectives, questions and chapters’ organization 
 Research objectives Chapter Research 
paper 
(reference) 
Research questions 
(HT: hypothesis testing) 
(EX: exploratory or descriptive) 
C
en
tr
al
 le
ve
l 
Setting the 
background by 
describing the official 
HRH incentive 
package in Sierra 
Leone 
Chapter 6 
(Bertone et al., 
2014) 
 What dynamics and processes at central level have led to the 
definition of the HRH incentive policies in Sierra Leone over the 
post-conflict period? (EX) 
 Was there a political ‘window of opportunity’ for reform in the 
immediate post-conflict period? (HT) 
 What type of financial incentive package for HWs emerged after 
the decade of post-conflict reforms? (EX) 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
le
ve
l 
Exploring how HRH 
remuneration is re-
shaped at district 
level 
Chapter 7 
(Bertone and 
Witter, 2015b) 
 Which factors and dynamics between local-level actors contribute 
to re-shaping the financial incentives of HWs? (EX) 
 What is the impact of such influence on the actual financial 
incentives experienced by HWs? (EX) 
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 le
ve
l 
Estimating HWs’ 
complex 
remuneration   
Chapter 8 -- 
 What are the different estimates of HWs’ incomes based on the 
three methods used (i.e., survey, indirect questioning, prospective 
daily logbook)? (EX) 
 How do results of income estimates compare to the  hypotheses 
on biases that had been formulated initially? (HT)  
- Recall bias in survey responses lead to underestimation of 
income amounts 
- Indirect questioning reduces reticence in response to 
questions on sensitive (i.e. informal or illegal) incomes and 
address normative bias 
- Daily logbooks can help address the issue of recall bias 
and capture variation overtime, but suffer from low 
response rate. 
Analyzing the 
complex 
remuneration of HWs 
Chapter 9 
(Bertone and 
Lagarde, 2016) 
(Bertone et al., 
2016) 
 What is the contribution of each income to the remuneration of 
HWs? (EX) 
 Which factors at individual, facility and district level drive the 
differences in the total remuneration and between components? 
(EX) 
 What are the views of the HWs on their incomes, and their 
satisfaction in relation with their livelihood strategies? (EX) 
Exploring the links 
between  complex 
remuneration and 
HWs’ productive 
activities 
Chapter 10 -- 
 Is the choice of activities of HWs driven by their effort to maximize 
income and minimize effort (as hypothesized by agency theory)? 
(HT) 
 Which factors constrain the choice of activities of HWs and 
influence the patterns of service delivery at facility level? (EX) 
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3.2 Conceptual framework 
 
In order to explore the questions and issues highlighted above, I developed a conceptual framework that 
delineates the potential causal pathways by which complex remuneration influences the allocation of time across 
different activities, and in turn affects health service delivery and use.  
 
The conceptual framework embeds the issue of the remuneration of HWs into a model that is primarily founded 
upon agency theory. Agency refers to a situation where someone (a principal) needs a task to be performed, and 
delegates its performance to a second person (an agent). Problems typically arise as (i) the agent’s interest may 
differ from her own and (ii) the agent has better information than the principal on her actions (Kiser, 1999). In the 
simple agency model, the utility–maximizer agent maximizes earnings while minimizing effort. Therefore, to elicit 
the desired behavior and obtain optimal effort levels, the principal needs to ensure that the agent’s remuneration 
structure is in line with the principal’s own objectives, by defining in the agent contract the appropriate ‘power’ of 
incentives (e.g., the extent to which the remuneration is linked to production). Theoretical models for particular 
cases of agency have been presented in the literature depicting the situations in which agents are multitasking or 
have multiple principals. In the first case (i.e., multitasking agents), if tasks are substitutes, which means that 
exerting more effort on one task increases the marginal cost of the other, stronger incentives to perform one task 
will drive the agent’s effort away from the other task(s) . The second case (also called, ‘common agency’) arises 
when one agent is subject to the influence of multiple principals (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986; Dixit, 1996, 
1997, 2002). In the absence of a single contract agreed upon by all principals (the case of a ‘collective principal’ 
(Nielson and Tierney, 2003)), each principal sets an incentive scheme that is optimal for her and the agent’s 
rational response is to choose the optimal level of effort on each task, according to his private costs and benefits 
given the full set of contracts.  
 
Agency theory was chosen as the underlying model of the conceptual framework because it provides a relatively 
simple and overarching structure which has been theoretically conceptualized and (at least partially) empirically 
tested in the literature. Additionally, it has been applied to workers in the public sector (Burgess and Ratto, 2003) 
as well as to the healthcare market (since Arrow, 1963). Moreover, while originally developed by economists, 
agency theory has been adopted in sociology and political sciences and have proved a useful conceptual tool for 
multidisciplinary analyses (Kiser, 1999; Shapiro, 2005).  
 
The conceptual framework adopted for this research is sketched in the figure below. It shows how a set of 
principals, encompassing the Ministry of Health, but also donors, NGOs and patients, provide different streams of 
income to HWs (who act as their agents) in exchange for undertaking certain defined tasks (e.g., providing health 
services). These payments, alongside the earnings from individual income-generating activities, make up the 
complex remuneration of HWs. HWs are at the same time multitasking agents, because their job encompasses a 
series of activities –both clinical and administrative- related to healthcare delivery, and have multiple principals, 
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as they act as agents for their main employer (typically the Ministry of Health), their patients, and other principals 
who contribute to their remuneration, such as donors and NGOs. In the case of multitasking agents, agency 
theory predicts that HWs would aim to maximize their utility (i.e., maximize earnings and minimizing effort), by 
allocating their effort across different tasks according to the benefits and costs associated to each. For example, it 
could be hypothesized that HWs would choose to give preference to trainings and meetings outside their facility 
which allow them to earn per diems, or could focus the provision of services linked to PBF payments, which 
provide high earnings (although they do also require effort and payment is related to increased production). By 
doing so, they could neglect other activities which do not provide extra income. Such utility maximization 
strategies affect, in turn, the pattern of service delivery as some services may be preferred and provided more 
often than others or spending more time on them. Finally, this affects healthcare use for the patients, as some 
services may be more accessible (because provided more frequently) or of better quality (because more time is 
spent on them). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework for this research 
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3.2.1 Definition of key concepts 
 
So far in the thesis, I have frequently used the term ‘complex remuneration’, and I will continue to do so in the 
following pages. The term is new to the literature and requires some definition. First of all, for what concerns the 
meaning of ‘remuneration’, I use it in this thesis as a general, overarching term to include all forms of present 
compensation, in-kind or in cash, that HWs receive or earn in exchange of work, activities or services produced. 
Such activities include both those carried out under their main job as public HWs for which they receive a salary, 
other allowances (in Sierra Leone, a remote allowance for working in rural areas and a PBF bonus related to the 
provision of six maternal and child health services; overtime may also be paid in other contexts), top-ups and per 
diems from external organization for specific tasks (such as training, workshops, or disease-specific activities), as 
well as those carried out alongside it, such as private practice or other income generating activities outside of the 
health sector (farming, business, small trade, etc.). However, the operational definition of ‘remuneration’ that I 
adopt does not include other benefits, such as housing, medical insurance or deferred compensation (e.g., 
pension). This is an important limitation of the research as those benefits are shown in the literature to be a 
relevant component of the motivation of HWs and a key reason to remain in public service (Songstad et al., 2012; 
Zinnen et al., 2012; Wurie et al., 2016). However, the choice was made because the HWs are often not able to 
precisely quantify those benefits, and in particular those that they will be receive in the future or in case of 
particular events (such as the case of insurance). Moreover, because the entire sample of HWs included in the 
analysis (as described in Chapter 5) is composed of public HWs, there is little or no variation in those benefits 
between all of them. 
 
Because I purposefully define ‘remuneration’ in a loose sense, I often use other terms such as ‘income’, 
‘revenue’, ‘payment’, ‘earning’, ‘financial incentive’ (or ‘incentive’) as synonyms, simply to avoid repetitions in the 
text. In particular, it is important to stress that, as explained in Chapter 2, although I recognize the key role played 
by non-financial incentives in the motivation of HWs (Buchan et al., 2000; Lehmann et al., 2008; Willis-Shattuck et 
al., 2008; Chandler et al., 2009; Lagarde and Blaauw, 2009), for this research it was explicitly decided to not 
include the analysis of such non-financial incentives, as for example social recognition, supervision and 
supportive working environment. Therefore, unless otherwise specified or clear from the context, the term 
‘incentive’ usually indicates financial incentives paid to HWs in cash or kind. Additionally, the use of the term 
‘financial incentive package’ normally refers to the set of official payments (salary, allowances, performance 
bonus, etc.) established for public HWs by the central government or Ministry of Health. 
The term ‘complex’ as referred to the HWs’ remuneration also deserves an explanation. It is important to stress 
that its use in this thesis does not relate to complexity theory or the study of complex adaptive system, and the 
specific definition adopted in that literature. Instead, I draw from the seminal paper by McCoy et al. on incomes of 
HWs in Africa, which states that “pay structures are often complex, consisting of a mix of salary, various 
allowances, periodic bonuses, overtime payments, and other forms of remuneration such as per diems” (McCoy 
et al., 2008: 675 - italics mine). The usage of ‘complex’ in this thesis is therefore in line with its first Oxford-
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dictionary definition of “consisting of many different and connected parts”. Indeed, more than other terms (such 
as, ‘multiple’ or ‘fragmented’ remuneration) which could have been valid alternatives, the term ‘complex’ stresses 
not only the multiplicity and diversity of the components of the remuneration, but also their interconnectivity (see 
Chapter 9 for a discussion of this).  
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3.3 Funding and ethics approval  
3.3.1 Funding and institutional setting of the thesis 
 
I gratefully acknowledge the funding of the Fondation AEDES (www.fondation-aedes.org), which awarded me a 
PhD scholarship. In addition, fieldwork data collection in Sierra Leone and dissemination activities were funded as 
an affiliate project of the DfID-funded ReBUILD Consortium (http://www.rebuildconsortium.com). 
 
This research was conducted in close collaboration with the ReBUILD’s core project on HWs’ incentives in Sierra 
Leone, led by Prof Sophie Witter. Particular care was taken to make sure that the two projects did not overlap, but 
complement each other. Overall, the work included in this thesis was carried out independently, under the affiliate 
project and for the purpose of this PhD thesis1. I was primarily responsible for all the stages of the research, from 
study design to data collection, analysis and writing up. Where publications are coauthored, co-authors have 
provided guidance in their roles as PhD supervisor (Dr Mylene Lagarde) and member of the PhD Advisory 
Committee (Prof. Sophie Witter). The only exception to this is the paper describing the HRH policy-making in the 
post-conflict period and setting the background to the remuneration of HWS, included in Chapter 6 (Bertone et al., 
2014). In this case, the research objectives concerning the background to the HRH policies in Sierra Leone and 
their development over the post-conflict period were the same for ReBUILD’s core and affiliate projects, and it 
was decided to carry out the study jointly. I was responsible for data collection, with support from other 
researchers at the College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences (COMAHS) in Freetown for a few key 
informant interviews, and was solely responsible for analysis and initial writing up of the article. Two COMAHS 
researchers, Dr Samai and Dr Edem-Hotah, also provided inputs into the final version of the report and, along 
with Prof. Witter, co-authored the journal article.  
 
3.3.2 Ethics approval 
 
Ethics approval for this research was granted by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Ethics 
Committee on July 18th, 2013 and from the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee on August 6th, 
2013. ReBUILD’s core project (under which the paper in Chapter 6 of this thesis was prepared) had also 
previously obtained ethics approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the Liverpool School of Tropical 
Medicine and from the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee. Letters confirming ethics approval 
are attached in Appendix 1.  
 
                                                          
1
 Because I pursued this PhD as part-time student, I did contribute to work and publications of ReBUILD’s core project as an independent 
consultant (Witter et al., 2015, 2016). 
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Written consent was sought from all participants to the different components of this research. Participants were 
first presented an information sheet detailing the purpose of the research and the reasons why they were invited 
to participate, as well as explaining the clauses of confidentiality and anonymity of the research. Any further 
questions were answered by the interviewer. The participants who agreed to take part in the study were asked to 
sign a copy of the consent form in two copies, one to be kept (which also included contact details of the 
researcher, supervisor and ethics committee) and the second for the researcher. As detailed in Chapter 5, 
participants in this research include key informants interviewed at central and district level, HWs included in the 
quantitative data collection (cohort study) and HWs who participated to in-depth interviews. Information sheets 
and consent forms for these different types of participants are attached in Appendix 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, 
respectively. 
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4. Context and study setting  
 
4.1 Socio-economic and demographic context 
 
Sierra Leone is a small country of West Africa bordering with Guinea and Liberia (Figure 4.1). Its recent history is 
characterized by a prolonged civil war which ravaged the country between 1991 and 2002. During that time, 
about 50,000 people were killed and 2 million displaced, which amounted to almost half of the population at the 
time (Smillie and Minear, 2004). The conflict paralyzed the economy and the provision of public services, and 
caused the destruction of the infrastructures and governmental institutions throughout the country. Since 2002, 
the political situation has become more stable, and the country has begun a phase of reconstruction and 
economic recovery. In 2010, the Gross National Income (GNI) was of USD 340 per capita and growth rate in 
2009 was estimated at 4.5% (World Bank, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Location of Sierra Leone in West Africa and map of Sierra Leone, detailing its districts 
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4.2 The health system in Sierra Leone 
 
In the aftermath of the conflict, the public health system was practically collapsed, with only 16% of the health 
centers still functioning by 1996, mainly in Freetown (Gberie, 2005). Since the end of the war in 2002, Sierra 
Leone has been gradually rebuilding its health system. Although health indicators had been improving over the 
post-conflict period, recent data still paint a dire picture of the health situation in the country. Between 2008-2013 
maternal mortality remained extremely high at 1,165 deaths per 100,000 live births, while under-five mortality was 
estimated at 156 per 1,000 live births and infant mortality at 92 (SSL and ICF International, 2014) (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1: Socio-economic and health indicators for Sierra Leone 
General indicators   
Total population (2010) 5,868,000* 
GNI per capita (2010) USD 340* 
Total adult literacy rate (%) (2005-2010) 41* 
Health indicators   
Life expectancy at birth (years) (2010) 47* 
Under-5 mortality rate per 1000 live births (2010) 156** 
Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births (2010) 92** 
Maternal mortality per 100,000 live births (2008, adjusted) 1,165** 
Estimated adult (15-49) HIV prevalence, (%) 2009 1.6* 
 
Source: * Unicef (http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sierraleone_statistics.html) 
              ** Demographic and Health Survey 2008-2013 (SSL and ICF International, 2014) 
 
In order to improve the health status of the population, and in particular to address the high levels of maternal and 
child mortality and make health services financially accessible, in April 2010 the Government of Sierra Leone 
introduced the Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI), which abolished user fees for serviced provided to pregnant 
and lactating women and children under five years of age (GoSL, 2009; Donnelly, 2011). A series of 
accompanying measures and reforms was triggered by the introduction of the FHCI. These reforms played a 
critical role in shaping the health system, its financing as well as the health workforce in the following years. A 
recent external evaluation of the FHCI (Witter et al., 2016a) stresses that, especially compared to other sub-
Saharan countries having introduced fee exemptions, the FHCI in Sierra Leone was designed and implemented 
with a broad rather than ‘vertical’ approach in mind, which avoided focusing solely on health financing, but was 
based on the understanding that the whole health system had to be reformed and upgraded. The results in terms 
of health output, however, are more difficult to establish, given the lack of baseline data. Overall, though, an 
improvement, in particular in child mortality, has been noted (Witter et al., 2016a).  
 
The National Health Accounts of Sierra Leone for the years 2007 to 2010 show an increase in the per capita total 
health expenditure from 60 USD in 2007 to 80 USD in 2010. In the same period, government funding went from 
5% to 7%, and donor funding from 12% to 25% (Table 4.2). This increase in expenditure was mostly driven by the 
run-up to and implementation of the FHCI. However, despite the introduction of fee exemptions, the direct 
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contribution of households to the total health expenditure, though decreased over the years, was still substantial 
in 2010 (67%) (MoHS, 2012). 
 
Table 4.2: Contribution of different financing sources to the total health expenditure, 2007 to 2010 
Financing Sources Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009 Year 2010 
Public 5% 5% 6% 7% 
Private (households) 83% 82% 69% 67% 
Private (others) 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Donors 12% 13% 24% 25% 
THE (Le. billions) 923.43 1,098.78 1,443.90 1,811.31 
THE (USD) 309,389,595.62 368,174,927.11 423,343,489.38 454,185,205.96 
THE per capita (Le.) 172,611 200,337 256,703 313,883 
THE per capita (USD) 57.83 67.13 75.26 78.71 
Source: (MoHS, 2012) – THE: Total Health Expenditure 
 
Organization of the health system  
 
The public health system in Sierra Leone is currently organized around three levels. At primary level (which is the 
focus of the analysis in this thesis), facilities are called Peripheral Health Units (PHUs). There are three types of 
PHUs: Maternal and Child Health Posts (MCHPs) are the lowest level of primary healthcare centers in the health 
system, and provide only services related to immunization and child health, delivery and maternal health, family 
planning and nutrition. They are staffed by one or two nursing aides (Maternal and Child Health/MCH Aides), who 
are the lowest cadre of qualified health professionals, with one and a half years of training. At a higher level are 
Community Health Posts (CHPs) and Community Health Centers (CHCs), which provide a broader range of 
curative services and are staffed by two cadres of non-physician clinicians (Community Health Officers/CHOs and 
the newly created cadre of Community Health Assistants/CHAs), nurses and midwives1 (State Registered 
Nurses/RNs and State Enrolled Community Health Nurses/SECHNs). Community Health Centers are the largest 
health centers of all and usually headed by CHOs, who are also responsible for supervising the Maternal and 
Child Health Posts in their area (MoHS, 2010). District hospitals in each of the districts compose the secondary 
level of care and reference hospitals in Freetown the tertiary level. In total, there are about 1,040 PHUs in Sierra 
Leone and 40 secondary and tertiary hospitals, 23 which are government-owned and the rest privately, NGO or 
faith-based owned (MoHS, 2010). 
 
Availability and distribution of health workers 
 
There are extremely few qualified HWs in Sierra Leone. The WHO estimates that there are 0.2 doctors and 1.7 
nurses and midwives every 10,000 people (WHO, 2012), while a recent study based on the Ministry of Health and 
Sanitation (MoHS) records indicates that there are 0.071 doctors and 0.631 nurses per 1,000 people in the public 
sector (Witter et al., 2016b). To add to the low numbers of human resources available, other challenges for HRH 
                                                          
1
 Note that in Sierra Leone there is currently no specific training for midwives. Midwives train as nurses and later specialize in midwifery. 
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concern the inequitable geographical distribution with major imbalances between rural and urban areas, the 
difficult working conditions and weak management system, and the low morale and demotivation of HWs at all 
levels (MoHS, 2009).  
 
The introduction of the FHCI and the accompanying measure represented an opportunity to address some of the 
HRH issues. HRH-related measures included a one-off fast-track recruitment and deployment of new HWs, a 
salary uplift for all clinical cadres of the MoHS and a payroll clean to ensure that ‘ghost’ workers were not include 
and paid. Later, in 2011-2012, a system of monitoring staff absences was introduced, as well as a performance-
based financing (PBF) scheme with funding linked to facility productivity, but a portion of which could be used for 
staff incentive, and a remote allowance for those working in rural areas. The consequence of the FHCI-related 
reforms also extended to other aspects of the health workforce challenges, beyond their remuneration. In 
particular the effects include substantial increases in number of HWs, a reduction in absenteeism and in attrition, 
and an increase in workload and outputs per HW (Witter et al., 2016b). 
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4.3 Study setting at district level 
 
The analysis at district and individual level included in this thesis was carried out in three districts of southern 
Sierra Leone: Bo, Kenema and Moyamba. The three districts were purposefully chosen in order to capture 
different levels of urbanization, poverty and type of primary facilities, as well as include variation in the presence 
of NGOs at district level, as it will be further explained in Chapters 5 and 7. 
 
Bo and Kenema towns, the main cities in each of the districts of the same name, are the second and third largest 
cities of Sierra Leone, with about 300,000 and 180,000 inhabitants, while Moyamba town is much smaller in size. 
However, it is important to note that all districts remain essentially rural, and the only urban district of Sierra 
Leone (Western Area, which includes Freetown) is not included in the analysis. The proportion of households 
living in rural areas varies from 55% in Bo, to 59% in Kenema and 92% in Moyamba (Table 4.3). Moyamba is 
also the poorest among the three districts. There is currently no paved road access and the bridge on the most 
direct road connection from Moyamba to Freetown collapsed shortly before fieldwork. While the district used to be 
crossed by the railway, since the destruction of the rail network, most of the district is cut off from trade and 
business. In contrast, Kenema and Bo are linked between them and to Freetown by one of the main highways of 
the country, which crosses Bo district and moves into Kenema until Kenema town. Both districts have more 
consistent economies than Moyamba, with diamond mining areas (in Kenema in particular) and other economic 
activities (logging, trade, agriculture).  
 
Table 4.3: Summary of socio-economic and demographic information for the three districts 
District  Area (Km2) Population  
(World Pop)* 
Poverty headcount 
 (WB and SSL, 2013)** 
Rural HH  
(WB and SSL, 
2013)** 
Kenema 6,053    569,300  62% 59% 
Bo 5,219    524,500  51% 55% 
Moyamba 6,902    320,900  71% 92% 
* Projections for 2010 based on 2004 census 
** Data from Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey 2011 
 
 
 
The public health system is much less developed in Moyamba compared to Kenema and Bo. Although this is not 
reflected in the number of primary facilities available (which is lower in Moyamba but in line with the smallest 
population), the contrast between districts is quite stark with reference to the available health workforce. Public 
HWs working at the different levels of the health systems are three times fewer in Moyamba compared to the 
other districts. In terms of health indicators, assisted deliveries are very low in Moyamba (33%) and lower than in 
the other districts. The prevalence of stunting among children under 5 is also high in all three districts, ranging 
between 34% in Moyamba to 45% in Bo. Finally, under-5 mortality is higher than the national average of 156 per 
1,000 live births, and ranges from 173 in Bo to 224 in Kenema (SSL and ICF International, 2014) (Table 4.4). 
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Table 4.4: Summary of health system information and selected health indicators for the three districts 
District  Num. of 
PHUs 
(MoHS) 
Tot num. of HWs 
(MoHS staff list 2013 
– DHTM, hospital 
and PHU staff, 
qualified and 
unqualified) 
Deliveries in a 
health facility 
(SSL and ICF 
International, 
2014) 
Under 5 mortality 
(deaths per 1,000 
live births) (SSL 
and ICF 
International, 2014) 
Nutrition (children 
under 5 years who 
are stunted) 
(SSL and ICF 
International, 2014) 
Kenema 116 1,134 77% 224 39% 
Bo 131 908 72% 173 45% 
Moyamba 99 346 33% 199 34% 
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5. Methods 
 
5.1 Study design and methods 
 
In order to explore the questions outlined in the previous chapter with relation to the complex remuneration of 
health workers, the overall research presented in this thesis is designed as a case study design, focusing on 
primary health workers in three districts of Sierra Leone. Furthermore, in most of the thesis (Chapters 7, 9 and 
10), the design takes the form of a ‘nested’ case study where sub-cases are made at district level and the 
analysis is carried out by comparing and contrasting the data and results in the three districts, to draw higher level 
conclusions, as in a multiple case study approach (Yin, 2003; Gilson et al., 2014). 
 
In terms of methodology, a variety of methods have been adopted to conduct the research. While some chapters 
(Chapters 6 and 7) make exclusive use of qualitative data, the majority of the analysis carried out for this thesis 
adopts a mixed-method approach. Methodologies that mix approaches making use of qualitative and quantitative 
methods have been increasingly adopted for social enquiry in recent years, because of the practical demands of 
that type of research (Greene, 2008). From a theoretical standpoint, a vast literature exists which reflects on the 
epistemological value of mixed-methods and the feasibility of mixing approaches that rest on opposed 
paradigmatic assumptions (usually assumed to be positivism for quantitative research versus interpretivism or 
constructivism for qualitative approaches) (Bazeley, 2002). While this literature recognizes the merit of mixed-
method approaches, it stresses that their application is as much possible and useful when the researcher is 
actively aware of such paradigmatic differences. In particular, Sale et al. (2002) argue that, while resting on 
different assumptions, quantitative and qualitative methods can be successfully combined for complementary 
purposes, rather than validation. In such cases, each method will look at close, but different phenomena, coupling 
the strength of each approach to look at similar questions. 
 
Following the pragmatic approach of Sale et al (2000), from a methodological perspective, this thesis aims to 
examine the different research questions by using the methods that are better apt to explore in depth each of 
them. In this sense, while I recognize the inherent differences of the ontological and epistemological paradigms 
underlying each quantitative and qualitative methods, I adopt a pragmatic stance focusing on choosing the most 
appropriate techniques and methods to address each research question (Richardson, 1996; Seale, 1999; Ritchie 
and Lewis, 2003). In this study, qualitative analysis is adopted to explore the background at macro (central) and 
meso (district)-level for the remuneration of HWs, while the quantitative component focuses on the individual 
HWs level (micro) in order to describe the extent of the complex remuneration phenomenon, and to analyze the 
determinants at individual, facility and district level of the remuneration structure and levels, as well as of the 
activities that HWs carry out in their productive time. At individual level, the quantitative analysis is complemented 
by qualitative information to understand the views and perspectives of HWs on their incomes and the use they 
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make of them, as well as on factors and actors that influence the activities that they perform. In this sense, I do 
not make use of one approach to validate findings from another. Rather, in line with the multiple methods 
approach (Spicer, 2011), quantitative and qualitative methods are combined in a complementary manner, and 
both inductively and deductively, to describe and investigate different phenomena that are part of the broader 
issue of HRH complex remuneration, so that findings from one approach also further illuminate the analysis of the 
other and vice versa (Sale et al., 2002). 
 
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the different data collection and analysis methods for each of the research 
components. Further details on the empirical methods can be found in each of the chapters/papers presenting the 
research findings (Chapters 6 to 10), but here I provide a lengthier description of the methods used. 
 
The overall data collection period spanned between October 2012 and May 2014. Initially, I was in Freetown for 
relatively brief visits in October 2012 and March 2013 to carry out documentary collection, a stakeholder mapping 
workshop and key informant interviews at central level (section 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3). I was then based in Freetown, 
with frequent travels to the study districts, from June to December 2013, and again from March to May 2014 for 
quantitative (section 5.3) and qualitative data collection  (section 5.2.4, 5.2.5). 
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Table 5.1: Summary of research components and methods  
  Research component 
(chapter) 
Tools used for data collection Sample Type of analysis / analytic 
frameworks 
C
en
tr
al
 le
ve
l 
Setting the background to 
HRH policies in Sierra Leone 
(Chapter 6) 
 Documentary review   57 documents 
 Policy analysis 
 
 Stakeholder mapping workshop 
 23 participants to stakeholder 
meeting  
 Key informant interviews at central level 
 23 key informant at central 
level 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
le
ve
l Exploring HRH remuneration 
practices at district level 
(Chapter 7) 
 Key informant interviews at district level  18 key informant in 3 districts  Political economy framework 
 Cross-sectional survey on HWs’ 
remuneration 
 266 HWs in 3 districts  Descriptive analysis of survey data 
In
d
iv
id
u
al
 le
ve
l 
Capturing HWs’ complex 
remuneration (Chapter 8) 
 Cross-sectional survey on HWs’ 
remuneration (direct and indirect 
questions 
 266 HWs in 3 districts  Comparison of survey and 
longitudinal data on HWs 
remunerations  Longitudinal logbooks on HWs’ 
remunerations and activities 
 266 HWs * 8 weeks 
Analyzing the complex 
remuneration of HWs  
(Chapter 9) 
 Cross-sectional survey and longitudinal 
logbooks on HWs’ remunerations 
 266 HWs in 3 districts 
 Descriptive analysis of income data 
 Multivariate regression analysis on 
income data 
 Semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 
HWs 
 39 HWs in 3 districts 
 Content framework analysis of in-
depth interviews 
Exploring the consequences 
of the complex remuneration 
on HWs’ productive activities 
(Chapter 10) 
 Longitudinal logbooks on HWs’ activities  266 HWs * 8 weeks  
 Descriptive analysis of activity data 
 Fractional multinomial logit 
regression analysis on activity data 
 Semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 
HWs 
 39 HWs in 3 districts 
 Content framework analysis of in-
depth interviews 
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5.2 Overview of methods for qualitative data collection and analysis  
 
A number of qualitative methods for data collection and analysis were adopted throughout this research, each 
with the aim of better fitting the specific research questions to be addressed. This section reports on each of them 
presenting in turn (and where relevant) the tools designed and used, the sampling or process to select 
participants/interviewees, data collection procedures and data analysis. The qualitative approaches to data 
collection included: 
 A stakeholder mapping workshop at central level 
 A documentary review 
 Semi-structured interviews with key informants at central level  
 Semi-structured interviews with key informants at district level 
 Semi-structured in-depth interviews with health workers. 
 
Additionally, a detailed field diary was kept to record direct observations during fieldwork and to make notes as 
the data collection evolved over time. While notes taken during the stakeholder mapping workshop and during all 
interviews (both with key informants and with HWs) were considered data and included in the respective coding 
and analysis, direct observations noted in the diary were rather used to provide background information and 
remind myself of key issues, and emerging themes and hypotheses as the research progressed. 
 
Data from the documentary review, stakeholder mapping workshop and key informant interviews at central level 
were used to inform the analysis of Chapter 6 of this research, on the HRH policy-making processes in Sierra 
Leone over the post-conflict period (2002-2012). Data from the key informant interviews at district level were 
analyzed for Chapter 7 of the research to explore the dynamics between those actors at district level. Finally, in-
depth interviews with HWs were used in conjunction with quantitative data for Chapter 9 on HWs’ income 
sources, and HWs’ views and perceptions on them and Chapter 10 on HWs activities and service delivery. 
 
5.2.1 Stakeholder mapping workshop at central level  
 
A half-day stakeholder mapping (SM) workshop was held in October 2012 in Freetown, at the initiative of the 
ReBUILD team working on the core project. Participants were selected and invited by COMAHS (ReBUILD 
research partner in Sierra Leone) and envisaged to comprise the representatives of the different bodies and 
agencies involved with HRH planning and regulation, both from the government and public organizations, but also 
from donors and NGOs and the private sector. The final list of participants included 23 individuals from the MoHS, 
regulatory bodies, public autonomous bodies involved in the human resource field, training institutions, 
development partners, NGOs and district medical officers (DMOs). However, development partners (donors and 
NGOs) and private and private non-for-profit sector representatives (with the exception of the Medical Council) 
were absent or poorly represented.  
Chapter 5 - Methods | 54  
 
The overall aim of the workshop was to provide a preliminary familiarization with the context and the background 
of the study setting for what concerns HRH issues, and an initial understanding of the key actors who influenced 
HRH policy and practices in Sierra Leone, as well as of how these changed over the post-conflict period (2002-
2012). Secondly, it aimed to lead to the identification of individuals (whether present at the workshop or not) who 
could be later contacted as key informants and with whom conduct in-depth interviews. Indeed, because these 
objectives were rather exploratory and descriptive, it was decided to prefer a group discussion rather than 
individual interviews which had the advantage of bringing together different perspectives and generate discussion 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). For the following steps of the data collection, individual interviews were chosen, which 
allowed for a neutral and discreet space for exchange where more sensitive issues could be disclosed. 
 
The workshop was structured similarly to a focus group discussion, where the participants were allowed to 
discuss and debate the different issues under the guidance of the facilitators (Dr Samai and Prof. Witter). I was in 
charge of note-taking during the meeting. Questions used to structure the discussion focused on (i) identifying 
current actors in relation to HRH policy and practice in Sierra Leone and exploring their roles and relationships, 
(ii) understanding the changes in these over the period since 2002, (iii) plotting the actors according to their 
perceived ‘influence’ and ‘interest’ in HRH policies and reforms (Varvasovszky, 2000). This mapping was done by 
the participants themselves based on their own perceptions, and final agreement was reached over the scores 
indicated in Figure 5.1 below. Because of the limited time available, but also because of the general difficulty of 
retrieving information for a 10-year period, the mapping was limited to the actors and their balance of influence 
and interest, at the time of the research.  
 
Because of its preliminary nature, the meeting was not recorded and therefore there is no verbatim transcription 
of the discussion to be coded and analyzed. A descriptive report of the meeting was then prepared by the team 
based on the notes taken by each of the researchers and the final mapping agreed on by the participants (Witter 
et al., 2012). 
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Figure 5.1: Plotting actors for influence and interest in HRH policy-making 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Documentary review at central level  
 
Search strategy and documents retrieved 
 
All documents included in the review were retrieved between October 2012 and March 2013, focusing on HRH 
policies, reforms and assessments during the post-conflict period, but also on other issues which had affected the 
health workforce such as the introduction of the Free Health Care Initiative, and on other documents useful to 
provide a general background to the post-conflict challenges in the health sector. The inclusion criteria were 
purposefully left very broad in order to be able to collect as much information as possible, including from sources 
such as newspapers and blogs. The search focused on documents in English, which should have not led to the 
exclusion of any relevant documents as English is the official language of Sierra Leone. As the period of interest 
covered the post-conflict time in Sierra Leone, documents dating from 2002 to 2012 (the time of the research) 
were included in the search. Because the majority of the documentation resulted to be composed by grey 
literature and unpublished reports, the main source of data collection was through contact with the MoHS in 
Freetown, donors and NGOs, researchers, technical assistants and other stakeholders both in Sierra Leone and 
in the UK. Additionally, a scoping internet search was also performed using keywords “Sierra Leone” and “human 
resources for health”, “health workforce”, “health workers”, to identify articles in peer-reviewed journals and other 
relevant grey literature publicly available, specifically targeting websites potentially archiving information on the 
topic, such as that of the African Health Workforce Observatory and of the WHO Health Workforce Department as 
well as of NGOs and organizations operating in Sierra Leone. After a first round of document search, a snowball 
technique was adopted by which documents mentioned in other documents were actively searched from the 
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source by asking to the relevant agencies and individuals. If a theme or policy seemed under-represented, new 
searches were performed.  
 
The search led to the identification of 76 documents (Appendix 3). All of these documents were important to 
provide background information on the study setting and on policy-making processes and drivers in post-conflict 
Sierra Leone. In particular, 57 of them were deemed specifically relevant for HRH issues (highlighted in bold in 
Appendix 3).  
 
The majority of the 76 documents are authored by the MoHS and the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL). 21 
documents (28%) are official policies and strategies, while 17 (22%) are informal documents of the MoHS. 12 
documents (16%) are evaluations, assessments of context, policies and technical assistance reports, and 14 
(18%) are independent studies, briefs and research articles. Only one document is by an international donor, 
defining its operational plan (Figure 5.2). In terms of the time of publication of the documentation available, there 
are very few documents covering the timeframe from 2002 to 2006, while the vast majority of publications refer to 
the period from 2009 onwards, with 54% of the documents dated 2011-2012 and 16% undated (Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.2: Type of documents retrieved by subject 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Date of publication of the documents retrieved by subject 
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It is important to stress that the search was not systematic and, despite all the care taken in collecting as much as 
possible of the relevant information, it is possible that some documents have been omitted. Moreover, most of the 
documents (such as, official policies and assessments) represent a static, end-point perspective on the 
discussions held between different actors or on the implementation of reforms, and there is a dearth of 
documents (such as minutes from meetings) which could highlight debates, discussions and processes of policy-
making. Moreover, the majority of documents analyzed were prepared by the MoHS, whilst donors and other 
stakeholders remains mostly silent in the documentary review. To address both these issues and complement the 
information gathered in the document review, a series of key informant interviews was carried out and was critical 
to fill those gaps (section 5.2.3). 
 
Analysis of the documents 
 
To analyze the documents collected, a series of ‘themes’ were pre-identified, based on the literature existing on 
the main HRH challenges (WHO, 2006, 2010) as well as on the analysis of policy-making processes and 
responses (Walt and Gilson, 1994). These themes identified were initially the same in the four countries included 
in the ReBUILD project (Sierra Leone, and also Uganda, Cambodia and Zimbabwe) where similar analyses were 
carried out. This choice was made to ensure the cross-country comparability of the findings. However, themes 
were then discussed and validated with the ReBUILD team in Freetown to ensure they reflected the specific 
context of Sierra Leone. To address the flexibility and adaptability needs, the themes were purposefully kept 
broad. This also allowed to capture the chronological dimension of HRH policy development and highlight 
changes over time, which was a key objective of the study component, for which this data was collected and 
which focuses on the background to HRH policies and policy-making processes in post-conflict Sierra Leone 
(Chapter 6). 
 
Themes and corresponding subthemes are listed in Table 5.2. All documents were read and manually coded, 
looking for reference to those themes with regards to each HRH policy discussed and implemented in Sierra 
Leone after 2002. A descriptive and intermediary summary of the findings under each of the themes and 
subthemes was then prepared (Bertone et al., 2013). 
 
Table 5.2: Themes and subthemes used for thematic analysis 
Themes Subthemes  
 
HRH context and challenges 
Recruitment challenges 
Changes  to 
these 
challenges 
since 2002  
Distribution challenges 
Retention challenges 
Performance challenges (pay, motivation, 
management, etc.) 
 
 
Policy responses 
Policy objectives and approaches  
For each of 
the policy 
responses 
Drivers of change 
Implementation of policies 
Financing of policies 
Impacts  
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5.2.3 Key informant interviews at central level  
 
In order to complement the information gathered through the document review and the initial stakeholder 
mapping workshop, it was deemed important to carry out a series of in-depth interviews with actors who played a 
key role in the development and implementation of HRH policies and reforms in Sierra Leone, at different times of 
the post-conflict period. Interviews were preferred to group discussions as they allowed more privacy and comfort 
for respondents to provide more frank and open answers to sensitive topics (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003), such as 
those reflecting the dynamics of power between actors and institutions, as well as the attitudes and behaviors of 
individuals involved, which may have proved influential drivers of change. 
 
Selection of key informants and interviews 
 
23 key informants were interviewed between October 2012 and June 2013. Initially, a preliminary list of relevant 
key individuals was drafted based on the stakeholder mapping meeting and contextual knowledge. Subsequently, 
a snow-balling technique was used to identify further informants, based on the suggestions of those who had 
already been interviewed. The aim of the sample was to be as comprehensive as possible and include the 
highest number of key stakeholders, given the availability of the interviewees and the time frame of the research. 
As much as possible, the selection of the interviewees also reflected the need, in order to address one of the 
limits of the document review, to include actors and views from outside of the government representatives. The 
challenge here was represented by the fact that many of those actors had moved outside of Sierra Leone by the 
time of the research and could not be reached. Indeed, for this reason, two interviews were carried out outside of 
Sierra Leone (one in the UK and the other by telephone), while most of the others (19) were done in Freetown, 
whilst 2 were conducted at district level. Of the 23 interviewees, 12 of the interviewees work or worked at the 
MoHS or with other governmental agencies. 6 NGO representatives were interviewed, along with 4 donor 
representatives and 1 Technical Assistant (TA) (Figure 5.4). I carried out 18 of the key informant interviews at 
central level, while the remaining 5 were carried out by other members of the ReBUILD team. 
 
The interviews were semi-structured and a topic guide was prepared for use across all of the ReBUILD project 
countries and adapted for use in Sierra Leone (Appendix 4). Moreover, for what concerns the interviews I carried 
out personally, the guide was continuously adapted from one interview to the next to allow for the exploration of 
emerging themes. Overall, the questions were sequenced in chronological order. Participants were asked about 
the HRH context in the immediate post-conflict period and the challenges that they faced. They were then asked 
about the policy responses to these challenges and what effects these had on the health system. Finally, they 
were asked to share any lessons learned from their experience and whether they had any recommendations for 
the future. As the interviews progressed and also based on the documentary review, more specific themes 
emerged and the interviews were tailored to reflect those, as well as the specific background and period of 
experience of the key informant. 
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Figure 5.4: Summary of characteristics of key informants interviewed 
 
 
Analysis and triangulation of information  
 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed for thematic analysis, and themes were manually mapped to highlight 
pattern in the key informants responses and allow interpretation. The list of themes used for coding was the same 
as for the documentary data collection (Table 5.2). This choice was made because the three tools described so 
far (e.g. stakeholder mapping workshop, documentary review and key informant interviews at central level) were 
all used to inform the first component of this research, focused on analyzing the HRH policies and policy-making 
processes at central (macro) level in post-conflict Sierra Leone (research objective 1). Adopting the same 
thematic codes for the analysis of documents and interviews allowed to systematically triangulate the information 
retrieved from both and ensure that the two methodologies were used in a complementary manner, helpful in 
improving our understanding of the processes of policy-making and the perspectives of different actors. 
Additionally, information was triangulated not only between methods, but also between different sources, i.e. by 
comparing the responses of different actors on the same issue or question (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Flick, 2006).  
 
A separate report was prepared to describe the findings of the interview analysis, which closely builds on those of 
the previous document review and start delineating the main emerging themes and issues (Bertone and Witter, 
2013). Subsequently, the findings from the three tools were brought together, through constant comparison and 
triangulation, in the research paper presented in Chapter 6 (Bertone et al., 2014), which provides a chronological 
narration of the policy-making trajectory (the ‘policy story’), but also a higher analytical level in the understanding 
of the patterns and drivers of such trajectory in the post-conflict setting. 
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5.2.4 Key informant interviews at district level 
 
In order to inform the second research question on the HRH remuneration practices at district level and the 
political economy dynamics which re-shape them, a series of key informant interviews was carried out at district 
level. Although, initially, data collection at district level was planned to only provide general background 
information, the exploration of the dynamics at that level was then turned into an autonomous research question 
because of the importance they appeared to have (based on direct observation and the first interviews) in 
shaping the translation of the policies designed at central level into implemented practices. 
 
Selection of key informants and interviews 
 
At district level, 18 key informant interviews were carried out during the first visit in the study districts (September 
2014), with members of each of the District Health Medical Teams (DHMTs) and staff of donors, international and 
local NGOs active in the districts (Figure 5.5). The selection of the participants aimed to be as comprehensive as 
possible and include most, if not all, of the actors involved in the health sector at local level. In order to identify the 
interviewees outside of the DHTMs and among the external partners, two main strategies were used: the first 
based on the information retrieved from the MoHS at central level on the NGOs operating at district level 
(although not updated), and the second through a list of contacts provided by the DHMT staff (e.g. participant list 
to District meetings, etc.). Despite the attempt to reach a comprehensive representation of the main actors 
involved in the health sector and specifically on HRH issues, one of the major NGOs in the district of Bo was not 
included as they were not available for interviewing at district level, although information on its operations was 
collected in an interview with its representative at central level and from secondary sources, as well as 
triangulated during interviews with actors working in the same district. Moreover, key actors such as Members of 
Parliament and politicians, civil society members and representatives of Local Councils, who have some authority 
over health issues under the ongoing decentralisation process, were not interviewed, nor private and informal 
providers of healthcare which also influence the incentives in the public system were included. This remains a 
limitation of the study, as explained in Chapter 7. 
 
Figure 5.5: Characteristics of key informants at district level 
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A semi-structured topic guide was adopted to carry out the interviews (Appendix 5). The focus was initially on a 
description of the interviewee’s organization, particularly in regards of any activities on HRH or which entailed 
direct payments to HWs. A second set of questions concerned how the organization defined it priorities and took 
and implemented decisions, for example, on the HRH-related activities to support, fund and/or organize. The 
topic guide was used flexibly and was iteratively adapted to the emerging issues and themes after each of the 
interviews. In particular, issues about conflicting priorities between actors at local level and the asymmetry of 
power became  relevant and frequent in many of the informants’ narratives, so that the second part was 
expanded accordingly, by asking question on the relationship between actors, the fora of discussion at district 
level, etc. 
 
Data analysis 
 
The analysis of the transcribed interviews was structured using a political economy framework, based on that 
proposed by Harris (2013), but adapted to reflect the fact that my analysis was not driven by a pre-identified 
problem, but rather exploratory in scope. The framework (Figure 5.6) focuses on the dynamic interactions 
between the structural features of context and institutions and the agency features. Context is considered as 
encompassing historical, cultural and geographical features, while institutions are the formal and informal ‘rules of 
the game’ (e.g., policies, regulations and social norms) that govern the interactions between actors. On the other 
hand, agency features relates to the main actors and their power, incentives and behaviors, as well as to the 
analytical concepts that may explain actors' decision logics and behaviors (Harris, 2013). This framework was 
chosen because it offers a practical approach to exploring a set of pre-identified elements and dimensions which 
can shed light onto the political economy dynamics between actors, but also explore elements of the context that 
can influence those dynamics. Moreover, it allowed freedom to choose an analytical concept that well fits the 
issue at stake and the conceptual framework I had already developed.  
 
During the analysis process, the elements of the framework were used to organize and interpret the data 
collected at district level. As described in Chapter 7 (Bertone and Witter, 2015), the framework was specifically 
applied to the issue of the complex remuneration of HWs with the aim of exploring the factors that contribute to 
determining it at district level. To do so, the application of the framework focuses on (i) describing the structural 
features of the socio-economic context of the three districts and their history, especially for what concerns the 
conflict and post-conflict phase, (ii) analyzing the institutions that regulate the HRH incentive package, both 
formal (e.g. the official HRH policies defined at central level) and informal, which are the HW’s remuneration 
practices introduced at local level, such as per diem payments, (iii) describing the actors present in each of the 
districts which are relevant to the analysis (District Health Management Teams and NGOs), and their agendas 
and motivations, (iv) exploring their relationships and discussion fora, and the balance of power, and finally (v) 
analyzing the decision logics of the actors using an analytical concept. In line with the conceptual framework 
presented in Chapter 3, the analytical tool applied was agency theory. As discussed in details in Chapter 7 
Chapter 5 - Methods | 62  
(Bertone and Witter, 2015), the analysis found two interrelated sets of principal-agent relations (between DHMTs 
and Ministry of Health and between NGOs and their funders), each ridden with its specific problems.  
 
Figure 5.6: Analytical framework to explore the political economy dynamics at local level 
 
Source: Adapted from Harris (2013) 
 
5.2.5 In-depth interviews with HWs at individual level  
 
The final research component, which explores the complex remuneration of HWs at individual level, makes use in 
terms of qualitative data of the information collected through a series of in-depth interviews with HWs in the 
primary facilities of the three study districts, which complements the quantitative data collected at the same level 
(described in section 5.3). Interviews were carried out both to explore the views of HWs on their remunerations, 
their income use and financial coping strategies, and how these affect their motivation (research question 4), as 
well as to investigate the possible links between remunerations and/or other factors, and activities performed 
(research question 5). 
 
Selection of HWs interviewed 
 
The in-depth interview with HWs took place in two rounds. First, during the second field visit, in October and 
November 2013, 15 in-depth interviews were carried out. Another round of 24 interviews with HWs was carried 
out in March-April 2014, for a total of 39 interviews. HWs were selected purposefully as a sub-sample of those 
included in the survey (see section 5.3.1 for the description of the HWs sampling for quantitative data collection) 
and to reflect a wide variety of views and situations in terms of cadre, but also rural/urban, male/female, type of 
facility, in-charge/staff and district, and to be in line with the mix of health workers in the districts. Table 5.3 
summarizes the key characteristics of the sample of HWs interviewed.  
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Table 5.3: Characteristics of respondent sample for qualitative data collection 
 
CHO 
(n= 4) 
CHA + Nurse 
(n= 10) 
MCH Aide 
(n= 25) 
Total 
(n= 39) 
Gender   
Male 4 3 - 11 
Female - 7 25 28 
 Age (mean) 32.5 47 40.4 41.3 
Type of facility   
CHC 4 5 4 13 
CHP - 4 3 7 
MCHP - 1 18 19 
Location     
Urban 3 6 4 13 
Rural 1 4 21 26 
District     
Bo 3 1 8 12 
Kenema - 4 9 13 
Moyamba 1 5 8 14 
 
 
Structure of the in-depth interviews 
 
The approach to the interviews was kept purposefully flexible and open to allow capturing as much as possible 
the HWs’ own voices and perspectives. The tools were iteratively adjusted after each interview to focus on the 
issues that emerged as more relevant in the views of the HWs (Appendix 6). In particular, after a first round of 
interviews, the topic guides was substantially revised to reflect the context at it emerged from the HWs’ narratives 
and the HWs’ challenges in terms of remunerations and coping strategies (Chapter 9), as well as their views on 
service delivery practices and activity choices (Chapter 10). In order to start the conversation with the HWs, 
different documents available in the facilities were used, such as the facility schedule which defines the weekly 
working routine of HWs and is often taped to the facility walls, the visitor book, which records all the actors visiting 
the facility and the purpose of their visits, or the logbooks reporting activities and incomes which HWs were asked 
to fill in for this research (section 5.3.2). HWs could interrupt the interviews if they needed to take care of their 
work or other issues, and interviews resumed once done. 
 
Interviews were carried out in English, or in a mix of English and local Krio, as most HWs speak basic English, 
but often mix it with the lingua franca of Sierra Leone. I carried out all interviews in person, with the help of one of 
the enumerators who would translate in the rare occasions when the HW and I could not perfectly understand 
each other. The interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed and translated (where needed) by the 
enumerators. 
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Analysis of the HWs interviews 
 
Qualitative interviews were manually analysed using content framework analysis (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003), which 
allows for more flexibility than the analysis by themes adopted for the key informant interviews. While for those I 
used pre-identified codes, here the coding was more inductively-defined, reviewed iteratively multiple times and 
grounded in the emerging accounts of the HWs. The analysis of the transcripts was carried out twice, once 
focusing on HWs’ income to inform the studies included in Chapter 9 of this research and the second focusing on 
the actors and factors influencing service delivery which informed Chapter 10. In both cases, the process followed 
these steps: 
 
 Familiarization with the interviews by printing out the transcripts and reading over both transcripts and field 
notes taken during each interviews. 
 Development of an initial coding framework. At this stage, the codes remained mostly conceptual (based on 
previously identified key issues) and descriptive, such as the categories of incomes. 
 First manual coding of the data (both transcripts and field notes) using different color-codes and making 
notes on the print-outs. 
 Iterative revision of the coding framework until finalized (Appendix 7). 
 Final coding of all interviews and notes. 
 Preparation of a thematic chart, by sorting and charting the relevant data and quotes so that similar themes 
are located together in a matrix. Thematic charts were prepared in Excel table, using a different row for each 
HW interviewed and a different column from each code identified in the coding framework. They were then 
printed out in tables of 6x4 and 3x3 A4 sheets.  
 Summarize and synthetize by coloring and linking issues and themes in the thematic chart in order to identify 
patterns and interpret data. 
 
As further explained in the relevant findings chapters, qualitative data were explored in complementarity to 
quantitative data, in a deductive and inductive way, i.e. both to complement and further explore issues emerging 
from quantitative analysis. Different approaches, among those identified in the literature, have been adopted in 
order to ensure the validity of data interpretation (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Anderson, 2010). Throughout the 
analysis, ‘constant comparison’ was employed, by which each of the HWs interviews (and the themes emerging 
from them) are compared with those of the other HWs, rather than taken on their own. Specific attention was paid 
to deviant cases potentially emerging from the analysis in order to generate new hypotheses and explore whether 
there are systematic differences between ‘regular’ and ‘deviant’ cases. The use of source triangulation was 
limited as there was only one source of qualitative information. Methods triangulation was carried out when 
possible, exclusively focusing on cross-checking descriptive or quantitative elements of the HWs’ interviews (e.g., 
demographic information on the HW, income levels) and to complement and strengthen the interpretation of the 
HWs’ narratives. 
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Reflexivity on my position, experience and background was exercised throughout interviews and analysis, in 
order to actively reflect on how these factors could have influenced both my interpreting of the HWs’ narratives, 
as well as the HWs’ responses to questions asked by an outsider. The presence of a local enumerator during all 
interviews, with whom a debrief was carried out after each interviews, allowed to partially bridge some of the 
cultural gaps in understanding and to pick up specific subtleties that would otherwise have gone unnoticed. On 
the other hand, being viewed as an outsider, unlikely to have future contacts with the HW or to report their 
practices to hierarchical superiors, may have represented an advantage in ensuring the openness of the accounts 
(Walt et al., 2008).   
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5.3 Overview of methods for quantitative data collection  
 
In this section, details are provided about the sampling, tools and procedures for the quantitative data obtained at 
HW individual level. Much attention is given to the data collection rather than the analysis carried out, as the latter 
is explained in each of the chapters/papers presenting the research findings (Chapters 6 to 10). 
 
5.3.1 Sampling of HWs 
 
In terms of quantitative data collection, this thesis made use of a cross-sectional survey on the incomes of the 
HWs as well as of self-reported longitudinal data on both incomes and activities of the same HWs. 
 
As mentioned before, the three districts of Bo, Kenema and Moyamba were purposefully chosen as study sites to 
allow for variation in number of NGOs present, as well as level of poverty, urbanization, and type of facilities – 
elements which were hypothesized to have an impact on the remunerations of HWs. Within each district, a 
random sample of 66 primary healthcare facilities were selected, for a total of 198 facilities out of the 346 existing 
in the three districts. The sample included all types of primary healthcare facilities or Peripheral Health Units 
(PHUs) in Sierra Leone, i.e. Community Health Centers (CHCs), Community Health Posts (CHPs) and Maternal 
and Child Health Posts (MCHPs). Sampling was conducted at facility level and not at individual HW level, 
because of the lack of reliable HW lists with updated posting. However, this type of sampling may have led to a 
selection bias as only those present in the facility on the day of the survey were included. Within each facility, 
enumerators selected 1 HWs (in MCHPs) or 2 workers (in CHCs and CHPs) who were clinically qualified and 
available on the day of the survey. “In-charges” (i.e. managers of facilities), if present, were interviewed before 
other qualified cadres. Clinically qualified cadres to be selected included two cadres of non-clinician physicians: 
Community Health Officers (CHOs) and Community Health Assistants (CHAs), two cadres of nurses and 
midwives: Registered Nurses (RN) and State Enrolled Community Health Nurses (SECHN), and a cadre of 
nursing aides: Maternal and Child Health Aides (MCHA).  
 
The decision to include only primary HWs in health centers, and therefore exclude all those working in hospitals 
as well as non-qualified Community Health Workers (CHWs) and Traditional Birth Assistants (TBAs) was made 
because the research aimed to specifically focus on the clinically-qualified staff as well as on those providing 
services directly to patients at primary level. This selection was also done to limit the type of cadres in the survey 
as that was envisaged to increase the power of the analysis (i.e. by avoiding to create many categories with few 
HWs sampled for each). In particular, the focus on in-charges within each facility and on CHOs and MCH Aides 
(usually in-charge of CHCs/CHPs and MCHPs, respectively) was based on the early findings from ReBUILD’s 
Health Worker Incentive Survey (HWIS) which had shown that those are the HWs for which the complex 
remuneration is more relevant (see section 5.3.2 for further detail). 
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Based on this selection process, the sample of healthcare facilities and HWs identified as described above should 
have led to the inclusion of 297 HWs. A total of 268 HWs were interviewed (Table 5.4), although the entries for 
two HWs were later dropped because of the high level of missing information The characteristics of the sample of 
HWs used for quantitative analysis are reported in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.4: Sampling frame and actual sample of individual HWs 
 District   
HWs in  
CHC+CHP 
HWs in 
MCHP Total 
Bo sampling frame              66  33       99  
actual sample                65  31        96  
Kenema 
 
sampling frame               66  33  99  
actual sample  59                       32 91  
Moyamba 
 
sampling frame               66  33  99  
actual sample                50  31  81  
Total 
 
sampling frame     297  
actual sample      268  
 
 
Table 5.5: Characteristics of final respondent sample after quantitative data collection 
  
CHO 
(n= 30) 
 CHA+Nurse 
(n= 76) 
 MCH Aide 
(n= 160) 
 Total 
(n= 266) 
Statistical 
Significance of 
difference in 
proportions / means 
Test used 
Gender  
Male 73% 42% - 20% p<0.0001 Chi2 
Female 27% 58% 100% 80% 
 Age (mean) 41.4 40.8 40.9 41 p=0.946 Bonferroni 
Role in facility      
p<0.0001 
 
Chi2 In-charge 90% 67% 49% 59% 
Staff 10% 33% 51% 41% 
Type of facility  
CHC 97% 51% 16% 35%  
p<0.0001 
 
 
Chi2 
CHP - 42% 29% 30% 
MCHP 3% 7% 55% 35% 
Location  
Urban 30% 32% 21% 25% p=0.106 Chi2 
Rural 70% 68% 79% 75% 
District  
Bo 60% 30% 34% 36%  
p=0.020 
 
Chi2 Kenema 20% 44% 32% 34% 
Moyamba 20% 26% 34% 30% 
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5.3.2 Design of data collection tools  
 
Two tools were used to collect quantitative data at individual HW level: 
 A cross-sectional survey on remunerations  
 A self-administered longitudinal logbook on remunerations and activities  
 
Copies of each of these tools are in Appendices 8 and 9. The tools were used to inform the analysis of Chapters 
8 and 9 on the HWs complex remuneration and Chapter 10 on the activities that HWs perform. Quantitative data 
on HWs remunerations were also partially used for Chapter 7 to highlight the effects that the dynamics between 
actors at district level have on HWs’ incomes. 
 
Cross-sectional survey on HWs’ remunerations 
 
The design of the income questionnaire was based on an adaptation of the Health Worker Incentive Survey 
(HWIS) developed by the Immpact project to collect data on HWs’ remuneration in Ghana, Indonesia and Burkina 
Faso (Immpact Project, 2007). The HWIS tool was also administered to HWs in Sierra Leone by the ReBUILD’s 
core project (Witter et al., 2015, 2016)1. In the case of the ReBUILD’s study, the sample of HWs included all 
cadres and all facility types, rather than only primary healthcare workers which were chosen in this study, and the 
research was carried out in different districts (Western Area, Kenema, Bonthe and Koinadugu). The experience 
with ReBUILD’s HWIS was essential to identify mistakes and lessons, and improve the sampling strategy and 
actual survey questionnaire used in this thesis. 
 
A key finding from the HWIS carried out by ReBUILD concerned the tool itself which was considered too long and 
cumbersome to administer. Therefore, for the tool used in this thesis, care was taken to simplify it avoiding to ask 
questions not strictly necessary for this research and which had led to a low response rate for the ReBUILD 
survey. In particular, the sections on (i) households’ income and consumption, (ii) HWs’ workload and (iii) 
perceptions of HWs on motivating factors, benefits of training, changes in their work life since the war and their 
plans for the future, were not included in the cross-sectional survey for this study. Concerning the questions on 
incomes, which remained the cornerstone of the survey tool, only information about amounts earned for per 
diems and non-health activities, rather than including extra details (e.g. changes to income in the last three years, 
location of the private practice or type of non-health activity, etc.) as done in ReBUILD’s HWIS.  
 
Finally, the HWIS tool used by ReBUILD’s core project did not include questions on amounts earned from (i) gifts 
and payments from patients and (ii) sale of drugs and other items with in the facility. Those incomes are 
considered particularly sensitive because they are earned from illegal activities and HWs tend to underestimate or 
                                                          
1
 I was involved as research consultant in the design, training, piloting and analysis for the HWIS carried out by ReBUILD’s core project, 
and I co-authored a report and academic publication including HWIS data. 
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not declare any earnings from them (Roenen et al., 1997). The choice of not including them in the ReBUILD’s 
questionnaire had been made in order to avoid normative answers and to avoid creating tension between 
enumerator and HW during the interview. For the present study, however, it was important to have an estimate as 
complete as possible of all the formal and informal incomes of HWs. Therefore, in order to increase the changes 
of obtaining a reliable response for sensitive incomes2, questions concerning the amounts earned from them 
were asked through indirect questions. Indirect questioning techniques have been introduced precisely to improve 
the accuracy of answers to sensitive questions. There are numerous techniques and designs, based on the 
properties of statistical distributions and probability, to allow the respondent to conceal the true answer even to 
the enumerator, thereby maintaining complete confidentiality. One of these approaches is the Randomized 
Response Technique (RRT). It was first proposed by Warner (1965) and has been used to explore sensitive 
questions on health-related issues, such as alcohol and drug use (Striegel et al., 2010; Dietz et al., 2013), 
abortion (Chow et al., 1979), sexual behavior (Williams and Suen, 1994), etc. A variant of the RRT makes use of 
a randomizing device (for example, a die), to conceal the response, by asking respondents to add or multiply their 
actual response by a randomly drawn number resulted of the die (Jamison and Karlan; Greenberg et al., 1971; 
Pollock and Bek, 1976). Because the average die roll is known to the researcher, it is possible to calculate the 
average response for the sample by subtracting/dividing the average results by the average die roll. Several 
studies have been carried out to compare responses elicited with direct and indirect questioning, including a 
meta-analysis of 42 studies (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005b). This analysis shows that randomized response 
results in more valid population estimates than direct answer. Moreover, RRT proves more valid as the sensitivity 
of the topic increases (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a). On the other hand, RRT presents some disadvantages: it 
is less efficient than direct questioning designs, as estimates need to be drawn from larger samples to maintain 
statistical power (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005a), and some of the designs may be complex to administer, inspire 
limited trust and face a strong false response bias (Lensvelt-Mulders and Boeije, 2003; Coutts and Jann, 2011).  
 
Based on these reflections, the cross-sectional questionnaire used for this research was administered face-to-
face to HWs and designed to include direct questions on (i) demographic and basic personal information of the 
respondents (i.e., gender, age, marital status, district of work and district of origin, type of facility s/he is working 
in, qualification, cadre, role within the facility), as well as information on facility characteristics (i.e., type of facility, 
remoteness level, district); and (ii) on the following individual incomes of the respondents: salary (amounts 
received and date), remote allowance, individual PBF bonus, share of the user fees charged for non-exempted 
services and redistributed to staff, salary supplementations (e.g., top-ups from NGOs or other organizations), per 
diems (usually called Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) in Sierra Leone), earnings from income-generating 
activities (IGA) outside the health sector. In the third section, an adapted version of the RRT was implemented to 
elicit response to quantitative questions on amounts earned for the most sensitive remunerations. Indirect 
                                                          
2
 For this study it was decided to consider as sensitive incomes (estimated using indirect questioning) not only (i) gifts and payments from 
patients, (ii) sale of drugs and other items, but also (iii) private practice, as the direct question of ReBUILD’s HWIS had resulted in a very 
low response rate for the question on earnings from private practice. 
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questions referred to: gifts and payments received in kind or cash from patients, sale of drugs and other items 
within the health facility, private practice (i.e., provision of health services outside of the facility). In practice, HWs 
were asked to roll a purposefully-built die without letting the enumerator know the result. The die was built so that 
each face would show a figure in the same order of magnitude of plausible remunerations, so that adding the 
result to the actual remuneration would effectively mask the real amount (Figure 5.6). Once seen the result of the 
die, HWs were asked to add the result to the actual amount of remuneration received last month (a calculator was 
provided for this purpose). This same process was repeated for each of the three sensitive incomes. 
 
Figure 5.7: Adapted dice used for indirect questioning 
 
 
 
 
Self-administered longitudinal logbook on remunerations and activities 
 
In order to collect information on which activities the HWs undertake daily and how much time they dedicate to 
different tasks, several options were considered. The literature on time use and workload measurement points to 
different techniques to collect this type of information, which are summarized, alongside their advantages and 
drawbacks in Table 5.6. Hybrid tools can also be devised, for example, by coupling logbooks with end-line 
interviews or with survey questionnaires (Department of Health, 2006). 
 
Table 5.6: Approaches to the measurement of time use of health workers 
Method Description Advantages Disadvantages 
Observational studies 
 
Time and motion 
(TM) studies 
 A trained observer follows a 
health worker and records all 
his activities in a period of 
time (day, shift, etc.). 
 Activities may be pre-listed in 
groups (Bryant and 
Essomba, 1995). 
 The ‘gold standard’ method 
 Very reliable and accurate 
information 
 
 
 
 Costly in terms of financial and 
human resources  limits to the 
sample size 
 Potential observer bias 
 Potential “Hawthorn effect” (i.e., 
because the observer is present, 
the subjects modify their 
behavior). However, some studies 
show that if the observation is 
sufficiently long this effect should 
disappear (Westbrook et al., 
2011). 
  Activities to be observed are  Reliable and accurate  For statistical accuracy, it requires 
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Activity sampling or 
work sampling 
selected at random points in 
time 
information  many subjects and a large amount 
of time for observations 
Self-reports 
 
Retrospective self-
administered 
questionnaire (SAQ) 
 Filled in at the end of the day 
or week by the health worker 
(Valadez et al., 1990)  
 Can be more or less 
structured. A structured 
questionnaire with a pre-
categorized list of activities 
helps focusing on the 
specific research questions 
and saves time during the 
analysis, but limits the detail 
of information received 
(Corti, 1993). 
 Could be coupled with end-line 
(semi-structured) interviews to 
check completeness of entries 
and clarify, validate, 
corroborate the information 
(Corti, 1993). 
 Cheap and not too time 
consuming for the researcher 
 Particularly useful to analyze a 
specific, narrow question/task, 
when reasons to misreport are 
weak, and/or the question is 
framed in such a way to avoid 
misreporting 
 Recall bias 
 Errors in reporting due to low 
accuracy and forgetfulness 
 Low truthfulness as people may 
be tempted to provide “normative 
desirable answers” (Jacobs, 1998)  
 Relatively time consuming for the 
responded  
 
 
Prospective 
timesheet or 
logbook 
 
 Activities recorded as they 
are performed, or right after 
 Can be more or less 
structured (see above) 
 No recall bias – however, in 
practice, people often do not 
fill in the logbook during the 
day, but leave it for the end of 
it  
 Could be coupled with end-line 
interviews (see above) 
 Relatively cheap and not too 
time consuming 
 Useful for narrow research 
question (see above) 
 Errors in reporting due to low 
accuracy and forgetfulness 
 “First day effect” as respondents 
change their behavior precisely 
because they are recording it (a 
sort of Hawthorne effect) (Corti, 
1993). 
 Very time consuming for the 
responded  requires some “buy-
in” and interest in the research 
(Pitt et al., 2009) 
 
Retrospective 
interviews 
 Field data collectors 
interview HWs at the end of 
a period (day or shift) and 
ask about activities 
performed. 
 May require less buy-in than 
SAQ and logbooks, as it is 
usually easier to reply to 
questions rather than fill in a 
questionnaire 
 Recall bias and low accuracy (see 
above) 
 Costlier and more time consuming 
than SAQ or logbooks, as skilled 
interviewers are required 
Source: adapted from (Bratt et al., 1999; Pitt et al., 2009) 
 
 
Pitt et al. (2009) offer a useful checklist to assist researchers in defining which technique could be the most 
suitable. They suggest considering the following factors: 
 the level of details needed to answer the research question: how many and what type of activities are to be 
observed? Can they be grouped into categories?  
 the available resources: time of both fieldworkers and participants, funding, availability of skilled fieldworkers 
 potential for bias: what are the likely sources of bias? Which method is suited to reduce them? Are the 
activities observed many or few? sensitive or not? prone to misreporting bias? Prone to observation bias? 
Could the ‘Hawthorn effect’ represent a problem? 
 the buy-in of participants (when buy-in is higher, misreporting should decrease).  
 
In the case of primary HWs in Sierra Leone, the hypotheses to be tested concerned the potential effects of the 
complex remuneration on HWs activities, and in particular the possibility that payments would cause HWs to 
spend more time on disease/service-specific tasks or outside the facilities. Therefore, the level of detail required 
was considered not extremely high and information not too sensitive or complex. For this reason, and also given 
the resources available and time and skills of enumerators, a self-administered daily logbook was chosen over 
observational approaches, despite its disadvantages in terms of misclassification and reporting bias. Additionally, 
a structured end-line interview was included during the last visit to check completeness, clarify and validate 
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information of the logbook entries (Corti, 1993). The end-line interview took the form of a weekly summary sheet 
which the enumerators completed together with the HW, by checking the information and summarizing the 
amounts earned and the activities undertaken each week, in a standardized way using pre-defined categories3. 
 
Logbooks given to the HWs were A5-format booklets. Each page referred to one day of the week (Monday to 
Sunday) and contained a list of all day hours, and two blank columns: one to be filled with the activities 
undertaken and second one with the amounts received. Indeed, critically, it was decided to also ask for the 
remunerations received during the week via the logbook. This choice allowed me to have a second estimate of 
incomes, which may be less subject to recall bias. In particular, it was hypothesized that the logbook measure 
would have been more reliable for irregular incomes linked to particular activities (e.g. income received for 
occasional private practice or non-health activities, income from sale of drugs or other items,  gifts from patients, 
per diems, etc.), which can be more easily forgotten over time.  
 
Logbooks were to be filled in daily for a prospective period of 8 weeks and sufficient copies were left with the 
HWs. This length was chose to balance the concern of HWs fatigue over time and potential loss-to-follow-up, with 
the necessity of having a time period long enough to allow capturing variability in incomes over time and include 
at least one full monthly cycle. 
 
5.3.3 Procedures for quantitative data collection and data entry 
 
Ten local enumerators were selected and trained in Freetown to carry out the data collection. First, quantitative 
tools were piloted in Freetown (Western Area district) over a week in early September 2013 and their formatting 
slightly revised after feedback from participants and enumerators. Quantitative data collection was carried out 
between September and November 2013 in the three districts, starting from facilities in Kenema, then Bo and 
lastly Moyamba. The fieldwork was organized in three rounds of visits to the facilities (Figure 5.7) and the same 
enumerator returned to visit the same HW three times. This approach was chosen as it was considered to 
increase the trust and understanding of the HWs and therefore potentially increase the reliability of their answers. 
During the first visit, the enumerators administered the cross-sectional survey, including both direct and indirect 
questions. They also introduced the logbooks, providing the necessary explanations to the HWs and leaving with 
them enough copies to be filled in over the following weeks. A second visit was planned to collect the logbooks 
already filled in, check on the progress, encourage the HWs to continue completing the logbook and correct 
potential mistakes, and a third one to collect the remaining logbooks and fill in the end-line summary. 
Enumerators also regularly called and texted HWs to remind them of the importance of filling in the logbooks, 
answer their queries and agree on the timing of the visit to the facility. 
                                                          
3
 The categories of activity include: general clinical activities; general administrative work; disease/service specific clinical activities; 
disease/service specific administrative work; meeting within facility; outreach; meeting outside facility; training, workshop, etc.; private 
practice; non-health activities that generate income.  
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Each round of data collection would last about two weeks in the field, followed by a week or two in Freetown. 
During the time in Freetown, enumerators entered the data collected up to that time. Double-data entry using 
EpiInfo and careful reconciliation of the databases was carried out for all data. Additionally, a focus group 
discussion with the enumerators was held after the first round of data collection to reflect on the experience of 
administering the indirect questionnaire, which involved an innovative technique and the use of a die. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Timeline of activities in the field, by district 
 
Note: pink triangles represent the time of the visit to HWs in that province  
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6. Setting the background to HRH policies in Sierra Leone 
 
6.1 Preface 
 
Part II of the thesis will present the empirical findings of this research, moving from the central (macro) level 
(Chapter 6), on to the district (meso) level (Chapter 7) and finally to the individual HWs (micro) level (Chapters 8-
10). The analyses at central and district level allow to explore the overall context, processes and dynamics that 
defines the HRH incentives. The also identify the key factors that shape HRH incentives, both at design and 
implementation stage. A thorough understanding of the environment at macro and meso level and of how it 
contributes to set the HWs payment structure and levels, and potentially gives rise to the complex remuneration 
phenomenon, is necessary to build on for the following chapters, focused on the analysis of the remuneration at 
individual level and of its consequences for HWs. 
 
The present chapter (Chapter 6) consists in a research paper which looks at how the HRH policies defining the 
set of incentives available to HWs in Sierra Leone were developed during the years that span along the post-
conflict period, from 2002 to 2012. The paper explores how such policies evolved over time, and examines the 
policy trajectory and its drivers, in terms of actors, evolving context and processes. Although its central focus 
concerns the timing of the reforms and the existence of a post-conflict ‘window of opportunity’ for change, the 
analysis carried out is particularly useful and instrumental to this thesis in order to provide a detailed context and 
to set the background to HRH policies. It aims to identify the policies and reforms which defined the HRH 
incentive package, and allows for a better understanding of how and why they were introduced, as well as of the 
details of their design as envisaged at central level.  
 
A key element that emerges from the article, which is essential to build on for the following analysis, concerns the 
efforts of harmonization and alignment of the design of HRH incentive package that ware undertaken, by 
government and donors in the wake of the introduction of the Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI), in 2009-2010. 
Chapter 7 will examine in more details the actual implementation of the reforms designed at central level, and 
highlight the challenges as well as the HRH incentive practices emerging at district level. 
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A window of opportunity for reform in post-conflict
settings? The case of Human Resources for Health
policies in Sierra Leone, 2002–2012
Maria Paola Bertone1*, Mohamed Samai2, Joseph Edem-Hotah2 and Sophie Witter3
Abstract
Background: It is recognized that decisions taken in the early recovery period may affect the development of
health systems. Additionally, some suggest that the immediate post-conflict period may allow for the opening of a
political ‘window of opportunity’ for reform. For these reasons, it is useful to reflect on the policy space that exists
in this period, by what it is shaped, how decisions are made, and what are their long-term implications. Examining
the policy trajectory and its determinants can be helpful to explore the specific features of the post-conflict
policy-making environment. With this aim, the study looks at the development of policies on human resources for
health (HRH) in Sierra Leone over the decade after the conflict (2002–2012).
Methods: Multiple sources were used to collect qualitative data on the period between 2002 and 2012: a stakeholder
mapping workshop, a document review and a series of key informant interviews. The analysis draws from political
economy and policy analysis tools, focusing on the drivers of reform, the processes, the contextual features, and the
actors and agendas.
Findings: Our findings identify three stages of policy-making. At first characterized by political uncertainty, incremental
policies and stop-gap measures, the context substantially changed in 2009. The launch of the Free Health Care Initiative
provided to be an instrumental event and catalyst for health system, and HRH, reform. However, after the launch of the
initiative, the pace of HRH decision-making again slowed down.
Conclusions: Our study identifies the key drivers of HRH policy trajectory in Sierra Leone: (i) the political situation, at
first uncertain and later on more defined; (ii) the availability of funding and the stances of agencies providing such
funds; (iii) the sense of need for radical change – which is perhaps the only element related to the post-conflict setting.
It also emerges that a ‘windows of opportunity’ for reform did not open in the immediate post-conflict, but rather
8 years later when the Free Health Care Initiative was announced, thus making it difficult to link it directly to the
features of the post-conflict policy-making environment.
Keywords: Post-conflict, Human resources for health, Policy analysis, Window of opportunity, Sierra Leone
Introduction
In the immediate aftermath of a conflict, governments
and international donors alike recognize the necessity to
rapidly rebuild the health system and increase health
service provision for the population, as a goal in itself as
well as an entry point for peace building [1]. At this
time, one of the most problematic aspects lies in striking
the balance between the humanitarian aid, focused on
saving lives, and the longer term development approach to
health system reconstruction and strengthening, aimed at
consolidating the state, providing legitimacy to the govern-
ment and ensuring effective and equitable service delivery
[2-4]. This balance is even more delicate as decisions
taken in the early recovery period are thought to affect the
long-term development of the health system, including its
efficiency and equity [5]. For this reason, it is particularly
useful to reflect on the policy space that exists in the post-
conflict period, by what this space is shaped and how
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decisions are made, and about the long-term implications
of those decisions. A longitudinal approach to examining
policy-making going beyond the immediate recovery years
is particularly needed and has been highlighted as a gap in
the literature on health systems in post-conflict and fragile
settings [6].
This study aims to address this gap by focusing on the
development of policies and reforms around the issue of
human resources for health (HRH) in Sierra Leone over
the decade that followed the end of the civil war, from
2002 until 2012. It is widely recognized that HRH repre-
sent a key component of health systems, albeit an often
overlooked one, especially during the rebuilding of the
health system and the re-establishing of the health ser-
vices after conflict [7]. Moreover, public health workers
(HWs) are an essential link between the government
and the population in all areas of the country, including
the most remote ones, which could help develop the
legitimacy of the government and demonstrate the gov-
ernment’s commitment to service provision and equity
[8]. However, beyond the importance of health work-
force reconstruction in the post-conflict period and the
need to establish an effective incentive environment to
recruit, retain and motivate HWs, focusing on HRH
policy development may also provide a useful case study
to (i) explore the pattern of reform and features of the
post-conflict policy environment and (ii) verify the hypoth-
eses suggested in relation to post-conflict policy settings.
In particular, we explore whether policies developed
according to ‘path-dependency’ [9] because of historical
decisions made (or not made) in previous stages and linked
(or not) to the post-conflict setting. Or rather, whether
there was a political ‘window of opportunity’ for reform in
the post-conflict period, as suggested by some [5,7,10].
In line with this aim, the focus on the study is rather
on the policy choices, the ‘drivers’ and reasons of these
choices, than on the evaluation of the policy outcomesa.
We look at the trajectory taken by the HRH policy, in-
cluding the official strategic documents and the practical
shifts and measures introduced to address the HRH
challenges over the first post-conflict decade. Our ob-
jective is to narrate the ‘policy story’ and investigate how
decisions were made, which factors and actors influ-
enced them and what defined their timing. We believe
that looking at the path taken by the HRH policy trajec-
tory can illuminate the policy-making patterns in the
post-conflict period and the legacies of such decisions in
the longer term.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section
briefly sets the context of the health status of the popu-
lation and the health system in Sierra Leone before the
conflict. Then, we present the methods and some limitations
of our study. The findings section begins with the health
system and HRH context in the immediate aftermath of
the war and then narrates the policy story, depicting how
HRH policy developed from 2002 until 2012. In the dis-
cussion section, the post-conflict policy-making trajectory
and its features are identified and analyzed, before
concluding with a review of the research questions.
Context
Sierra Leone emerged in 2002 from a 10-year period of
war and social and economic unrest. During that time,
about 50,000 people were killed and 2 million displaced,
which amounted to almost half of the population. It is
estimated that more than 20,000 children were conscripted
as soldiers [11].
Studies carried out before the conflict provide some
information on the health status of the population and on
the health system. Data from the 1974 census show that
life expectancy at birth was 36–40 years for females and
33–37 years for males and the infant mortality rate was
225 per 1000 [12,13]. In 1980, 31 of the 146 chiefdoms
(the lower level in the administrative system in Sierra
Leone) had no government health facilities, whether a
hospital or a dispensary, and only 5-10% of children below
the age of 5 were enrolled at a clinic [12]. According to
some studies, the underutilization of health care services,
particularly in rural areas, was related to the low availabil-
ity of healthcare facilities, poor quality of services in the
available public facilities [14], frequent drug stock-outs
and irregular payment of health workers salaries [15]. As a
consequence, most people chose to buy drugs from the
market, visit private or mission clinics or make unofficial
payments to healthcare workers in public health facilities.
Against this background, user fees were introduced in the
1980s, through the Cost Recovery Policy of the Ministry
of Health and Sanitation Sierra Leone emanating from the
Bamako Initiative. Public health expenditure declined by
60% between 1980 and 1987, such that by 1995 91% of the
health expenditure were private, of which 95% were out-
of-pocket expenditures, providing no financial protection
against illness [15].
The conflict lasted between 1991 and 2002 and, al-
though it alternated between periods of higher and lower
intensity and affected the areas of the country in different
ways, it paralyzed the economy and the provision of public
services and caused the destruction of the infrastructures
and governmental institutions throughout the country.
The public health system in the aftermath of the conflict
was practically collapsed. Only 16% of the health centers
were still functioning by 1996, mainly in Freetown [16].
Recent data paint a dire picture of the health situation in
the country. Maternal mortality remains extremely high at
857 deaths per 100,000 live births for the period between
2003–2008 [17], while in 2010 under-five mortality was
estimated at 217 per 1,000 live births and infant mortality
at 128 [18].
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Methods
This study is part of a research project carried out by
the ReBUILD Project Consortium in Sierra Leone which
specifically focused on health workers incentives. The
overall objectives of the project are, to document how
the incentive environment has evolved after the conflict
and understand what influenced the trajectory; to describe
the reform objectives, mechanisms, intended and unin-
tended consequences; and to document lessons learned
(on design, implementation, sustainability and suitability
to context), reflecting on how they can be used to guide
future interventions. The study received ethics approval
from the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and from
the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee.
The overall study design of the research project
utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods and is
based on retrospective collection of data and informa-
tion on the 10-year period between the end of the con-
flict in 2002 and the time of the research, which started
in 2012. Six different tools were applied to gather data.
A half-day stakeholder mapping (SM) workshop was
held in October 2012 in Freetown with 23 stakeholders
in the health sector in order to understand the key
actors who have influenced policy and practices in HRH
in Sierra Leone over the post-conflict period [19]. Subse-
quently, a document review was carried out, based on
documents retrieved through contacts in country, as well
as in journals and grey literature. A total of 76 documents
were identified, of which 57 were deemed relevant for
HRH issues [20]. Finally, 23 key informant interviews (KII)
were conducted, in and outside Sierra Leone, between
October 2012 and June 2013. Twelve of the interviewees
work(ed) with the Ministry of Health and Sanitation
(MoHS), 6 were NGO representatives, 4 donor representa-
tives and 1 a technical assistant to the MoHSb [21]. The
other three data collection methods were: routine HRH
data analysis, in-depth interviews with health workers and
a survey of health workers. These are not described in
detail in this article as this study draws from the first three
research components onlyc.
The methodology adopted reflects the difficulty of col-
lecting original data over such a long period of time and
in a post-conflict setting, where information is scarce and
difficult to retrieve [22]. The combination of methods was
conceived so that each could build upon the others, allow-
ing for the collection of information to be enriched in an
iterative way. For instance, the document review was help-
ful in order to formulate preliminary hypotheses and guide
the key informant interviews, and the interviews were
critical to illuminate on the gaps that had emerged in the
documentary review, in particular regarding the discus-
sions, processes and dynamics between actors, for which
the documents were silent. Due to the combination of data
collection methods, it was possible to compare and
thoroughly triangulate findings. Similarities and discrepan-
cies were analyzed in a reflective way to better understand
why perceptions and insights differ between actors and
sources. This process ensured that the methodologies are
complementary and helpful in shedding light on the pro-
cesses of policy-making in a comprehensive way and from
different perspectives.
Despite the careful triangulation of information, our
methodology and sampling present the following limita-
tions: (i) the majority of the participants during the key
informant interviews and in the group discussion for the
stakeholder mapping, as well as the bulk of the documents
retrieved (about half), are from the MoHS or from other
governmental bodies; (ii) few documents referred to the
HRH situation prior to 2009, whilst more than 50% of
the documents were dated after 2011; and (iii) only few
respondents were present in Sierra Leone and engaged in
HRH policy-making for the period under review, and par-
ticularly during the immediate post conflict period. Those
who were present for the entire time found it difficult to
recall events that occurred in the immediate post conflict
period and emotional and personal narratives emerge
rather than organizational ones.
Although the findings section is based on the chrono-
logical narration of the HRH policy evolution and does
not follow in its structure the conceptual elements of an
analytical framework, the analysis is inspired by political
economy and policy analysis approaches [23,24]. Draw-
ing from these approaches, rather than looking exclu-
sively at the policy content and implementation, our
analysis focuses on the interactions between the context,
including the historical legacies, the evolving formal and
informal institutions and power structures; the actors,
both national and external, applying ideological, political
and financial pressures to decision-making; and the dy-
namic processes of the political system [25-28]. We use
these analytical tools in a flexible manner as our analysis
is not performed cross-sectionally looking at a specific
moment in time, but rather covers a 10-year period. We
explore, for each reform or policy stage in turn, the polit-
ical processes and dynamics of change, looking at the key
drivers of reform, the main actors, their roles, agendas
and influences, and the formal and informal arenas in
which they interacted.
Findings: the unfolding ‘policy story’
Immediate post-conflict context and HRH challenges
By the end of the conflict in 2002, the situation of
the health system was extremely challenging. Concerning
HRH, little data and documentation exist and those
available are often unreliable and contradictory [29]. As
one respondent noted, this reflects the fact that all actors
were primarily concerned with the pressing needs of
the early recovery and little time was available for the
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production of documents and reports, and even less
for academic research.
The available information shows that the challenges
faced at the time in Sierra Leone are not dissimilar to
those in other post-conflict contexts [7,10,29]. The basic
health infrastructure was destroyed and most services
were completely disrupted, especially in the eastern and
southern part of the country where most of the rebel ac-
tivity took place. Health facilities were grossly understaffed
as many HWs had left the country, and particularly those
in the higher cadres. Other HWs were employed by NGOs
or held dual positions with NGOs and the MoHS [30].
The majority of those HWs who stayed in the government
service preferred to work in Freetown or in the Western
Area around the capital. The data available for that period
clearly indicate a significant loss of qualified HWs in the
public health sector in Sierra Leone which created a gap
that remained to be filled in the aftermath of the conflict.
Of the 203 Medical Officers that were present in the
country in 1993, only 67 remained in 2005 and of the 623
State Registered Nurses (SRN) 152 remained [31]. While
the private sector employed only a small minority of the
health workforce, centered in the capital, in the few years
immediately after the conflict, many HWs in the public
sector were working with NGOs in the governmental fa-
cilities, for which they would receive incentives and train-
ing, whether under a formal agreement with the MoHS or
without. NGOs supporting public facilities also recruited
and funded personnel, which was later absorbed in the
MoHS payroll.
In those early years, the extreme lack of coordin-
ation between the different actors in the health sys-
tem appears to be an important feature of the policy
context. The term ‘chaos’ frequently emerged in the
respondents’ narratives:
“What happened was, during a period of chaos, most of
the NGOs were operating on their own” (KII - MoHS).
“After the war, it was complete chaos. The NGOs
came and went […]. They employed the nurses
directly, without even consulting the Ministry. […]
They never presented any budget. But this was a
war. We had to bend backwards in the Ministry”
(SM – MoHS).
This highlights the fragmentation of the health system
at this stage and the struggle that the government
through the MoHS faced to create a system and estab-
lish control over the health workforce. However, it seems
that the MoHS was able to maintain a certain leadership
to start the process of reconstructing the public health
system. For example, in contrast to other countries in
similar post-conflict situations [6,32-34], in Sierra Leone
health services were provided by public facilities and
were not contracted-out to other actors of the health sys-
tem. Although the choice of not adopting a contracting-
out approach did not appear to be made explicitly by any
of the actors but was rather the consequence of the
specific context, it clearly had lasting consequences which
affected the future development of the healthcare system.
The development of formal HRH policies: 2002–2009
Against this backdrop, HRH reforms began to develop.
Our findings reveal that between 2002 and 2009 the pro-
gress towards policy-making for a coherent restructuring
of the health workforce was not rapid or effective. Al-
though the challenges were correctly identified by the
MoHS and potential solutions being proposed (cf. for
example [30,35]), very little was happening in practice.
Relatively minor changes were introduced to improve
the management of HWs in order to keep the system
functioning. For instance, between 2006 and 2007, the
Scheme of Service was reviewed to ensure a clearer car-
eer path and HWs started receiving allowances for hous-
ing, remote area placements, and leave [35,36]. However,
the major reforms suggested in the annual presentations
of the MoHS HRH Manager and in other informal MoHS
documents [30,35], remained unfunded and unimple-
mented and the response to the HRH challenges was
fragmented. At the same time, a series of broad pol-
icies and strategies were being drafted – in 2002 the
National Health Policy (NHP) [37], followed by the
Human Resources for Health Development Plan 2004–
2008 [38] and then the Human Resources for Health
Policy in Sierra Leone [39]. Similar to other post-conflict
contexts, these documents tended to remain relatively
vague normative frameworks rather than operational doc-
uments to be reflected in changes at peripheral level
[7,22,40]. As the most recent HRH Policy (2012) states,
“there have been two attempts to formulate national pol-
icy to guide the development and management of Human
Resource for Health in Sierra Leone […], but none was
finalized or adopted for implementation” ([41]: p.6).
The lack of technical and implementation capacity within
the MoHS could explain why policies remained on paper.
Additionally, external agencies played a significant role
in this, in particular because their mandate narrowly
focused on production rather than implementation of
the strategies. Some key informants pointed out to the
fact that these policies were externally-driven, lacking
the national ownership that would ensure their effective
implementation:
“People started working on their own areas and they
started developing a policy and plan and things like
that […]. But it was all happening in parallel, also
depending […] on the focus of donors to provide TA
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and funding for certain things. So I think a lot of
policies applied at the beginning were definitely
donor-driven. WHO said ‘you don’t have a policy on
this and this. We have to develop it’, and you’ll get it.”
(KII - NGO).
The piecemeal support of the international community
did not allow for the strengthening of the MoHS, espe-
cially as donors focused on ‘their’ programmes, support-
ing one or another department or units, undermining
the overall capacity of the MoHS and creating a frag-
mentation within the Ministry, with long-lasting conse-
quences [4].
Among the reasons for the delay in the adoption and
implementation of major shifts in HRH policy may be
the lack of clear political vision on the future of the
health system more broadly. Indeed, key informants
agree that in the years following the conflict, strategic
policies and plans were slow to be put in place or miss-
ing altogether.
“The main issue during this time [was that] the
Human Resources Strategic Plan was not adequately
addressing the issues of Human Resources. Because of
the absence of a strategic plan, we were just
swimming with ideas […] and there was no clear
direction as to what to do.” (KII – donor).
“Let me tell you something, in life when you do
not have a goal you are working towards and you
go purposeless, aimless, you’re slow at it.”
(KII – MoHS).
The consequence of the lack of political guidance and
strategic vision was a general sense of ‘purposelessness’.
This resonates with the findings of the documentary
review, where it emerged how fluid and uncertain policy
context was, as explicitly recognized by the HRH Develop-
ment Plan 2004–2008 which states that a certain flexi-
bility will be allowed in the proposed activities “given
the current level of uncertainty regarding the exact na-
ture of the reforms” ([38]: p.80 – italics added). Obviously,
the broader political dimension is important to under-
stand the lack of strategic vision for the health sector. The
government elected in 2002, which seemed to initially
enjoy some support, soon lost much of its popularity given
its weaknesses in terms of leadership to drive for reform,
especially compared to the following administration in
power from 2007 ([4] & KII). For the HRH sector, the
consequence of drafting broad policies without an over-
all vision on the ways to rebuild and strengthen the health
system was a relatively static approach, which left little
space for innovation and focused mostly on “fire-fighting”,
as suggested by a respondent, i.e. tackling the most
immediate issues with quick-fix solutions. The situation
substantially changed with the introduction of the ‘free
health care initiative’ (FHCI).
The introduction of the FHCI: 2009–2010
In September 2009, the President of Sierra Leone, Ernest
Bai Koroma, announced at a donors’ conference in London
his intention to launch a reform to introduce free health-
care for pregnant women, lactating mothers and children
under 5 years of age [42]. Soon after, the announcement
was made in Sierra Leone to the MoHS and partners and
an official launching document was drafted [43]. A few
months were allowed to prepare the launch of the new pol-
icy in April 2010. Without doubt, the introduction of the
Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI) is the key event that
emerged from the document review and that informants
consistently mentioned in their narratives about the recon-
struction of the health sector.
Different factors emerge as the ‘drivers of change’ for
this reform. Certainly, the health status of the population
with one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the
world, as well as emerging evidence of financial barriers
in access to healthcare, played an important part in pro-
moting the policy ([44] & KII). However, even more crit-
ical seems to be the role of the President and the lead he
took to include the FHCI among the government’s prior-
ities. The political dimension of the FHCI is confirmed by
the President’s direct involvement in the announcement of
it as a ‘Flagship Project’, by the work done by the Strategy
and Policy Unit, a very influential, high-level advisory unit
in charge of promoting the presidential agenda [42], as well
as in numerous interviews. Additionally, the international
environment and the pressure from external actors also
contributed to the decision. Indeed, free healthcare was at
the time an increasingly popular reform in many African
countries, supported by some of the international donors,
and in particular the UK Department for International
Development (DfID), which also made funding available
tied to the implementation of this particular reform. As
one informant stated:
“You have to have it [the FHCI] in context. I know
that there was a push in 2008/2009 by Gordon Brown
and he decided, DfID decided to support [the reform].
And because of DfID support, […] that is why it was
able to get off. Under our government’s own resources
they could not [support it].” (KII – MoHS).
The launch of the FHCI provided an opportunity for
health system strengthening and to address in a more
comprehensive and organic way the issues that previ-
ously were partially solved with piecemeal changes. The
design and preparation of the FHCI (much more than
its implementation) represented an occasion to increase
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and improve coordination among actors and provide a
broad, common objective to all stakeholders (KII). Six
Technical Working Groups were put in place, of which
one focused on HRH, which held meetings weekly and
were tasked with designing the necessary reforms, as
well as of coordinating among the different partners
[45].
With reference to HRH, the launch of the FHCI played
an instrumental and catalytic role in pushing reforms. It
was explicitly recognized by all stakeholders that ad-
dressing issues affecting the health workforce was critical
for the success of the FHCI, for at least two reasons:
firstly, HWs would have to deal with an increased work-
load; and secondly, in order to compensate facilities and
HWs for the loss in revenues due to the end of the cost-
recovery. With the inputs from the Working Group,
HRH reforms started developing. The result was that, by
April 2010, salaries had been increased for all HWs in
technical positions. The increase was substantial, ranging
from 314% for the lower grades up to 705% for the
higher grades [46]. As a corollary to the salary increase,
an in-depth verification and cleaning of the MoHS pay-
roll was carried out to ensure that only legitimate staff
were included and to eliminate ‘ghost workers’ [47]. Add-
itionally, a mobile recruitment programme at district level
was put in place for the fast-track recruitment of new
workers and of those already volunteering in the facilities
[47]. At the same time, discussions began about the
introduction of a system to monitor the presence of
HWs in the facilities, which was later introduced in
mid-2010 when staff absence begun being monitored
through the Attendance Monitoring System, and January
2011 when the Sanctions Framework was implemented
[48].
Obviously, the decision-making process that led to the
choice, design and implementation of these reforms was
less smooth and linear that it would appear from the end
results. While the creation of inter-agency working groups
undoubtedly increased coordination, some issues were
hidden under the surface. As one respondent recalls,
“Of course we had our Working Group meetings and
we would talk, but these were the ‘big lines’. If you go
to the little activities, we were not so well
coordinated”. (KII – NGO).
In particular, concerns emerged around the role of the
donors, their different views on FHCI and on how differ-
ent components of the health system could be reorga-
nized to provide free health services. In particular, the
argument between two donors around the merits of a
salary increase compared to the introduction of a
performance-based financing (PBF) scheme stalled the
discussion for some time. As a key informant recalls,
“These meetings [of the HRH Working Group] were
completely dominated by [two donors] having their
ideological fight effectively. I mean, it wasn’t just
those two individuals but these meetings achieved
very little, because, when these two big donors are
busy having a fight, week after week after week not
much else gets discussed.” (KII – TA).
In the end, while conflicting agendas and ideologies
may have played a role in the decision, the choice of pol-
icy approach (i.e. the salary increase) was ultimately
taken on the basis of practical feasibility. Although it
was recognized that PBF would have had the advantage
of improving the accountability of HWs, it was also
agreed that setting up a PBF scheme would have higher
transaction costs and take longer than a salary increase.
This was perceived as a major disadvantage given the
urgency of the launch of the FHCI (KII – donor). More-
over, after a nation-wide HWs strike which took place in
March 2010 in request for higher salaries, this option
became inevitable. What emerges from the analysis is that
the MoHS perspective seemed to have been caught in the
cross-fire of the donors’ agendas and the funding possibil-
ities that came with donors’ support. It also appears that
the corollary measures taken, such as the payroll cleaning
and the introduction of the Sanctions Framework, were
not only strategies to improve the HRH management and
performance, but also a conditional request from the
donors funding the reform, and DfID in particular, in
order to “protect their investment” and “minimize risk” of
misuse of their funds (KII – donor).
Several episodes confirm the influence of external ac-
tors, as well as the fragmented and ‘serendipitous’ nature
of policy-making at the time. Many respondents recog-
nized the drawbacks of the technical assistance provided,
characterized by high turnover and little coordination,
which resulted in the loss of institutional memory, dupli-
cations and incoherence in policy-making and implemen-
tation. This is, for instance, the case with the cleaning of
the MoHS payroll which was done in 2009–2010, but
had already been carried out a few years before for the
entire civil service ([49] & KII). Providing another ex-
ample, some informants recalled how, despite the pres-
sures and promises of some partners, the issue of funding
the salary increase, was resolved in an “entirely coinci-
dental” way (KII – TA), when the Global Fund’s Health
System Strengthening funds became available. Inter-
estingly, the Global Fund had not participated in the
Working Group’s discussions directly and its low level of
engagement contributed to creating a commonly accepted
narrative around the role of donors, where DfID (contrib-
uting, over three years, about 22% of the total health salar-
ies after the increase, but highly involved in the discussion
and providing substantial, direct support to the MoHS
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through numerous technical assistants) took a much more
central role and was able to steer critical decisions, than
the Global Fund (contributing 20% of the total amount, in
the initial 3 years) [50].
HRH policy-making after the Free Health Care Initiative:
2011–2012
Beyond the urgency of the FHCI launch, the momentum
for the collaboration between MoHS and partners seems
diminished, if not lost, afterwards. The Working Groups
are reported to meet much less regularly after the launch
of the FHCI and were almost inactive by March 2013.
Nevertheless, two major reforms were implemented after
2010, which in fact had been discussed or planned at the
time of the FHCI design: a Performance-based Financing
(PBF) scheme and a Remote Allowance for HWs work-
ing in rural posts.
While the discussion of a PBF scheme became
detached from the design and the planning of the FHCI
as the salary increase option was preferred, meetings for
the planning of PBF continued, especially between the
World Bank and the Department for Planning and Infor-
mation (DPI) of the MoHS. The scheme was designed and
has been implemented since April 2011. Along with the
World Bank, which as the promoter and the funder of the
scheme is recognized to be the driving actor for its imple-
mentation, the DPI also played a critical role and remains
in charge of the operationalization of the policy. In contrast,
the Department for HRH (D-HRH) which is in charge of
the payroll management (which, incidentally, is supported
by a different donor) is far less involved in the scheme and
has surprisingly little overview of the working mechanisms
of PBF. The consequence of this is a further fragmenta-
tion, not only in terms of the design of the HRH policies
and the package of incentive for HWs, but also of the im-
plementation of the PBF scheme. This has been plagued
with severe delays in the payments made to the facilities,
which undermine the effectiveness of the scheme and may
have had negative consequences on the performance of
the HWs (KII).
A similar story applies to the Remote Allowance for
HWs, which was introduced in early 2012. This policy had
already been discussed before the launch of the FHCI;
however, it was not implemented because of the lack of re-
sources. As further funding from the Global Fund became
available, the policy was finally designed and introduced.
Again, the DPI is mainly responsible for its implementa-
tion and, despite some collaboration with the D-HRH to
access payroll data, there appears to be a strict division of
tasks between the two departments, with little transpar-
ency in its management. As a consequence, few actors
seem familiar with the mechanisms for eligibility and
funding. Furthermore, the Remote Allowance currently
rarely reaches the HWs that are eligible for it, due to the
discontinuity of the Global Fund funding, as well as the
poor communication and coordination within the MoHS
(KII). The separate management of the Remote Allowance
creates a further fragmentation of policies and activities,
even within the MoHS.
Beyond these two major reforms (and their implementa-
tion challenges), several HRH issues remain unsolved or
only partially addressed. For instance, during the prepar-
ation for the FHCI, a mobile recruitment programme had
been set up. However, this remained a one-off exercise. For
the routine recruitment of HWs, the establishment of a
Health Service Commission (HSC) was planned to replace
the Human Resources Management Office (HRMO). Des-
pite the HSC being established by a Governmental Act in
2011 and the Commissioners being nominated, the HSC
appears to be still not functional in March 2013. Similarly,
pre-service training has been overlooked in the rush for
the launch of the FHCI, in order to focus on aspects that it
was possible to address faster (e.g., recruitment of HWs
and in-service training). In-service training proliferated
in an uncoordinated manner and only in early 2014 was
the D-HRH of the MoHS preparing an HRH Training Plan
for the next 10 years, to ensure the standardization and
coordination of both pre-service and in-service training.
Additionally, the role of non-financial incentives for the
motivation of HWs, and in particular for those in rural
postings, also emerges as largely ignored by policy-makers.
In terms of official MoHS policies, while the documents
prepared before 2009 have remained mostly on paper, as
described above, those approved following the launch
of the FHCI, and in particular, the Human Resources
For Health Policy and the Human Resource for Health
Strategic Plan 2012–2016 [41,51] seem to have been pre-
pared to give an ex-post, official shape to the changes that
had already taken place at operational level in HRH
strategies.
Discussion
The stages of policy-making in post-conflict Sierra Leone
Figure 1 plots the sequence of Sierra Leone’s main HRH
policy and operational reforms over time. It points out
to three broad stages in the policy-making process.
The initial post-conflict period was certainly critical to
define the trajectory in the reconstruction of the health
system and determine the shape of the system in place.
It was, for example, the decision not taken to contract-out
health services that put the MoHS in charge not only of
the stewardship of the system, but also of service delivery.
The decision appears to be based on contextual factors.
First, the government legitimacy was (more or less) ex-
tended to the entire country and its authority recognized
by all [4]. This means that the MoHS was recognized to
have sufficient capacity to reach all areas, and that public
services could be provided safely without the need of
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delegating to third-parties. More importantly, the influ-
ence of the UK, because of the historical relations between
the two countries (from the freed slaves’ settlements in Si-
erra Leone to the active role played by the British Army at
the end of the conflict) may have led to a certain pattern
in terms of aid and development. DfID preferences in
terms of health systems organization may have influenced
the decision to opt for direct public provision of
healthcare.
However, in the immediate post-conflict, efforts to tackle
HRH issues were limited to ‘fire-fighting’ measures, as
noted in other post-conflict settings [4,7]. Rarely were these
measures translated into formal, coherent and comprehen-
sive Ministerial policies, as partners adopted a fragmented
approach, often implemented without the involvement of
the MoHS (for example, by providing salary supplementa-
tions or hiring HWs directly). Little or no opportunities
opened for strategic reforms, possibly because of the uncer-
tain political context, which is a common feature of post-
conflict settings [10,22,40].
While these difficulties are generally recognized, some
authors suggest that there is a ‘window of opportunity’
for reform in the immediate post-conflict period due to
the political energy released by the change of regime, the
fluidity of the situation with new players and ideas enter-
ing the political arena, and increased funding available
[5,7,10,40]. Sierra Leone experienced a prolonged transi-
tion at the end of the conflict comparable to that of
Liberia and South Sudan, rather than a ‘sudden onset’ of
peace [3], but, for example in contrast to Liberia, there
was no transitional government. National elections were
held immediately after the peace agreement (in 2002)
and the government retained a certain degree of legitim-
acy, control and capacity to provide services [4]. Despite
these possibly favorable conditions, in those early years,
there was no decision space opening for strategic health
system strengthening reforms (including HRH changes),
under the weak leadership of the government and the
patchy interventions of the development partners. In terms
of funding, the National Health Accounts reveal that the
donors’ contribution to the Total Health Expenditure
(THE) was 146.86 billion Leones in 2004. It then decreased
to 109 billion in 2007, but substantially increased to 450.77
billion in 2010. In relative terms, this represented 18% of
the THE in 2004, 12% in 2007 and 25% in 2010 [52,53].
The data confirm that, while donor funds were higher in
2004 than in 2007 both in absolute and relative terms, the
substantial increase in funding followed the establishment
of the FHCI.
Therefore, in the case of HRH policy in Sierra Leone,
the ‘window of opportunity’ seems to have opened later
than usually recognized and for reasons not necessarily
linked to the post-conflict phase, but rather to the mo-
mentum created around the FHCI. Indeed, it took about
eight years after the official end of the conflict for a sec-
ond phase of intensive policy-making to begin, brought
by strategic reforms for the health system. The disappoint-
ingly late onset and slow pace of the reconstruction process
has been noted in other contexts. In South Sudan, it took
three years after the peace agreement before an actual start
to the recovery activities was made [3], while in Liberia the
international community was not able to stimulate prepara-
tory steps for an organic health system strengthening
reform during the initial 3-year transitional phase, so that
another 3 years under the new government had to go by
before it was possible to start addressing the reconstruction
of the health sector [54]. Also, for the case of Sierra Leone,
it was a separate event, i.e. the launch of the FHCI, not
related to the post-conflict setting that made it possible to
overcome the political uncertainty and bring pressure for
change, opening a political ‘window’ for it.
The announcement of the FHCI was the necessary in-
strumental event and catalyst for action in all respects of
the health system, including HRH. This pattern of HRH
reform is not uncommon to other contexts, whether post-
conflict or not. The most salient moment in this trajectory
was the introduction (for reasons mostly external to the
health sector) of a broader health financing reform, not
Figure 1 The sequencing of HRH policies and reforms in Sierra Leone: 2002-2012.
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specifically focused on HRH, but which had a critical im-
pact on the HRH reform process and was instrumental to
it. While Sierra Leone has been one of the few (if not the
only) country to explicitly address the link between the re-
moval of fees and the incentives faced by HWs [46], thus
making the FHCI more effective (at least, in the design),
the fact that a broader health financing reform may be a
helpful or even indispensable entry point for HRH reform
is a key insight common to other contexts ([22] & KII).
Undeniably, following the introduction of the FHCI,
some important progress was made, at least in the de-
sign of HRH policies and likely in their implementation
and impact on the health system (an evaluation of the
effects of the FHCI and related reforms is currently un-
derway). However, below the surface appearance of suc-
cessful reforms, issues remained for the overall planning
and, as noted in other post-conflict settings [22], differ-
ent HRH-related policies were managed separately with
little coordination between donors, as well as within the
MoHS, between the different departments.
After the launch of the FHCI and related reforms, a new
phase in HRH policy-making can be identified. In this
phase, post-conflict issues and features become less appar-
ent. Compared to the previous phase, the pace of HRH
decision-making and reforms slowed down, losing the pre-
vious momentum. The Working Groups almost stopped
meeting altogether and coordination became more diffi-
cult. Additionally, with reduced political pressure for the
policies introduced after the FHCI, implementation of the
policies has not followed the design and there are several
problems and delays in their execution.
Features of the policy-making context
The HRH policy trajectory in Sierra Leone shows the role
played by historical events and contextual factors in con-
straining future choices (the concept of ‘path dependency’).
As noted in other post-conflict countries, uncontrovertibly
“the future health system [is] shaped by the present deci-
sions” ([22]: 665). In the case of Sierra Leone, for example,
the fact that the contracting-out approach, which is often
adopted in post-conflict settings, was not taken, has af-
fected the subsequent trajectory of policy-making in HRH
and beyond. However, despite the fact that some decisions
appear irreversible because of how policies developed in
previous stages, the Sierra Leonean HRH policy trajectory
also shows that it is possible to generate radical reforms
in the health sector. As pointed out in the literature,
political uncertainty and (politically) fragmented health
systems are unlikely to produce “big non-incremental
change”. Nevertheless, the realization of propitious condi-
tions could increase the likelihood of such change taking
place [55]. In the case of Sierra Leone, the emergence
of a powerful initiative, which acted as catalyst both
with respect to the internal political will and the
external (political and financial) support, was critical to
build momentum, open a political ‘window of opportunity’
and create widespread support for radical reform in all
aspects of the health system, including HRH.
It could be argued that some elements more common
in a post-conflict context facilitated this process. One of
these features is the fluidity of power relations and
dynamics between influential actors that could facilitate
reform. An example of this emerged in our study. While in
other countries the professional boards are a powerful
actor and the relations between those bodies and the MoH
are entrenched in the system, often limiting the space for
reform on HRH issues, in Sierra Leone the power relations
with the professional associations seemed much more
fluid. The Nursing Board, for instance, is chaired by the
Chief Nursing Officer (Director of Nursing) at the MoHS,
and is by definition aligned to the decisions taken by the
MoHS, so that there is less or no opposition to radical
changes. No opposition to the introduction of the Sanction
Framework came from any of the professional boards on
behalf of their affiliates (KII). Secondly, it is possible that
because of the state of the health system, the launch of the
FHCI could not be based on some relatively minor, incre-
mental measure, but it required wider reforms, including
for HRH. It could be hypothesized that in other non post-
conflict contexts, such reforms could be postponed or
diluted over time, while in a reconstruction context, the
gravity of the situation, accompanied by the general cli-
mate of reform, renovation and change could foster new
initiatives and gather national and international support
around them. Indeed, similarly to South Africa in 1994
where the post-crisis situation created both an opportun-
ity and a need for dramatic change [56,57], Sierra Leone
has enjoyed high levels of political interest and pressure.
This was coupled with substantial donor funding and
technical assistance, while in other sub-Saharan Africa
countries free health care initiatives were introduced
without generating such momentum (as for example in
Burundi, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal, Sudan and others
[58-64]). The reasons are likely to be related to the com-
bination between (i) the national political conjuncture
under the new government interested in implementing a
visible and successful flagship reform, (ii) the international
momentum around the improvement of Maternal and
Child Health and the introduction of fee exemptions, as
well as the major role played by some donors, and espe-
cially by a donor such as the UK with close historical ties
to Sierra Leone, and (iii) the health needs of the popula-
tion (in particular, with reference to the high maternal
mortality levels).
Other features of the policy-making environment that
our analysis highlights are less specific to the post-conflict
context. It could be argued that they are not qualitatively
different from those in low-income settings, but that
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perhaps the differences are only quantitative (i.e. same is-
sues but worse) or, in fact, negligible. One such feature
relates to the role of external actors in influencing the
policy-making processes, which occurs in non post-conflict
settings and is well documented in post-conflict where gov-
ernments are under-resourced and weak [3,10,40,54,65].
Sierra Leone is no exception and, although evidence and
health needs certainly played a role, the approach adopted
for decision-making seems to be a pragmatic one, where
the critical issue of the availability of funding allowed
space for donor influences. Also, some HRH mea-
sures, such as the reorganization and management of
the payroll, received high levels of donor-funded tech-
nical assistance, which may have allowed their realization,
but raises concerns around their sustainability in the
longer-term. Additionally, despite the noteworthy increase
in the alignment of partners to the ministerial policies
during the preparation of the FHCI, there appear to be
some disconnections between the different actors. The
fragmentation of views and agendas was partially over-
come by the urgency to make decisions at the time of the
launch of the FHCI. However, the lack of coordination be-
came problematic later on, as the political pressure for
rapid reforms was reduced. The result was fragmented
policy-making, a set of policies that are not completely co-
herent and a largely ineffective implementation of some of
those policies [10]. Moreover, reforms remained incom-
plete as the adoption and implementation of other neces-
sary measures (e.g., recruitment and deployment of HWs,
improved pre-service training and development of non-
financial incentives) were not pursued or pursued in a
slow and partial manner.
Finally, the apparent success of Sierra Leone in
addressing HRH issues by taking advantage of a window
of opportunity for reform cannot hide the evident
challenges of having HRH changes pushed forward by a
short-lived political pressure. As a consequence of the
urgency of the reforms, preference was often given to
one-off exercises, such as the mobile recruitment, or
shorter-term solutions (as for example the decision to
overlook pre-service training or the postponement of the
introduction of the remote allowance). Similarly to other
settings [65], much attention was generated around the
design of the policies, while far less was given to their im-
plementation at local level, which remains problematic,
despite some innovative features, such as use of civil soci-
ety monitors at facility leveld.
Conclusions
‘Post-conflict’ is a relatively little studied and poorly under-
stood period of time, which may be extremely influential
for the reconstruction of the health system after a period
of social and political unrest. The trajectory of HRH policy
developments in Sierra Leone provides a useful case study
to examine the pattern of reform and the features of the
post-conflict policy-making environment, as well as to
reflect on the hypotheses about ‘path-dependency’ and
‘windows of opportunity’ in the policy-making processes.
Our analysis identifies different stages in the policy-
making processes and discusses the key drivers that de-
termined the shifts and the progression along the policy
trajectory. In terms of context, it appears that policy-
making was driven by the changing overall political situ-
ation, at first uncertain and later on more clearly defined
as the new government set its priorities and put pressure
for the success of its ‘flagship’ reform. It has also shown
that the sense of need for radical change (and the decision
space for it given by the evolving political dynamics) also
played an important part. In terms of actors, the will of
internal high-level political players, as well as the pressure
of international partners contributed to the emergence of
a catalyst initiative (the FHCI). Looking specifically at the
decisions taken on HRH, the role of the agencies in influ-
encing the reform options adopted emerges more clearly,
given the fluidity of power relations in the health sector,
as well as the relatively weak hierarchical structures
and the fragmentation between departments within
the MoHS. The donors’ availability of funds to sup-
port reform, but also, importantly, their direct partici-
pation in policy-making forums and the provision of
technical assistance in key roles within the MoHS de-
fined the relative capacity of these agencies to influ-
ence policy-making.
Our analysis of ‘path-dependency’ and ‘windows of
opportunities’ allows reflection on the overall processes
and patterns of policy change over time. ‘Path-depend-
ency’ and the influence of the decisions taken (or not
taken) in previous stages of the policy-making process
contributed to define the trajectory and limit the options
available. Nevertheless, the case of Sierra Leone shows
that some events, by creating an alignment of actors and
agendas, can act as catalyst for substantial (not incre-
mental) change. Indeed, the pattern of HRH policy in
Sierra Leone allows us to reflect on the timing of
such political ‘window of opportunity’ for reform
along the recovery process. As noted for other post-
conflict countries, despite the potential opportunities
for needed reforms to be introduced with less resist-
ance post-conflict, “long-suffering health systems are
poor reformers” ([51]: 662). From our analysis, it
emerged that the decision space for the reform of the
health system did not open in the immediate post-
conflict period, which was instead characterized by in-
cremental policy-making and stop-gap measures. A
window of opportunity opened later on (8 years after
the end of the war), making it difficult to link it directly
to the features of the immediate post-conflict policy-
making environment.
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Endnotes
aFor an assessment of the outcomes of the HRH policy
making, and an analysis of the evolving incentive envir-
onment in the post-conflict period and how it affected
the recruitment, retention and performance of HWs, see
further work carried out by the ReBUILD Consortium
(www.rebuildconsortium.com/publications/index.htm).
bQuotes from the stakeholder meeting are marked SM,
while those from key informant interviews are marked
KII. In both cases, the type of organization to which the
respondent belongs to is also detailed (i.e., MoHS, donor,
NGO, or TA), unless the same issue was mentioned by
more than one respondent.
cFurther work making use of these data is ongoing and
will be available on the ReBUILD Consortium website
(www.rebuildconsortium.com).
dA civil society organization, the Health for All Coalition
(HAC), was entrusted in 2011 with the function of
guaranteeing an independent oversight on the imple-
mentation of the FHCI and in particular to monitor the
possible under-the-table payments of patients and HWs’
attendance.
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7. Exploring HRH remuneration practices at district level 
 
7.1 Preface 
 
In the previous chapter (Chapter 6), I explored the policy-making context and trajectory which led to the 
emergence of the official HRH policies in post-conflict Sierra Leone, from a central level perspective. In theory, 
such analysis should be sufficient to present the list and design of the incentives available to primary HWs, which 
is needed to set the background for the analysis of the HWs remuneration. On this basis, data collection at district 
level, through a series of key informant interviews, was initially planned with the sole aim to provide general 
background information useful to complement the analysis of the individual HWs remuneration, for example, by 
triangulating information on training or campaigns carried out in the district (which would explain an increase in 
per diem payments), etc. However, during fieldwork in the districts, it became soon evident that there was a 
substantial gap in the translation of the official HRH policies as designed at central level into HRH practices 
implemented at local level. In particular, the narratives of the key informants repeatedly touched upon the issue of 
the interactions between District Health Medical Teams (DHMTs) and health non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) present in the districts, reporting the actors’ respective perceptions over the process and evidencing the 
key role that such dynamic interactions played in re-shaping the HRH policy implementation and leading to the 
emergence of HRH practices.  
 
The present chapter (Chapter 7) presents a research paper which focuses on the implementation of HRH policies 
and on the processes by which HRH policies are translated into actual practices. It also explores causes and 
consequences of the discrepancy between HRH policies as designed versus as implemented. A political 
economy framework is adopted to structure the analysis and to investigate how features relating to the structure 
(context, historical legacies and institutions) and agency (actors, agendas and power relations) dynamically 
interact to define the incentives available to HWs. By exploring the HRH practices in the three districts of focus, 
this chapter provides a useful background, more relevant than the sole analysis of the policy design at central 
level, before we turn to the individual HWs incentives (Chapters 8-10). It also identifies the district dynamics as a 
key driver of the variability in incomes that will be found at individual level (Chapter 9), and unravels the 
mechanisms behind those dynamics. Finally, this understanding will prove essential for the analysis of the factors 
defining the activities that HWs do, which is carried out in Chapter 10. 
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a b s t r a c t
The need for evidence-based practice calls for research focussing not only on the effectiveness of in-
terventions and their translation into policies, but also on implementation processes and the factors
inﬂuencing them, in particular for complex health system policies. In this paper, we use the lens of one of
the health system's ‘building blocks’, human resources for health (HRH), to examine the implementation
of ofﬁcial policies on HRH incentives and the emergence of informal practices in three districts of Sierra
Leone. Our mixed-methods research draws mostly from 18 key informant interviews at district level.
Data are organised using a political economy framework which focuses on the dynamic interactions
between structure (context, historical legacies, institutions) and agency (actors, agendas, power re-
lations) to show how these elements affect the HRH incentive practices in each district. It appears that
the ofﬁcial policies are re-shaped both by implementation challenges and by informal practices emerging
at local level as the result of the district-level dynamics and negotiations between District Health
Management Teams (DHMTs) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). Emerging informal practices
take the form of selective supervision, salary supplementations and per diems paid to health workers,
and aim to ensure a better ﬁt between the actors' agendas and the incentive package. Importantly, the
negotiations which shape such practices are characterised by a substantial asymmetry of power between
DHMTs and NGOs. In conclusion, our ﬁndings reveal the inﬂuence of NGOs on the HRH incentive package
and highlight the need to empower DHMTs to limit the discrepancy between policies deﬁned at central
level and practices in the districts, and to reduce inequalities in health worker remuneration across
districts. For Sierra Leone, these ﬁndings are now more relevant than ever as new players enter the stage
at district level, as part of the Ebola response and post-Ebola reconstruction.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been increasing attention paid to the
need for evidence-based practice to improve health outcomes
worldwide (Pang et al., 2003). Research has focused on identifying
which policies work, but has also explored the processes by which
knowledge is translated to highlight potential bottlenecks for
evidence-based policy (Oliver et al., 2014). While a growing liter-
ature exists to explore the use of evidence in policy-making, there is
limited knowledge on how policies can be successfully translated
into effective practices. However, several studies (Chaudoir et al.,
2013; Durlak and DuPre, 2008) conﬁrm that implementation does
inﬂuence the outcomes of an intervention and highlight the
importance of understanding which factors affect implementation
by looking at elements both in the context outside the organisation
of focus and within the cultural and management features of the
organisation. The importance of ﬁlling the knowledge gap seems
even more relevant for complex health system interventions,
where the wider context can play a major role in inﬂuencing the
outcome of the policies. It is therefore essential to look beyond
policy-making to reﬂect on actual practices, and on how, by whom,
and why policies are potentially reshaped in the translation
process.
In this paper, we aim to analyse how features relating to the
context (structure) and the actors (agency) in three districts in
Sierra Leone inﬂuence the implementation of health workers'
incentive policies and deﬁne HRH practices at local level. Our* Corresponding author. 15-17 Tavistock Place, London WC1H 9SH, UK.
E-mail address: maria.bertone@lshtm.ac.uk (M.P. Bertone).
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research question focuses on if and how the local political economy
features and dynamics, and in particular the interactions between
District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) and nongovern-
mental organisations (NGOs), may have effects which contribute to
shape incentives for healthworkers in public facilities and, thus, the
functioning of the local health systems. Our focus is not on a speciﬁc
intervention, but broadly on HRH incentives, including the ofﬁcial
policies in place to regulate the incentive package for public health
workers, as well as the actual practices that inﬂuence the ﬁnancial
and non-ﬁnancial incentives effectively available for those health
workers. We believe that HRH incentive issues make a useful case
study to reﬂect on how deeply structural and agency features can
inﬂuence local-level practices in a key area, such as HRH. In order to
analyse the translation process at local level, we adopt a political
economy framework. The framework allows us to explore the
policy implementation, going beyond a static view of one organi-
sation (usually the DHMT), to look at the dynamics between the
layers of the structural context and the multiple actors and orga-
nisations that shape practices and deﬁne the incentive package
differently in each district.
This research was conducted just before the Ebola virus
epidemic started in Sierra Leone, in May 2014. Our ﬁndings high-
light some of the factors that may have played a role in the collapse
of the health system, as we point to in the concluding section.
Moreover, our research contributes to the reﬂection on the conse-
quences of the changing local dynamics as new players enter the
stage at district level as part of the Ebola response and post-Ebola
reconstruction, of which HRH incentive practices are an essential
component.
2. Context
Sierra Leone is aWest African country of 6million people, with a
GDP per capita of 613 USD in 2012 (IMF, 2013). Between 1991 and
2002, the country was ravaged by a civil war which left the public
health system in ruins (Gberie, 2005). Over the last decade, Sierra
Leone's health system underwent a process of reconstruction and
reform. However, the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for
the 2008e2013 period ﬁnds that maternal mortality remains high
at 1165 deaths per 100,000 live births, while under-ﬁve mortality is
estimated at 156 per 1000 live births (SSL & ICF International,
2014). In terms of health workforce, in 2011 there were an esti-
mated 0.0071 doctors and 0.0631 nurses per 10,000 people in the
public sector (Wurie et al., 2014). The distribution of health workers
remains inequitable with major imbalances between rural and ur-
ban areas, and health workers attraction, retention and motivation
are a challenge (Witter et al., 2015).
We analysed elsewhere the trajectory and drivers of HRH policy-
making in the post-conﬂict period (Bertone et al., 2014). It emerged
that the launch of the Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI) in 2010
provided the momentum for the approval of a series of HRH re-
forms, which included a substantial salary uplift for all technical
staff of the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS), and the
cleaning of the MoHS payroll to eliminate ‘ghost workers’ and add
those working as ‘volunteers’. The HRH reform process continued
with the introduction of a Performance-based Financing (PBF)
scheme in 2011 (which includes a staff bonus) and a Remote
Allowance for health workers based in rural areas, in 2012. In
parallel to their support to the design, and in some cases the
funding, of these reforms, certain donors and NGOs adopted mea-
sures to ensure the alignment and rationalisation of the health
workers' incentive package. In particular, the World Bank and
Global Fund abolished supplementary payments to health workers
in charge of HIV/AIDS services. However, despite the relative suc-
cess of the decision-making process and the design of reforms, their
implementation remained ﬁlled with challenges (Witter et al.,
2015).
3. Methods
The present research was undertaken in the districts of Kenema,
Bo and Moyamba (Fig. 1), which were purposefully selected to
maximize differences in poverty, urbanisation, type and remote-
ness of facilities, as well as number of NGOs.
This paper draws on a series of key informant interviews at
district level (n ¼ 18), carried out in SeptembereNovember 2013.
The interviews aimed to be as comprehensive as possible of actors
at local level, including DHMTs, as well as donors and local and
international NGOs' staff (Fig. 2). One NGO in Bo was not included
as not available for interviewing at district level, although some
information was collected from its representative at central level
and from secondary sources, and triangulated during interviews
with other actors in Bo. Moreover, key actors such as Members of
Parliament and politicians, civil society members and representa-
tives of Local Councils, who have some authority over health issues
under the on-going decentralisation process, were not interviewed,
nor havewe included in the analysis private and informal providers
of healthcare which also inﬂuence the incentives in the public
system (Ensor andWitter, 2001). This is due to the fact that initially
key informant interviews aimed solely at providing a background
to the broader research, focused on health workers at individual
level. However, the interactions between DHMTs and NGOs became
such a relevant and recurring theme that it was later developed into
a speciﬁc research question. The omission of actors external to the
health system and non-public providers is a major limitation of our
work.
The key informant interviews at district level are embedded in a
larger mixed-methods research, which aims to investigate the
health workers' ‘complex remuneration’ by quantifying their
overall income and exploring the consequences of income levels
and fragmentation. The broader researchmakes use of other data. A
longitudinal survey was carried out to collect information on rev-
enues (salary, remote allowance and PBF, as well as per diems and
salary top-ups, and informal incomes) for 266 primary healthcare
workers (90 in Kenema, 96 in Bo, 80 in Moyamba). The research
also involved prolonged ﬁeldwork (September 2013eMay 2014), a
series of in-depth interviews with health workers (n ¼ 39e13 in
Kenema, 12 in Bo, 14 in Moyamba), as well as an earlier docu-
mentary review and 23 key informant interviews at central level.
Although this study relies mostly on key informant interviews at
district level, the other sources of information were important to
inform the analysis. For example, preliminary results from the
health workers survey are included to support the ﬁndings from
key informant interviews. Ethical clearance for all research com-
ponents was obtained from the London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine and the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientiﬁc Review
Committee.
In order tomap the emerging elements and themes, the analysis
makes use of a political economy framework. This framework is
based on that proposed by Harris (2013), but slightly adapted to
take into consideration the fact that this research is not driven by a
pre-identiﬁed problem, but is rather exploratory in scope (Fig. 3).
Two main areas are identiﬁed as the subject of analysis e on the
one hand, the structural features which include the historical, cul-
tural, geographical context and the relevant ‘rules of the game’
(institutions), such as policies, regulations and social norms; on the
other, the agency features relating to themain actors, their interests,
incentives and relations of power, and the analytical concepts that
may explain actors' decision logics and behaviours. In particular, as
analytical concept, we apply ‘agency theory’, which describes a
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situation where someone (principal) delegates a task to another
person (agent). The principal typically faces problems in controlling
the agent, as (i) the agent's interest may differ from the principal's,
and (ii) the agent has better information than the principal on her
actions (Kiser, 1999). In economic theory, to minimise these issues,
a monitoring system and/or the alignment of incentives are needed
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Sociological and management theories deal
with more complicated situations as they loosen assumptions
allowing for multiple principals, multiple agents (which leads to
‘collective action problems’), as well as multiple interests of both
principals and agents e for example, agents may not be necessarily
self-interested, utility maximisers (which leads to ‘stewardship
theory’ (Perrow, 1986)). In our analysis, we will ﬁnd two interre-
lated sets of principaleagent relations, each riddenwith its speciﬁc
problems. Some of the dimensions indicated in the framework (e.g.,
cultural, social, geopolitical factors, climate change, technology) are
relatively little explored as our focus rest on the health sector-
speciﬁc dynamics.
4. Findings
4.1. Structural features and context
Despite their proximity and the fact that they are all predomi-
nantly Mende in ethnic composition, the three districts are rather
different for historical legacies and contextual features, including
socio-economic and health indicators (Table 1). Kenema is a fairly
large district with vast rural areas, although Kenema Town is the
third city of Sierra Leone. Some of the diamond mining areas are
located in Kenema and the district was severely affected by the
conﬂict, with destruction of infrastructure and population
displacement. Bo is the second city of Sierra Leone and the most
urban and least poor district among the three (WB & SSL, 2013).
During the war, internally displaced people (IDP) camps were set
up and Bo witnessed the presence of health NGOs (one of which
still operating) engaged in directly providing health services to
those populations. Moyamba is the most rural and poorest district
among the three (second poorest in Sierra Leone) (WB& SSL, 2013).
Fig. 1. Maps of Sierra Leone's districts.
Fig. 2. Summary of characteristics of key informants at district level (n ¼ 18).
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In all three districts, the local health system is organized in a py-
ramidal way with a district hospital (and a second NGO-run hos-
pital in Bo e see below) and three types of primary-level facilities
(Peripheral Health Units e PHUs).
4.2. Relevant formal institutions
Institutions are “the ‘rules of the game’ in a society or, more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human
interaction” (North,1990: p.3). They can be formal, such as laws and
regulations, and informal, i.e., accepted and stabilized political,
social and cultural practices, such as ‘patronage’ or the practice of
‘tipping’. For HRH in Sierra Leone, in spite of the on-going decen-
tralisation process, formal institutions aremostly set at central level
and apply uniformly across districts. The institutional framework to
regulate HRH issues is delineated in the Human Resource for Health
Policy and Human Resource for Health Strategic Plan 2012e2016.
However, our research highlights discrepancies between centrally-
deﬁned policies and practices on the ground as it reveals that
formal institutions (i.e., ofﬁcial policies) deﬁning the HRH incentive
structure are re-shaped both by implementation challenges com-
mon to the three districts, and by informal HRH incentive practices
at local level. Below we describe the implementation challenges
ﬁrst, then the district-speciﬁc actors, before exploring the dynamics
between them and the informal practices that emerge.
HRH reforms described in the context section have been
implemented in a very centralized way. Salary uplift and payroll
updating were managed by the Ofﬁce of the Payroll within the
MoHS. Little HRH management is performed at district level,
although in theory it is a function that has been devolved to
Councils and DHMTs. The DHMTs are responsible for the
deployment of health workers within their district, but HRH
management is not performed systematically as no staff within
the DHMT is speciﬁcally in charge of HRH. DHMTs have no control
over other HRH issues, including the skill mix of the staff they are
allocated, career progression and payment. Meanwhile, the
payroll in Freetown is increasingly imprecise and our survey
found that 15% of the sampled health workers are not paid. At the
same time, the PBF scheme's external veriﬁcation, carried out in
April 2014, reports delays of more than one year in payment of
PBF bonuses (Cordaid, 2014). As a consequence, health workers
have no insight into the relation between performance and pay-
ment. Internal veriﬁcation of PBF indicators is supposedly done
quarterly and jointly by DHMT and Local Councils. In practice,
only one third of Councils is involved (Cordaid, 2014), while
DHMTs face numerous logistic and time challenges to carrying it
out regularly. As a result, the veriﬁcation process is weak and the
external veriﬁcation found ﬁgures between 12% and 73% different
to those of the internal one (Cordaid, 2014). As for the remote
allowance, most respondents were unaware of its existence
altogether or of the ways it works. Cross-checking between sur-
vey, health workers' interviews and key informant interviews, it
emerges that payments were delayed since mid-2012 (soon after
its beginning) because of cash-ﬂow issues, and they stopped by
the end of 2012.
This description highlights the challenges in the implementa-
tion of the ofﬁcial HRH policies, which are related to operational
issues at central level, and in particular the slowness in adminis-
trative procedures, funding gaps and cash-ﬂow problems. However,
the general narrative from actors at central level remains one of
‘success’ of the FHCI and related reforms (Witter et al., 2015). On the
other hand, for actors operating at local level, the implementation
failures and the detachment of policy-makers from the reality of
the ﬁeld are a cause of frustration:
“The real key issue is that with all of these policies and all of
these strategies, none of them have been properly operational-
ised and none of them have stayed around. Like, in 2002, there
was a free health care policy announced for pregnant women,
lactating mothers, under 5, the elderly, disabled, all this, right,
and then it just didn't happen. So free health care is announced
again in 2010, and it's like, OK, it's happening, but is that going to
slowly start to fall apart? If PBF is announced, it's like, oh it
comes and then it stops, you know.” (international NGO).
As formal institutions fail (and are expected to fail), informal
institutions and practices emerge at local level.We introduce below
the main actors present at local level, their objectives and re-
lationships, before turning to the informal institutions.
Fig. 3. Analytical framework to explore the political economy dynamics at local level.
Source: Adapted from Harris (2013).
Table 1
Summary of basic socio-economic, demographic and health system information for the three districts.
District Area
(Km2)
Population
(World
Pop, n.d.)a
Poverty
headcount
(WB &
SSL, 2013)b
Rural HH
(WB &
SSL, 2013)b
Num. Of
PHUs
(MoHS)
Average
remoteness of
PHUsc (health
worker survey)
Tot num. Of health
workers (MoHS
2013 e DHTM,
hospital and
PHU staff)
Deliveries in a
health facility
(SSL & ICF
International,
2014)
Under 5 mortality
(deaths per 1000
live births) (SSL &
ICF International,
2014)
Nutrition (children
under 5 years
who are stunted)
(SSL & ICF
International, 2014)
Kenema 6053 569,300 62% 59% 116 2.01 1134 77% 224 39%
Bo 5219 524,500 51% 55% 131 1.74 908 72% 173 45%
Moyamba 6902 320,900 71% 92% 99 2.66 346 33% 199 34%
a Projections for 2010 based on 2004 census.
b Data from Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey 2011
c Scale from 0 (urban) to 4 e facilities included are a random sample of all PHUs in the district.
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4.3. Main actors at district level, their activities and agendas
In Kenema, a few local and two main international NGOs oper-
ate in the health sector. One of these, a large humanitarian NGO, has
a holistic focus on the health sector and operates in three war-
affected districts (including Kenema) since the end of the conﬂict.
At the time of the research, its health activities were enacted
through the support to the public health system, covering all 121
Peripheral Health Units (PHUs) in the district and focussing in
particular on Maternal and Child Health (MCH). The NGO is rec-
ognised by the DHMT and other NGOs as the “driving force” in the
district (key informant e international NGO). Its activities include
provision of extra drugs and equipment for MCH, beyond those
distributed under the FHCI, support to communication and referral
system, including an ambulance for MCH emergencies. Looking
speciﬁcally at HRH, the NGO provides training, which entails per
diem payments to health workers, as well as supervision and
coaching to PHU staff through monthly visits (the DHMT only visits
facilities every quarter), which are focused on the same indicators
and checklist of the PBF scheme. The NGO used to provide a salary
supplementation to health workers employed in the public PHUs,
but ended this practice once the PBF scheme was introduced to
avoid the duplication (key informant e international NGO). How-
ever, the NGO still provides a monthly lump-sum payment to
DHMT, Council and Hospital staff who do not receive PBF payments,
as well as in-kind support for DHMTactivities, such as vehicles, fuel,
etc. for supervision and PBF veriﬁcation.
In Bo, the context is more fragmented as several NGOs have
divided up their activities roughly based on a geographical repar-
tition of the chiefdoms, although not all PHUs receive external
support. One international NGO with a humanitarian mission is
present, but was phasing-out its activities. It still runs a hospital at
the site of an IDP camp during the conﬂict where it provides clinical
services, and, while it used to include 110 facilities, it now supports
only a few public PHUs with drugs and equipment, and an ambu-
lance referral system. The health worker survey revealed that this
NGO is one of the few which still provides a salary supplement of
about 5e6% of the monthly salary to public health workers in the
supported PHUs. This payment has consequences for the DHMT's
ability to regulate the distribution of staff, as some health workers
refuse to move away from PHUs with where incentives (key
informant e DHMT). There are two other main NGOs in Bo, an in-
ternational and a local one. They both focus on MCH activities and
provide rehabilitation of infrastructure, equipment and drugs,
ambulance for referral, and mobile phones for communication to
some of the PHUs in the district. In terms of HRH activities, while
they both provide training and related per diems to the health
workers, none pays supplementary incentives. While the ﬁrst NGO
admits not to be able to carry regular supervisions, the second,
which only supports 13 facilities, is able to provide supervision and
coaching, which also aims to “equip PHUs so they get more PBF
money” (key informant e local NGO).
Finally, in Moyamba there are two main international NGOs in
the health sector, both focussing exclusively on nutrition, and
supporting 49 and 40 public PHUs respectively with overlaps in
some facilities. Both NGOs visit the public PHUs either monthly or
twice a month (while the DHMT reports to be visiting facilities
quarterly), but only on ‘feeding days’ in order to supervise those
activities. Joint NGO-DHMT supervisions also focus only on nutri-
tion services. There are no external actors supporting MCH activ-
ities and therefore PHUs receive no (extra) drugs or equipment, and
staff has little MCH supervision, training and no other payments
from external organisations.
Overall, the distribution of the NGOs between districts seems to
be deﬁned by historical legacies and patterns which emerged
immediately post-conﬂict, with large humanitarian NGOs estab-
lished in the conﬂict-afﬂicted districts of Kenema and Bo, and the
relatively recent NGO presence in Moyamba. Additionally, the
choice of focal activities and operational approaches seems to be
based on the NGO's own missions rather than on local health pri-
orities and needs.
4.4. Relationships and balance of power
Relations between actors at district level are negotiated through
various committees, as well as bilateral meetings between the
DHMT and each NGO. Ofﬁcially, DHMTs are required to chair the
District Health Coordination Meeting (DHCC) which is supposed to
meet quarterly and is the main coordination forum, including the
DHMT, the Local Council and all health partners. In Kenema, the
DHCC appears to be meeting regularly, but one key informant
(DHMT) reports that this was not the case for the previous one or
two years. While in Bo the DHCC is reported to meet regularly, in
Moyamba it seems to have happened rarely, if ever. Other com-
mittees may be created ad hoc for different reasons, including
addressing donor's requirements. For example, in Kenema, an NGO
reported that another ‘stakeholder meeting’ is held quarterly and
explained that:
“The stakeholder meeting, we wanted it because it is in our
proposal to meet with district partners, whilst the DHCC is
theirs [of the DHMT]. But it is almost just like the same thing;
but the key difference is, ehm, this [stakeholder meeting] is
mainly [NGO] kind of programme focusing on reproductive
health issues. But the DHCC now is [focused on] all health things
and matters” (international NGO).
In other cases, NGOs prefer to hold bilateral meetings with the
DHMTs. In Moyamba, for example, the two main NGOs, although
both working on nutrition issues, prefer to address their concerns
directly with the DHMT rather than in multilateral meetings (key
informant e international NGO).
These interactions through bilateral meetings or committees are
clearly characterized by a substantial asymmetry of power, both
regarding ﬁnancial resources as well as access to information be-
tween the parties. On the one hand, DHMTs struggle to ensure the
coordination of activities to avoid duplications and balance prior-
ities and they have no lever to enforce it when NGOs are not willing
to engage. As they chronically lack funds even for tasks that they are
mandated to carry out by the MoHS (e.g., routine supervision, PBF
veriﬁcation, etc.), they have to rely on NGOs for support. As one
DHMT staff stated:
“[… ] at the end of the day, who pays the bride price calls for the
tune. [… ] They have their own priorities. [So] at times, as head
of the district, you need to strike the balance, because the NGO
world is a very powerful world [… ], so our own duty is to see
where you can tap into their resources” (DHMT).
On the other hand, depending on their approach or their donors'
requirements, NGOs either seek to align with DHMT and MoHS
policy or need, at least formally, the ofﬁcial support of the DHMT for
their activities. Providing the DHMT with in-kind donations (ve-
hicles, motorbikes, fuel, communication means, etc.) or cash al-
lowances to support its tasks, or at least those that match the NGO's
objectives and scope (geographical, disease-wise, missionewise,
etc.), becomes a bargaining tool to ensure the smooth running of
both NGO and DHMT activities. In this ‘bargaining’, DHMTs have
varying levels of oversight over the amount and timing of funding
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and donations, as budgets are usually not shared or known in
advance by NGOs:
“Even with our yearly planning, you ask them [NGOs] for their
own budget, what they plan to do, and it is very, very difﬁcult to
get it from them” (DHMT).
The result of the differences in objectives, resources and power
is an ‘unbalanced’ mutual dependency between DHMTs and NGOs,
which often leads to frustration on both sides.
4.5. Relevant analytical concepts to explore actors' incentives and
decision logics
To analyse these dynamics and the logic behind actors' behav-
iours (the last element of our framework), we found helpful to
explore elements of agency theory delineated above. While DHMTs
and NGOs are co-dependent for the implementation of activities,
they are not tied together in a principaleagent relation. Instead,
they act (at least, in theory) as agents for two different principals,
the MoHS and the funders/donors, respectively. Not only do the
usual agency problems apply to both cases, but for the case of in-
ternational NGOs an ample literature exists on the challenges
presented by multiple principals and accountabilities, ‘steward’
behaviour coupled with ﬁnancial, material pressures, and
competitive incentives resulting in collective action problems
(Cooley and Ron, 2002; Edwards and Hulme, 1996). Moreover,
although all principals should share the same overall objectives and
approaches, in reality these are slightly different, at least in the way
they are operationalised. This results in differences between the
two sets of principals and agents, for example, in activity focus
(speciﬁc diseases/conditions versus system approach), geograph-
ical targeting, long versus short-term planning and budgeting,
quantity of activities carried out versus quality, willingness to co-
ordinate, etc. Moreover, objectives and incentives of NGOs and
DHMTs are not perfectly aligned. For instance, some NGOs are
rewarded to reach a large number of beneﬁciaries, a target which is
not only difﬁcult to measure, but also does not take into account
quality issues and the speciﬁc features of the context, including the
need to avoid duplication with other NGOs. Some NGOs may be
required to coordinate with the DHMTandwork in partnership, but
the practice is rather unbalanced, as we showed, given the absence
of common planning and budgeting tools. In other cases, especially
if funded with own resources, NGOs have little reason to coordinate
with DHTMs. In conclusion, the misalignment of agendas and in-
centives of DHMTs and NGOs, who are accountable to different
principals, is reﬂected in their bargaining dynamics and objectives.
In turn, the bargain shapes local-level practices, including HRH
incentives.
4.6. Informal institutions and HRH incentive practices at local level
Because formal institutions deﬁning HRH incentives partially
fail when implemented or are expected to fail and, at the same
time, district-level actors continuously negotiate to achieve their
objectives, a set of informal institutions (i.e., established and stable
practices) emerge at local level. In the case of HRH incentives,
informal institutions take the form of selective supervisions and
support to some programs (e.g., PBF), as well as salary supple-
mentations and per diems paid to individual workers to provide
extra remunerations beyond those ofﬁcially set. Salary supple-
mentations and per diems have received attention in the health
literature, mostly for their disruptive effect. Speciﬁcally, salary
supplementations are discussed in relation to vertical disease-
focused programmes because of their potential to create parallel
systems (Brugha et al., 2010; Hanson, 2012; Mussa et al., 2013). Per
diems have been explored as ‘corrupt’ practices, with perverse
consequences for the health system's performance and governance
(Chene, 2009; Ridde, 2010; Vian et al., 2013).
At district level, informal HRH incentive practices have a key
function as they are used to achieve a better ﬁt between the health
workers' incentive package and the NGOs' objectives and agendas.
Because of this, they are deﬁned by the district-level actors' moti-
vations, resources and approaches, mediated by the negotiation
processes with the other actors, including the DHMT. Indeed, our
analysis shows that different local dynamics produce differential
HRH practices, inﬂuencing ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incentives.
Provision of equipment and drugs, rehabilitation, and selective
supervision and coaching can act as non-ﬁnancial incentives,
improving the working environment and motivating those health
workers deployed where such support is in place and for the pro-
grammes/activities which have been selected. Moreover, access to
drugs can be a powerful ﬁnancial incentive for health workers if
there is room for misappropriation and informal sale. Finally, such
support can also entail a potential increase in PBF revenues, per
diems and top-ups. Based on the survey data, we observed a vari-
ation between individual health worker remuneration across dis-
tricts (although there are limitations to this analysis because
samplingwas representative of the entirety of PHUs in each district,
regardless of the proportion of those supported by the different
NGOs and because of other confounding factors), Table 2 provides
preliminary evidence of the impact of local-level dynamics on in-
dividual health workers' incomes.While the difference in salaries is
non-signiﬁcant across districts, in Kenema, the long-term presence
of a large NGO, working closely with the DHMT, and expanding its
coverage over time to include all PHUs with a clear focus on MCH
activities results, at individual level, in higher income from PBF,
whose indicators focus only on MCH, and higher per diems. In Bo,
the fragmentation of the support, with many PHUs not covered by
external organisations, results in substantially lower incomes
compared to Kenema both for PBF individual bonuses and per di-
ems. InMoyamba, where almost all PHUs are covered by NGOswith
a focus on nutrition, the picture is mixed, with the lowest income
levels from per diems, and PBF bonuses substantially lower than in
Kenema but higher than Bo. Ultimately, the different levels of
revenue for each component are reﬂected in the total income for
health workers, which is found to be unequal across districts.
5. Discussion
The analysis of the district-level dynamics shows the effects of
the interplay between structure (i.e., context, historical legacies and
formal and informal institutions) and agency (actors, agendas and
power relations) on HRH incentives. The ‘bargaining’ process be-
tween actors at local level and the informal practices it creates can
modify, substantially in some cases, the individual health workers'
incentive package. The result is a discrepancy between ofﬁcial HRH
incentive policies and actual practices.
The role of NGOs at district level emerges as one of the driving
factors in shaping HRH incentives. Similarly, Pfeiffer (2003) de-
scribes the model of collaboration between international NGOs and
primary healthcare in Mozambique. Although the focus is at indi-
vidual level (expatriate personnel and their local counterparts) and
on the social dynamics rather than political economy ones, he ﬁnds
that ofﬁcial coordination coexists with behind-the-scenes deal-
making which “hinged on the provision of extra ﬁnancial beneﬁts
to health workers in a new aid-speciﬁc patronage system” (Pfeiffer,
2003: p.732). In his ethnography of an aid project, Mosse (2004:
p.639) describes how development practices are “driven by amulti-
layered complex of relationships and the culture of organizations
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rather than policy”. At the same time, “actors work hardest of all to
maintain coherent representations of their actions as instances of
authorized policy, because it is always in their interest to do so”
(Mosse, 2004: p.639). Our cases highlight a similar pattern. The
district-speciﬁc context and dynamics shape HRH practices and re-
shape the health workers' incentive package deﬁned at central level
in different ways, while most NGOs strive to maintain a narrative of
alignment and harmonization with national policies and DHMTs.
On the other hand, though, NGOs are also accountable to their
funders. Often donors do not reward coordination (Pfeiffer, 2003)e
or if they do (as in our case in Kenema, in line with Mosse's point),
they impose coordination as a box to tick with the creation of a new
‘inclusive’ committee rather than by strengthening existing struc-
tures. The lack of coordination, combined with the unbalanced
mutual dependency between NGOs and DHMTs, is a cause of con-
stant frustration, as recounted by our key informants and described
in other studies (Gilson et al., 1994).
Coordination of the ‘unruly melange’ of external actors has long
been recommended (Buse andWalt, 1997). Most NGOs are aware of
this issue and some have signed a Code of Conduct (Health Alliance
International, 2008). Tellingly, three articles out of the six which
compose the Code refer to HRH practices, including hiring, remu-
neration and in-service training. However, such calls do not seem to
be sufﬁcient, if not accompanied at national level by strengthened
effort for coordination between ‘principals’ to ensure alignment of
incentives, and by the explicit consideration of the existence of
local-level practices. At the other end of the ‘bargaining’ process,
the role of the DHMT as agent for the MoH should be also carefully
considered, as it is central for stewardship, coordination and
priority-setting at district level. Since the Harare Declaration of
1987, the role of the Health District as a key agent for the func-
tioning of health systems and the delivery of primary health care
has been stressed, with the recommendation to decentralise
ﬁnancial and HRH management, and adopt district planning pro-
cesses (CoP Health Service Delivery, 2013). DHMTs have also been
at the centre of attention for their governance role to ensure
accountability both upward, i.e. towards higher-level health
administration agencies and the MoH, and downward, i.e. towards
the communities they serve (Cleary et al., 2013; Van Belle and
Mayhew, 2014). However, Van Belle and Mayhew (2014) note
how “constrained decision-spaces, inadequate resources and ca-
pacity hamper public accountability practices” of DHTMs, while
other studies highlight the prevalence of informal practices in HRH
management, because of the lack of power, resources and institu-
tional incentives to enforce formal rules (George, 2009).
In light of our ﬁndings, it seems essential to empower DHMTs
with tools to redress the power imbalances between them and the
external actors at local level, in order to create a more effective and
balanced ‘mutual dependency’. These tools include transparency in
budgeting and planning processes, increased ﬁnancial and human
resources, improved skills and capacity, widened decision-spaces,
and openly shared objectives and agendas. The current planning
process in Sierra Leone envisages a bottom-up approach with the
preparation of district plans which should feed into a national plan.
However, the preparation of district plans appears to the DHMTs
themselves a formal exercise based on pre-set and unrealistic
items, rather than an essential and locally-adapted tool. The result
is a wish-list of activities for which there is unsecure funding, given
the meagre DHMT resources and the unknown or unpredictable
NGOs activities and budgets (key informantdDHMT). In contrast,
realistic and contextualized planning, budgeting and reporting
should be strengthened under the DHMT leadership so that it
would (i) deﬁne in advance a plan of activities and tasks, based on
the nationally-deﬁned health priorities (rather than NGO/donor-
speciﬁc ones), adapted to the local context. Such plan should
leave enough room for ﬂexibility and adaptation to the evolving
context and potential stressors or emergencies (such as the Ebola
outbreak); (ii) identify those responsible to carry activities out and
when; and (iii) include all resources available, from internal and
external sources, in a transparent and predictable manner. The
latter could be done through district-level ‘basket funds’, pooling
resources available and envisaging a funding mechanism linked to
the accomplishment of each task, which would hold actors
accountable for their performance under the same contractual
framework. While this process would dramatically reduce the in-
ﬂuence of external partners, with reference to our HRH case, it
would, in parallel, improve the alignment of HRH practices to the
nationally-deﬁned incentive package, eliminating the room for
extra salary supplementation and differential support to national
policies, and standardizing per diem payments. Limiting the un-
balanced bargaining processes at local level would not only create a
more equal partnership between actors in the local health system,
which could beneﬁt HRH and other practices (including priority-
setting and service delivery), but could also improve governance
at local level and ensure the responsiveness and accountability of
DHMTs towards communities, civil society and patients alike.
From a methodological perspective, these ﬁndings stress the
importance of looking at both structural and agency factors (related
to multiple internal and external organisations), and exploring
their variation across contexts. If policy is political, implementation
is no less so (Morgan-Trimmer, 2014). This calls for the use of tools
that allow a closer look into the political economy to unravel them
in research programs, and to take them openly into consideration
when implementing programs (Brinkerhoff and Bossert, 2013;
Erasmus and Gilson, 2008). This analysis also shows that qualita-
tive tools and a ﬂexible political economy framework incorporating
elements of institutional economics can be useful to illuminate
these dynamics.
6. Conclusions
Our analysis looked at what happens in three districts of Sierra
Leone when HRH incentive policies established at central level are
translated into practice. We presented not only the formal in-
stitutions deﬁning the incentive package and how effectively (or
not) they are implemented at local level, but also analysed the
informal institutions and practices that emerged as the outcome of
the ‘bargaining’ process between the local health actors. We have
shown how the political economy dynamics between those actors
deﬁne incentives with effects that ultimately extend to the
Table 2
Average income of PHU staff from selected sources and total monthly income in the three districts (Leones).
District Income from PBF Income from per diems Income from salary Total income (incl. All sources of
revenue)
Mean [95% conf int] Mean [95% conf int] Mean [95% conf int] Mean [95% conf int]
Kenema 102,392 79,387 125,398 207,722 160,331 255,114 491,276 445,702 536,851 849,903 763,069 936,737
Bo 57,112 40,258 73,966 134,132 91,974 176,289 516,984 467,925 566,044 786,986 694,985 878,986
Moyamba 92,985 72,196 113,773 109,966 85,512 134,421 484,913 444,007 525,819 719,854 653,579 786,130
Note: 1 USD ¼ 4270 Leones (October 2013).
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individual health workers. Moreover, the comparison of the three
districts shows how differences in contexts and actors lead to
different HRH practices. The consequence is a discrepancy between
policy and practice, and inequalities across areas of the country.
Some scholars conclude that this discrepancy is intrinsic and
unavoidable (Mosse, 2004). We believe that it is possible to go
beyond this, if key actors at central level (government, MoH and
development partners) and at district level (local councils, DHMTs,
local and international NGOs) remain aware of these dynamics and
ensure that they are channelled in a way that, as much as possible,
contributes to the reinforcement of the health system. A more
careful attention to the role of DHMTs and NGOs as local health
actors, as well as the balance of powers between them within a
bargaining process turned into open and transparent planning, may
improve policy implementation. Moreover, research focussing on
the evaluation of interventions and their implementation must
carefully investigate these dynamics and adopt tools that allow for
their exploration.
In the current context of the Ebola virus epidemic afﬂicting Si-
erra Leone, our ﬁndings are particularly relevant. Indeed, some of
the weaknesses we highlighted may have played a role in the
collapse of health services induced by the outbreak. For instance,
the disconnect between central authorities and districts, the poor
provision of central support functions, the narrow mandates of
NGOs, and the rigid incentives related to pre-determined results
may have reduced the responsiveness and resilience of the local
health systems in the face of the Ebola challenge. Some scholars
have hinted at the heavy NGO involvement in healthcare in Sierra
Leone and Liberia as one of the reasons for the delay in the control
of the epidemic, because it removed from local governments the
responsibility of coordinating a single healthcare policy and
because of the lack of investment at the meso-level of health
administration (Abramowitz, 2014). As this analysis illuminates the
political economy dynamics that were shaped in the post-conﬂict
period, their legacies and impact on local practices, it can also
provide useful insights for the post-Ebola transition and health
system reconstruction.
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8. Capturing HWs’ complex remuneration: a comparison of 
methodological approaches 
 
8.1 Preface 
 
After setting the background to the issue of the complex remuneration of HWs by exploring the drivers and the 
outcomes of HRH policy-making at central level (Chapter 6) and HRH practices as implemented in the districts 
(Chapter 7), in the following chapters (Chapters 8 to 10) I move on to the individual level perspective.  
 
The first research objective at this level is to describe the remuneration structure of primary HWs in the study 
districts and the absolute and relative levels of each of their income in order to map the complex remuneration of 
HWs. As detailed in the Methods (Chapter 5), the research carried out for this thesis made use of different tools 
to collect information concerning the multiple remunerations of HWs, namely: a cross-sectional survey, which 
included a series of indirect questions for sensitive incomes, and a self-administered longitudinal logbook filled in 
daily over 8 weeks. The present chapter (Chapter 8) provides a description of the analysis carried out to calculate 
the remuneration estimates based on the different approaches and each of the estimates is analyzed, carefully 
triangulated and compared, and reflected upon.  
 
This section is drafted as a thesis chapter rather than an academic paper. The choice of presenting in a separate 
chapter the comparison of the methodological approaches and the calculation of the income estimate, which is 
then used for further analysis in Chapter 9, was made because of the limited space that is usually allowed in 
journal publications which did not permit to explain the detail of the methodological procedures. Indeed, the 
research papers included in Chapter 9 (Bertone and Lagarde, 2016; Bertone et al., 2016a) make use of the final 
income estimate which is calculated as detailed in this chapter. While they provide a brief explanation on the data 
sources, they do not report the analysis behind its calculations, which is presented here. 
 
In the following pages, first, I review and summarize the approaches used to collect data on the remuneration 
received by the HWs from each source. Then, I present the results based on each of these data collection 
methods, before comparing them and describing which data sources were used for the final income estimate 
needed for further analysis in Chapter 9.   
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8.2 Approaches used to collect data on HWs’ remuneration 
 
As Chapter 5 describes, three different approaches were adopted to collect quantitative data on the incomes of 
the HWs: a cross-sectional survey including (i) direct and (ii) indirect questions, and (iii) a self-administered 
longitudinal logbook. However, not all income sources were captured by the three approaches. Direct questioning 
in the cross-sectional survey focused on remunerations considered less sensitive (i.e. salary, remote allowance, 
PBF bonus, share of the user fees, salary supplementations or top-ups, per diems, earnings from non-health 
income-generating activities) and did not include questions on sensitive remunerations (i.e., gifts and payments 
received in kind or cash from patients, sale of drugs and other items within the health facility, private practice). 
Instead, those were captured with indirect questions. Finally, HWs were also asked to record all incomes earned 
on their daily logbook, for 8 weeks. Additionally to the self-report, when visiting the facilities to collect the filled-in 
logbooks, enumerators carried out an end-line interview with the HWs, checked the logbooks, probed for 
potentially missing incomes and summarized the information in weekly summary sheets. Figure 8.1 below 
provides a summary of the remuneration amounts collected under each methods.  
 
Figure 8.1: Overview of the remuneration questions included in the three data collection methods 
 
 
 
As a consequence of this approach, while there is a complete overlap between the information collected from the 
survey (through direct and indirect questions) and from the logbook so that all information is available from the 
two tools and can be triangulated, there is no perfect overlap between direct and indirect questioning so that 
some information is available from one but not from the other. In particular, data on sensitive incomes are only 
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available from indirect questioning, while data on all other, less sensitive incomes are available from direct 
questions1. 
 
The rationale for collecting information on HWs remunerations based on different approaches was an attempt to 
test and potentially compensate the biases of each of them and reflect on the advantages and disadvantages of 
the methods to capture HWs remunerations. One initial hypothesis was that the cross-sectional survey would 
have led to the underestimation of many remuneration components due to recall bias. In particular, irregular 
remunerations such as per diems, PBF bonuses, gifts/payments from patients, as well as earnings from sale of 
drugs or other items, private practice and non-health activities were thought to be potentially more subject to 
recall bias compared to regular and fixed incomes such as salary, remote allowance and top-ups. In contrast, it 
was envisaged that the data collection through a longitudinal logbook filled in daily would have limited the recall 
bias of HWs. Additionally, collecting longitudinal data on HWs’ remunerations via the logbooks was considered to 
have another advantage as it allowed capturing the level of variation of irregular incomes over time. A second 
hypothesis concerned the possible normative bias of sensitive remuneration components. Indirect questioning 
was applied to those incomes to address such possibility, for activities that are illegal or informal and subject to 
negative perceptions which could have led to a substantial underestimation of the amounts earned.  
 
  
                                                          
1
 Questions on the amounts earned for sensitive incomes were not asked among the direct questions of the survey, because asking about 
those remunerations twice (once directly and once using indirect questioning) would have defeated the purpose of using a technique apt to 
mask the real amounts earned. 
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8.3 Income estimates from the three data collection approaches 
 
This section looks separately at the income estimates based on the three different approaches used for data 
collection, highlighting issues and challenges in data analysis and interpretation for each of the methods, before 
comparing the results in the next section. 
 
8.3.1 Results from direct questions in cross-sectional survey 
 
Data from the direct questions in the cross-sectional survey were entered, cleaned and descriptively analyzed. 
Particular attention was given to distinguish between missing values (no response), non-applicable question (e.g. 
remote allowance for those posted in urban areas) and 0 Leones value. The descriptive results, standardized as 
average monthly estimates, are summarized in Figure 8.2. For the purpose of the analysis, CHAs and 
nurses/midwives were grouped together as they have similar grades in the MoHS designation plan.  
 
Figure 8.2: Average monthly remuneration per component by cadre, estimated from direct questions 
 
Note: Exchange rate: 1 USD = 4,270 Leones (October 2013) 
 
 
8.3.2 Results from indirect questions in cross-sectional survey 
 
Data on sensitive remunerations were collected through indirect questions. HWs were asked to roll a die, unseen 
by the enumerators, then add the result of the die roll to the actual amount earned in Leones (or add 0 if they did 
not earn any income from that particular source), and report to the enumerator only the final result of the 
calculation. This way, even the enumerator would not know the actual amount earned.  
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The adapted die had the following values: 20,000; 30,000; 50,000; 80,000; 250,000; 400,000 (Figure 5.6 – 
Chapter 5). Therefore, the expected mean of a die roll, known to the researcher, was 138,333 Leones (Le.), with 
a confidence interval ranging between 114,755 and 161,912 Le. for the entire sample of 266 HWs. By subtracting 
the average earning as recorded from the sample of HWs, it is possible to calculate the actual average of amount 
earned from each of the informal activities. However, in practice, the calculations based on the actual averages 
obtained from the survey led to negative results, summarized in Table 8.1. 
 
Table 8.1: Results from indirect questions on sensitive incomes 
Income question Average earning as 
recorded  
Expected average 
from die roll 
Estimate of actual average 
amount earned  
Gifts/payments from patients 128,707 138,333   -9,626 
Sale of drugs and other items 134,422  138,333   -3,911 
Private practice 116,266 138,333   -22,067 
 
 
The reasons behind the negative results could be related to practical issues in the design and administration of 
the indirect questioning survey, as well as to the ‘reticence’ of HWs to report the correct amounts. Concerning 
practical design issues, one problem rests on the relatively low number of HWs sampled which resulted in a 
relatively wide confidence interval in the expected die results. Additionally, for the game to be effective, the mean 
and distribution of the die roll should be similar to the expected mean and distribution of the remunerations to be 
estimated. However, the mean earning amounts for those sensitive questions, and their distributions was 
unknown before the survey, and it is likely to be non-normal (unlike the die distribution). Moreover, during the 
administration of the survey, it is possible that some HWs did not fully understand the procedures they had to 
follow and, for example, did not add the amounts to the die roll. 
 
More importantly, the negative results could be caused by the reticence of HWs to answer truthfully those 
questions, even with an approach that concealed the real answer. A focus-group discussion with the enumerators 
to debrief about the first round of data collection highlighted that, because of the high sensitivity of the questions 
and the stigma attached to earning incomes from those sources, HWs were unlikely to report a high number out 
of the calculations, even when the number was the result of a high die roll, rather than their actual earning. 
Despite explanations and reassurance by the enumerators that the number stated and recorded was “just a 
number”, and not their actual earning, HWs attempted to provide lower estimates. One common way of doing so 
was by throwing the die again until they got a lower die results to which to add their actual income. This reticence, 
despite the indirect questioning technique adopted, is not dissimilar to what found by Lensvelt-Mulders and Boeije 
(2003) when exploring the motives of respondents to give social desirable answers or cheat on the rules during 
computer-administered indirect questioning, as well as, in a setting more similar to Sierra Leone, by Akwataghibe 
et al. (2013), when investigating financial coping strategies of HWs in Nigeria, including giving priority to activities 
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that enabled the earning of per diems, pilfering drugs from facilities and accepting informal payments and gifts 
from patients in return for priority treatment. 
 
8.3.3 Results from self-reported incomes in longitudinal logbooks 
 
The information on amounts earned from each remuneration sources was also collected through the longitudinal 
logbooks. In adopting this method, one of the main concerns was the potential high attrition. Table 8.2 reports the 
absolute and relative loss to follow-up during the 8-week prospective period of data collection. Enumerators 
reported that the reasons for not filling in the logbooks were related both to the fact that they required extra work, 
as well as to personal circumstances (e.g. HWs moved to another facility, travelled to town, were sick or 
pregnant, etc.). The relative high number of HWs who did not fill in the logbook for week 8 is mostly due to logistic 
reasons, as some HWs were visited mid-week and did not have time to fill in the full week-long logbook. 
However, until week 7, the overall loss to follow-up was low. Further analysis of the HWs lost to follow-up shows 
that, though not systematically different by district of posting, there were a higher proportion of drop-outs among 
CHOs (perhaps because of their higher burden of work), than among CHAs, nurses and MCH Aides. Additionally, 
despite the relatively low attrition, the analysis revealed that some logbooks were not fully filled-in, with pages or 
the income column left blank in some cases, which raises issues about the quality and reliability of the data 
collected.  
 
Table 8.2: Loss to follow-up over the 8 weeks covered by the logbooks 
Week HWs lost to 
follow-up 
Proportion of 
HWs lost to 
follow-up 
HWs having filled in 
their weekly logbook 
w1 8 3% 258 
w2 8 3% 258 
w3 8 3% 258 
w4 12 5% 254 
w5 19 7% 247 
w6 19 7% 247 
w7 20 8% 246 
w8 53 20% 213 
 
 
The length of the follow-up could have also influenced the responses in two different ways. On the one hand, 
HWs could have become more accustomed to the task and therefore accurate in filling in the logbook as time 
passed. On the other hand, they could have become increasingly fatigued and therefore underreport their 
earnings. The analysis shows no clear trend in the reporting for irregular remunerations, such as private practice, 
non-health activities, sale of drugs and per diems. The only exception is gifts and payments received from 
patients, which shows a decrease in reported remunerations over time (Figure 8.3).  
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Figure 8.3: Amount received for irregular/occasional remunerations over time (week 1 to 8) 
Gifts and payments from patients 
 
Sale of drugs and other items 
 
Private practice 
 
Incomes from non-health activities 
 
Per diems 
 
 
 
Logbooks proved to have the advantage of recording the variability in remuneration levels between weeks, in 
particular for those remunerations that are occasional and irregular. This is particularly clear, for example, for the 
per diems estimates (last panel in Figure 8.3 above), which reflect the organization of some of the activities for 
which HWs receive per diems, such as training and immunization campaigns. While not all the activities ongoing 
in the districts and involving some or all of the facilities are known, it is known that on week 3 an Human 
Papilloma Virus (HPV) vaccine campaign took place in Bo, and at varying time on weeks 6, 7 and 8 a polio 
vaccine campaign was carried out in all districts. 
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The total income amount based on the logbook data was estimated by calculating the average weekly amount for 
each remuneration source that varied from week to week (per diems, incomes from non-health activities, sale of 
drugs, gifts and payments from patients and private practice) and standardizing it to monthly values, and then 
adding the estimate for the remunerations received monthly (salary, top-ups and share of user fees), and 
quarterly (remote allowance and PBF bonus), the latter also standardized as monthly value. Figure 8.4 presents 
the final monthly income estimate, by component for the different cadres of HWs.  
 
Figure 8.4: Average monthly remuneration per component by cadre, estimated from logbooks 
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8.4 Comparison of income estimates 
 
In this section, a comparison of the income estimates obtained from the different methodological approaches is 
presented. I also present the rationale and calculations for the compounded estimate used for further analysis of 
the HWs remuneration. 
 
Overall, I find that income estimates from logbooks were lower compared to those from the direct questions of the 
survey for most components (Table 8.3). Statistical tests for difference between direct questions and logbook 
estimates (paired t-test) confirm that differences are significant for most income components for MCH Aides and 
CHAs/nurses (except for share of user fees for MCH Aides), while for CHOs estimates are not significantly 
different (except for per diems), most probably due to the smaller sample. 
 
It appears that the general finding of lower amounts for logbook estimates is true both for remunerations that are 
regular and received once a month or once a quarter, but also for those that are occasional. In the first case, 
which includes salary, remote allowance (negligible in practice), PBF, share of user fees and top-ups/salary 
supplementations, the lower amount could be explained by the fact that the specific income was not received 
during the 8 weeks of logbook records, either because it was a quarterly income or because the payment was 
late or not physically collected, and therefore not accounted for by the HWs. The latter is often the case with 
incomes received on a bank account located in the district towns and far from the posting of HWs. However, the 
reasons for lower estimates in the irregular remunerations is more puzzling as these are those hypothesized to be 
better captured by logbooks, which should have limited the recall bias of the survey. However, the lower estimate 
may be due to the lack of completeness and low reliability of the logbook. Additionally, while it was hypothesized 
that the recall bias in the survey estimate would have led to a under-estimation of the amounts earned, it is 
possible that HWs, when not precisely remembering the amounts earned, tended to actually overestimate them. 
The reasons which could lead to the overestimation of some incomes may be related to the HWs reporting 
theoretical incomes, rather than what actually received, or may be influenced by HWs’ perceptions on the 
importance they ascribe to some of their incomes within their financial coping strategies (Chapter 9 - Bertone and 
Lagarde, 2016). 
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Table 8.3: Comparison of average income estimates for survey (direct questions) and logbooks 
Income component Cadre Survey 
estimate 
(Leones) 
Logbook 
estimate 
(Leones) 
p-value of paired t-test 
testing if average 
income estimates are 
different 
Salary 
CHO 799,700 708,115 0.0509 * 
CHA+nurse    554,526 395,228 0.0004 *** 
MCH Aide    443,971 359,102 0.0001 *** 
Remote allowance 
CHO -- -- - 
CHA+nurse 3,867 425 0.2676 
MCH Aide 3,030 -- - 
PBF bonus 
CHO       114,805        17,529  0.0019 
CHA+nurse       87,277        23,150  0.0000 *** 
MCH Aide       75,373        25,504  0.0000 *** 
Share of UF 
CHO         41,607        18,679  0.1712 
CHA+nurse       16,111          4,719  0.0041 *** 
MCH Aide         8,500          6,443  0.3301 
Top-ups 
CHO           3,333          3,333  no difference 
CHA+nurse -- -- - 
MCH Aide -- -- - 
Per diems 
CHO       254,554     117,099  0.0227 ** 
CHA+nurse    210,355        57,382  0.0000 *** 
MCH Aide    104,658        54,636  0.0000 *** 
Non-health activities 
CHO         66,533        25,516  0.2209 
CHA+nurse       67,534        16,024  0.0098 ** 
MCH Aide       17,285          3,221  0.0002 *** 
Sale of drugs 
CHO -- 10,790 - 
CHA+nurse --         3,608 - 
MCH Aide -- 5,261 - 
Gifts and payments from 
patients 
CHO -- 42,026 - 
CHA+nurse -- 54,266 - 
MCH Aide -- 35,446 - 
Private practice 
CHO -- 5,431 - 
CHA+nurse --         6,984 - 
MCH Aide -- 8,580 - 
Note: CHO: n=27, CHA+nurse: n=71, MCH Aide: n=244.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
8.4.1 Income estimate used for further analysis  
 
In order to further the analysis on the complex remuneration of HWs and calculate the absolute and relative 
amounts earned from each sources, as well as the determinants of the income received and their levels, one 
single income estimate for each HWs was needed. For what concerned sensitive remunerations (i.e., gifts and 
payments from patients, sale of drugs and other items, private practice), because of the problems with the indirect 
questioning which led to negative results, the choice was limited to only one possible option, i.e. relying on the 
logbook estimates. The estimate is likely subject to some degree of normative bias because of the sensitivity of 
the earnings, but it was hypothesized that the prolonged relation between HW and the same enumerator over 
time, with three in-person visits and multiple calls and texts, may have increased trust, leading to a higher level of 
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disclosure and improved reliability of the answers beyond what expected from direct questions in a cross-
sectional survey.  
 
On the other hand, for what concerns non-sensitive remunerations, data both from cross-sectional survey (direct 
questions) as well as from the longitudinal logbooks were available. It was decided to include the estimates based 
on the survey in the final income calculation. The choice was relatively straightforward for ‘regular’ incomes 
received monthly or quarterly (i.e., salary, remote allowance, PBF, share of user fees and top-ups), which were 
not well captured by the daily logbooks. For the irregular remunerations (i.e., per diems, earnings from non-health 
activities, sale of drugs, gifts and payments from patients and private practice), the choice was done because the 
self-reported estimates of the logbooks were considered to be of lesser quality and reliability than the answers to 
the survey, administered by trained enumerators. Table 8.4 provides a summary of the data sources used to 
estimate each component of the HWs remuneration in the research papers included in Chapter 9. 
 
Table 8.4: Summary of data sources for the estimate of each remuneration 
Type of income Data source 
Salary Cross-sectional survey (direct questions) 
Remote allowance Cross-sectional survey (direct questions) 
PBF bonus Cross-sectional survey (direct questions) 
Share of user fees Cross-sectional survey (direct questions) 
Top-ups Cross-sectional survey (direct questions) 
Per diems Cross-sectional survey (direct questions) 
Income from non-health activities Cross-sectional survey (direct questions) 
Sale of drugs and other items Longitudinal logbooks  
Gifts/payments from patients Longitudinal logbooks  
Private practice Longitudinal logbooks  
 
 
8.4.2 Discussion 
 
The research carried out for this thesis made use of multiple and innovative approaches to collect data on HWs 
remunerations, test the differences between the different estimates obtained and reflect on the reasons of the 
variation. This experience with data collection methods points to some key issues on how to produce an estimate 
of the formal and informal remunerations of HWs, and on the advantages and disadvantages of some of the 
potential approaches. 
 
In particular, the original idea for this research was to use different methods based on some hypotheses relative 
to each of the approaches adopted. While some of these hypotheses were confirmed during data collection, 
others were not. Table 8.5 provides a summary of the rationale behind the initial selection of the different data 
collection approaches, the actual results and the possible explanations behind the results observed. 
 
Chapter 8 – Capturing HWs’ complex remuneration | 115  
Table 8.5: Summary of initial hypotheses that led to methods’ choice, results and possible explanations 
Method Initial hypotheses  Results Possible explanations 
Cross-
sectional 
survey 
(direct 
questions) 
Recall bias likely to lead to 
underestimation of all 
income components 
Generally, higher estimates from 
survey than logbook 
• Lack on completeness in logbooks 
• In the survey, HWs reported theoretical 
income rather than what actually received  
• HWs’ perceptions around own income 
Indirect 
questioning 
More reliable estimates for 
sensitive incomes 
Negative results  
(under-reporting) 
• Reticence of HWs even with indirect 
questions masking the real answer 
• Design issues (mean earnings and 
distribution unknown) 
Longitudinal 
self-reported 
logbooks 
• High attrition rate 
• Capture variation over 
time of irregular incomes 
• Acceptable attrition rate over 
time, but: 
• Lack of completeness and 
low quality of entries 
• Some variation over time 
captured 
• Self-reported estimates 
• Time consuming exercise 
 
 
 
This research highlights the advantages and disadvantages of the possible methods to collect HWs income data 
(Table 8.6). Overall, surveys prove to have the advantage of low costs and limited time requirements which allow 
for an increase in sample size and higher statistical power. However, surveys are subject to recall bias, especially 
for irregular incomes, and looking at the logbook results, HWs will tend to over-estimate these revenues. 
Additionally, surveys carried out at one point in time do not capture the elements of the HWs’ remuneration which 
vary from one week to the next, because of seasonality (e.g. incomes from agricultural activities, in-kind gifts from 
patients) or with no specific patterns (e.g. per diems for training and workshops, private practice, etc.). Finally, 
directly asking questions on the amounts earned for informal incomes may be extremely sensitive and lead to 
normatively biased answers, because such earnings are illegal or because of the negative perceptions around 
them. I attempted to address this issue by using one of the indirect questioning techniques (i.e., the randomized 
response technique), although results point to HWs’ reticence also under this approach.  
 
 
Table 8.6: Advantages and disadvantages of methods for data collection on HWs multiple remunerations 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Cross-sectional 
survey (direct 
questions) 
• Relatively inexpensive and rapid 
 
• Recall bias (in which direction?) 
• Does not capture variation over time 
• Normative bias for sensitive questions  
Indirect 
questioning 
• More reliable estimates on sensitive 
questions (in theory) 
• Relatively rapid to administer 
• Less efficient (needs larger sample) 
• Complex to administer (requires well trained 
enumerators) 
• “Reticence” of HWs, acceptability and 
understanding 
Longitudinal 
logbook 
• More precise estimation for irregular 
incomes  
• Multiple contacts with the same 
enumerator increase trust and 
improve quality of data on sensitive 
incomes 
• Self-administered and time consuming / extra 
work for HWs  low reliability and 
completeness 
• Costly and time consuming for researcher / 
enumerators 
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In conclusion, collecting reliable estimates, especially on sensitive incomes, remains a challenge and other 
approaches could be tested in this sense by future research. Although further exploration could be made with 
indirect questioning, overall, it appears that cross-sectional surveys remain a good option for the task, especially 
in settings similar to this study and given limited resources. A potential solution which could be envisaged to 
improve the estimate from surveys is to carry out multiple cross-sectional surveys repeated over time (e.g., every 
3-6 months). This would allow to better capture the variability and seasonality of the incomes. Mixed-method 
approaches, coupling quantitative methods with in-depth and key informant interviews and direct observation, are 
essential to provide essential additional information to better understand the context and key issues of the 
complex remuneration of HWs in a specific setting, as well as complement and explain the income information 
based on the survey with that from other sources.  
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9. Analyzing the complex remuneration of HWs 
 
9.1 Preface 
 
After setting the background to the policies and the implementation practices that define the complex 
remuneration of HWs at macro and meso levels in Chapters 6 and 7, Chapter 8 focused on the methods to collect 
data and estimate the different components of the individual HWs remuneration. The present chapter (Chapter 9) 
presents the in-depth analysis of the complex remuneration of primary HWs in the three study districts, going 
beyond the description of the absolute level of each income estimate.  
 
The analysis has been divided into two research papers, presented below. The first one (section 9.3) focuses on 
all the components of the remuneration of HWs, while the second (section 9.5) looks specifically at one 
component, that is the performance-based financing (PBF) bonus. The decision to separate the analysis into two 
publications was made, firstly, because of the limited space allowed in journal articles which did not permit to 
present all the findings in one paper. Secondly, specific issues emerged in the HWs’ interviews concerning the 
linkages between PBF, and its features beyond the face monetary value, and HWs’ motivation. Because of the 
relevance of PBF and motivation issues in the current international debate for researchers and policy-makers 
alike, it was deemed important to carry out a separate analysis and report it in a second paper. 
 
The two research papers are rather similar in the overall structure. First, they present a description of the 
remuneration of HWs, and of the absolute and relative level of their different incomes. Second, they examine the 
determinants of both the likelihood of receiving a certain income, and of the income level. This analysis is carried 
out for variables at individual level, as well as for facility characteristics and based on the district of posting, and it 
contributes to identify the causes, at these levels, behind the variability in incomes and the complex 
remuneration. Finally, the consequences of the complex remuneration of HWs are explored from the own 
perspective of HWs, by looking at their views on each of their incomes, including monetary amount, but also non-
financial features and the interaction between incomes. The first paper focuses specifically on the use that HWs 
makes of each income and discusses the consequences of the different elements of the HWs remuneration 
(remuneration structure, perceptions on the income level, financial and non-financial features of the incomes, 
income use) on the financial coping strategies that HWs enact. The second paper looks at how the motivational 
potential of PBF payment is transformed, positively or negatively, by the HWs’ perceptions of the payment, its 
features and its interaction with other incomes within the complex remuneration, as well as by the PBF 
implementation issues.  
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Abstract
Exploring the entire set of formal and informal payments available to health workers (HWs) is
critical to understand the financial incentives they face and devise effective incentive packages to
motivate them. We investigate this issue in the context of Sierra Leone by collecting quantitative
data through a survey and daily logbooks on the incomes of 266 HWs in three districts, and carry-
ing out 39 qualitative in-depth interviews. We find that, while earnings related to the HWs official
jobs represent the largest share, their income is fragmented and composed of a variety of pay-
ments, and there is a large heterogeneity in the importance of each income source within the total
remuneration. Importantly, each income has different features in terms of regularity, reliability,
ease of access, etc. Our analysis also reveals the determinants of the incomes received and their
level based on individual and facility characteristics, and finds that these are not in line with HRH
policies defined at national level. Additionally, from their narratives, it emerges that HWs are ‘man-
aging’, in the sense both of ‘getting by’ and of enacting financial coping strategies, such as mental
accounting (spending different incomes differently), income hiding to shelter it from family pres-
sures, and re-investment of incomes to stabilize overall earnings over time, in order to ensure their
livelihoods and those of their families. These strategies question the assumption of fungibility of in-
comes and the neutrality of increasing or regulating one rather than another of them. Together, our
findings on earning and income use patterns have important policy implications for how we go
about (re)thinking financial incentive strategies.
Key words: Human resources, incentives, income use strategies, income hiding, mental accounting, Sierra Leone
Key messages
• This study describes the incomes of primary health workers in Sierra Leone and finds that salaries make up about 60%
of the total revenues, while the rest is composed by a variety of formal and informal incomes.
• Health workers’ narratives reveal that the satisfaction related to the incomes does not depends only on their amounts,
but also on non-financial features. Based on these features, health workers choose to assign incomes to different uses.
• These findings have policy implications for designing incentives as they call for more attention to the earning opportuni-
ties for health workers beyond formal allowances, and to the HWs own perspectives which question the assumption of
income fungibility.
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Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increased attention to the deter-
minants of health workers’ (HWs) motivation, and in particular the
role of financial incentives (Willis-Shattuck et al. 2008). Some coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa have embarked on reforms to increase
salary levels (Mueller et al. 2011), while new incentives such as per-
formance-based financing are increasingly introduced (Witter et al.
2012). In some settings, remunerations from external sources, such
as salary supplementations (‘top-ups’) and per diems from aid agen-
cies, are thought to account for an important part of HWs’ income
(Ferrinho and Van Lerberghe 2000; Vian et al. 2013). Moreover,
given the weak regulatory capacity of governments and the presence
of informal healthcare markets in many low-income settings (Ensor
and Witter 2001), HWs often engage in various other activities,
including private practice, non-health activities such as trading or
agriculture, informal fees requests and illegal sale of drugs (Roenen
et al. 1997; Ferrinho and Van Lerberghe 2000). The existence of
multiple sources of income, that we termed ‘complex remuneration’,
creates a multifaceted set of incentives which may affect the motiv-
ation and performance of HWs in several ways (Bertone and Witter
2015a).
A comprehensive approach to the study of financial incentives is
essential to describe the income of HWs and the relative and abso-
lute level of each of the income components, beyond those received
for their official job. However, with some exceptions (McCoy et al.
2008), few studies look at the entire set of earnings, and little is
known about the individual and facility characteristics associated
with the fragmented income structure and with the variability in in-
come levels, or about the implications of such fragmentation in
terms of HWs’ views and relative satisfaction with the different
components of their income. From a policy perspective, taking into
account the full set of incomes of HWs is essential in order to design
effective incentive packages. These issues are particularly critical,
and even less studied, in post-conflict settings where the fragmenta-
tion of the health system and the presence of many, often uncoordin-
ated, actors at local level may determine the multiplication of
payment sources.
In this paper, we look at the case of healthcare providers work-
ing in public primary care facilities in three districts in Sierra Leone.
Using a quantitative survey, the study aims firstly at describing the
level of each source of income, and their relative importance. We
then model the determinants of the incomes received to explore
which factors, at individual and facility level, affect them. Finally,
we explore the HWs’ perceptions about each of the revenues, and
how incomes are relevant to them, beyond the amount. By exploring
the HWs’ narratives on income use, we also investigate their finan-
cial coping strategies and the role that the different incomes play in
those.
Context
After a decade of armed conflict and social and economic unrest,
Sierra Leone has been rebuilding its health system since 2002. In
order to increase the demand for health services and improve health
outcomes, user fees for maternal and child health services were
removed in April 2010 (Donnelly 2011). Given the low number of
HWs (in 2011, there were an estimated 0.071 doctors and 0.631
nurses per 1000 people in the public sector) and their uneven distri-
bution (Witter et al. 2016), with the launch of the Free Healthcare
Initiative (FHCI), a series of reforms were designed and imple-
mented to address the issues of distribution, retention and
motivation of the health workforce (Bertone et al. 2014). These re-
forms included the cleaning of the Ministry of Health (MoH) payroll
to eliminate ‘ghost workers’ and add those working without salary,
a salary increase and a one-off fast-track recruitment and deploy-
ment process to increase workers in rural areas. In 2011, a perform-
ance-based financing (PBF) scheme was launched which includes
bonuses for individual staff based on facility performance, and in
2012 a remote allowance for those working in rural posts was intro-
duced. In parallel, donors and most NGOs adopted measures to en-
sure the alignment and rationalization of the HWs’ incentive
package, in particular, by abolishing salary top-ups linked to vertical
programs and disease-specific activities (e.g. HIV/AIDS services).
However, these reforms have only been partially implemented
and many challenges remain (Witter et al. 2016). Since the technical
assistance to the Payroll Unit ended, the MoH payroll is increasingly
imprecise. An external verification of the PBF scheme, carried out in
April 2014, reported delays of more than one year in the payment of
PBF bonuses (Cordaid 2014). As for the remote allowance, pay-
ments stopped by the end of 2012 because of cash-flow issues
(Bertone et al. 2014). Moreover, the implementation of policies
relies on NGOs at district level, whose presence varies considerably
for geographical coverage and service/disease focus. Among the
three districts where the research was carried out (Bo, Kenema and
Moyamba, all in the southern part of Sierra Leone), Moyamba is the
most rural and poor district. Two main NGOs, focused on nutrition
services only, worked there. In Bo, a wealthier and more urban dis-
trict, several NGOs divided up their activities based on a geograph-
ical repartition but not all facilities were supported, and in Kenema
few NGOs operated, with the leading one covering all facilities and
providing support on a broad range of maternal and child health
services (Bertone and Witter 2015b). Additionally, since May 2014,
Sierra Leone has been afflicted by an unprecedented Ebola Virus
Disease (EVD) outbreak. The epidemic started weeks after the con-
clusion of fieldwork for this research so that this paper reflects the
situation as it was before the epidemic. However, there is emerging
evidence that the EVD outbreak may have emphasized the fragmen-
tation of HWs’ remuneration.
Methods
Study design
This is a mixed-methods study carried out in three districts in Sierra
Leone, which were purposefully chosen to allow for variation in
number of NGOs, as well as level of poverty, urbanization and type
of facilities—that we hypothesized to have an impact on the remu-
nerations of HWs. In the districts, primary quantitative and qualita-
tive data were collected at individual HW level. Ethical clearance
was obtained from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine and the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review
Committee.
Quantitative data
Quantitative data were collected between September and December
2013 by a team of ten trained enumerators. A random sample of
198 primary health facilities were chosen, out of the 346 in the three
districts. The sample was constructed to include the same number of
facilities in each district (n¼66) and to include all types of primary
healthcare facility, i.e. Community Health Centers (CHC),
Community Health Posts (CHP) and Maternal and Child Health
Posts (MCHP). Within each facility, enumerators selected 1 or 2
workers (for MCHPs and CHCs/CHPs respectively) who were
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clinically qualified and available on the day of the survey. ‘In-
charges’ (i.e. managers of facilities) were interviewed before other
qualified cadres. A total of 266 HWs were interviewed, encompass-
ing two cadres of non-physician clinicians: Community Health
Officers (CHOs) and Community Health Assistants (CHAs); two
cadres of nurses and midwives; and a cadre of nursing aides
(Maternal and Child Health Aides—MCH Aides). For the purpose
of the analysis, CHAs and nurses/midwives are grouped together as
they have similar grades in the MoH designation plan.
HWs were administered a face-to-face survey that included
open-ended questions on the amount received monthly for the fol-
lowing sources of income: salary, remote allowance, individual PBF
bonus, share of the user fees charged for non-exempted services,
top-ups or salary supplementations, per diems and income-generat-
ing activities outside of the health sector. The questionnaire also
included questions on demographic information (sex, age, marital
status, cadre, education, role within facility, i.e. in-charge or staff)
and facility characteristics (type of facility, remoteness level, dis-
trict). In addition, at the end of the interview, HWs were given log-
books to fill daily for a prospective period of eight weeks. In their
logbooks, HWs had to report their activities, as well as revenues
earned each day. Each HW was visited by the same enumerator
three times over the 8 weeks, and received regular calls and text re-
minders. We believe that this prolonged relation and the consequent
increased trust may have led a higher level of disclosure of informal
incomes in the logbooks (Corti 1993). Therefore, to estimate the
total income, we added, to the incomes estimated in the survey, data
from the logbooks for revenues from illegal sale of drugs, gifts and
payments from patients and private practice.
Qualitative data
We conducted two rounds of in-depth interviews in November–
December 2013 and March-April 2014, with a sub-sample of 39
HWs purposefully selected among the 266 above. HWs were chosen
to reflect a wide variety of views and situations in terms of cadre,
but also rural/urban, male/female, type of facility, in-charge/staff
and district and to be in line with the mix of health workers in the
districts (Table 1). The semi-structured interview guide was itera-
tively adapted during the rounds of interviews, and interviews were
carried out until saturation was reached. The main issues of focus
were (1) income sources, and views on level and fairness and (2)
strategies for the maximization, stabilization and use of income(s),
including at individual, household and facility level.
Quantitative data analysis
Income data were converted to monthly equivalents and used to
construct the total income of HWs. We calculated the average
monthly amount for each income and its importance relative to total
income. Then, we estimate two types of multivariate regressions.
The first estimates a logistic regression to explore the determinants
of the likelihood of receiving each type of income (the dependent
variable is equal to 1 if the HW declared to have received some rev-
enue from that particular source in the past month). In the second
model, we run a linear regression model to estimate the determin-
ants of the level of each type of income, and total income received
(the dependent variables are log-transformed income amounts). For
both models, we explore the influence of individual (i.e. gender, age,
cadre/qualification, role within facility), as well as facility character-
istics (i.e. type of facility, urban/rural, district).
Qualitative data analysis
Qualitative interviews were recorded, transcribed and manually
analysed using content framework analysis (Ritchie and Lewis
2003). Qualitative data were explored in complementarity to quan-
titative data, in a deductive and inductive way, i.e. both to confirm
and further explore issues emerging from quantitative analysis (such
as, HWs’ views and perceptions).
Results
Health workers’ remuneration: income components and
fragmentation
The characteristics of the sample of HWs surveyed are summarized
in Table 2. Overall, results show that the monthly income of pri-
mary HWs are 164 USD for MCH Aides, 235 USD for CHAs/nurses
and 314 USD for CHOs (Figure 1). They also point to the fact that
HWs’ remuneration is complex and fragmented, with revenue from
official job activities (salary, remote allowance, user fees and PBF)
contributing to 71% of total income for CHOs, 66% for CHAs/
nurses and 76% for MCH Aides. Governmental salary is the major
source of income for public primary healthcare workers, although it
represents only slightly more than half of their total income. The se-
cond major source of income are the per diems paid by the MoH or
external organizations for activities such as attending trainings, tak-
ing part in or supervising immunization campaigns. Per diems make
up between 15% and 21% of total income depending on the HW
cadre. The next most importance source of revenue is PBF bonuses
received, providing about 10% of the total income for all cadres,
while top-ups seem to represent very limited additional revenue for
HWs. Because of the exemptions under the FHCI, user fees also rep-
resent a small share of HW revenue (1–3% of total income), with
only 27% of HWs declaring to have received revenue from user fees.
Similarly, revenues from under-the-counter sale of drugs and other
items and private practice represent a negligible proportion of HW
income (all <1%). In contrast, although incomes declared as ‘gifts
and payments from patients’ may be underestimating the under-the-
table payments for health services still illegally charged to patients
(as partially documented in Denney and Mallett 2014), the fact that
74% of workers declared to be receiving them and their estimate at
3–5% of total revenues seems to be reliable with reference to an-
other aspect of the relation between HWs and patients/communities.
Indeed, it emerged from the interviews that under this category
Table 1. Characteristics of respondent sample for qualitative data
collection
CHO
(n ¼ 4)
CHA þ Nurse
(n ¼ 10)
MCH Aide
(n ¼ 25)
Total
(n ¼ 39)
Gender
Male 4 3 – 11
Female – 7 25 28
Age (mean) 32.5 47 40.4 41.3
Type of facility
CHC 4 5 4 13
CHP – 4 3 7
MCHP – 1 18 19
Location
Urban 3 6 4 13
Rural 1 4 21 26
District
Bo 3 1 8 12
Kenema – 4 9 13
Moyamba 1 5 8 14
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HWs report gifts usually in-kind (rice, palm oil, cassava, yam, char-
coal, chicken, etc.) that patients and communities provide them
with. Finally, income through activities outside of the health sector
(most frequently: farming, small trading and businesses including
buying palm oil to resell when prices are higher, or credit groups)
represents 2–7% of the income. However, for the 21% of HWs re-
porting such earnings, they represent a substantial revenue, amount-
ing to 20, 23 and 11% of the total income for CHOs, CHAs/nurse
and MCH Aides respectively.
The determinants of remuneration
Beyond the issue of income fragmentation, the analysis of survey
data reveals that there is much heterogeneity in total income as well
as in the revenue breakdown. To explore whether or not differences
are linked to justifiable and observed individual characteristics (e.g.
higher cadres or older HWs earning more) or to HRH policies (e.g.
allowances to HWs in rural areas), we estimated a multivariate re-
gression model of the different income levels. Table 3 presents the
results of the analysis exploring factors associated with earnings
from the main sources of revenue. We find that the odds of earning
income from selling drugs are almost 20 times larger for CHOs com-
pared to CHAs/nurses and MCH Aides (col.6). The odds of receiv-
ing a salary are 11 times larger (col.1) for in-charges (i.e. the facility
managers) compared to staff workers. Their odds of receiving PBF
bonus almost 4 times larger (col.2) and odds of receiving gifts from
patients 3 times higher (col.7). Being young decreases the likelihood
of receiving a salary (OR: 0.206, col.1) but increases the likelihood
of taking up income generating activities outside of the health sector
(OR: 2.014, col.5). Looking at facility characteristics, those working
in CHPs are more likely to receive a salary (OR: 5.702, col.1) and a
Table 2. Characteristics of respondent sample for quantitative data collection
CHO
(n ¼ 30)
CHAþNurse
(n ¼ 76)
MCH Aide
(n ¼ 160)
Total
(n ¼ 266)
Statistical Significance
of difference in
proportions/means
Test used
Gender
Male 73% 42% – 20% p < 0.0001 Chi2
Female 27% 58% 100% 80%
Age (mean) 41.4 40.8 40.9 41 p ¼ 0.946 Bonferroni
Role in facility p < 0.0001 Chi2
In-charge 90% 67% 49% 59%
Staff 10% 33% 51% 41%
Type of facility
CHC 97% 51% 16% 35% p < 0.0001 Chi2
CHP – 42% 29% 30%
MCHP 3% 7% 55% 35%
Location
Urban 30% 32% 21% 25% p ¼ 0.106 Chi2
Rural 70% 68% 79% 75%
District
Bo 60% 30% 34% 36% p ¼ 0.020 Chi2
Kenema 20% 44% 32% 34%
Moyamba 20% 26% 34% 30%
Figure 1. Absolute and relative mean income by cadre and by component. Note: Exchange rate: 1 USD ¼ 4270 Leones (October 2013)
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PBF bonus (OR: 2.509, col.2) than those in MCHPs, but both those
working in CHCs and CHPs are less likely to receive a share of user
fees (OR respectively: 0.284 and 0.296, col.3). HWs working in
urban areas are less likely to receive per diems from external organ-
izations (OR: 0.316, col.4) or gifts from patients (OR: 0.467, col.7),
compared to those working in rural areas. In-depth interviews sug-
gested that this is because most of the gifts received in these rural,
farming areas are in-kind, since this is what patients and commun-
ities have easier access to.
Table 4 reports factors associated with receiving a higher income
for certain sources. As expected, we find that HWs of higher cadres
receive significantly higher salary compared to MCH Aides (col.2).
CHOs also have a higher income from user fees (col.4). Facility in-
charges are shown to earn higher PBF bonuses, and significantly
higher overall income compared to workers in staff positions (col.1).
Workers in higher level facility receive a lower income from gifts
from patients (col.7), but overall have a higher income (significantly
for those in CHCs) (col.1). There is also some heterogeneity across
districts, as workers in Bo receive less PBF payments and per diems
(col.3,5) than those in the other districts, while in Kenema PBF pay-
ments received are higher (col.5). This results in a significantly
higher overall income for HWs in Kenema (col.1).
Health workers’ satisfaction with their incomes
HWs interviewed overall agreed that their salary was the most im-
portant and dependable source of income. However, the majority
expressed dissatisfaction with their salary level stating that is was
‘not enough’ (mentioned by eight HWs), ‘small for the job’ (five
HWs), or ‘not satisfying’ (one HW). The only HWs who had rela-
tively positive views were those already employed before the FCHI,
as they were comparing their current salary level to that before.
While salary payments were reported to be made on time and regu-
larly, HWs mentioned that salaries can only be accessed through the
local branch of banks located in the main towns, far from the rural
facilities where they work. Moreover, because of the issue with the
payroll, all interviewed HWs who (re)trained after 2010 mentioned
they did not receive their salary or received the payment correspond-
ing to their old cadre.
In contrast, HWs’ narratives were overwhelmingly positive when
discussing performance-based payments. PBF was said to ‘help’
(three HWs), to be ‘good money’ (two HWs), or ‘really enough’
(one HW). While these comments were in stark contrast with the
views on salary and at odds with PBF relatively limited contribution
to the overall income, positive remarks have to be understood in the
context of the entire set of payments, and their features. The rather
unpredictable timing and the yearly delays of the PBF payments
(which delink it from the activities performed and the effort exerted
at the time) make the bonuses seen as a gift, with less sense of en-
titlement compared to the salary. It also emerged that PBF was per-
ceived as a complement to the salary. HWs admitted that:
I am happy with it because my salary is so small so if I am getting
that [PBF], I am happy with the government (MCH Aide in Kenema)
Table 3. Odds of receiving revenues from a particular source (logistic regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Received
Salary
Received
PBF
Received
user fees
Received
per diems
Received income
from non-health
activities
Received income
from sale of drugs
Received gifts
HW characteristics
Cadre (omitted category: MCH Aide)
CHO n/a 0.413 2.441 0.332 0.276 19.081 *** 0.985
(0.290) (1.793) (0.263) (0.238) (19.033) (0.750)
CHAþnurse 0.913 0.348 ** 1.966 1.125 0.520 2.128 1.350
(0.783) (0.154) (0.966) (0.535) (0.289) (1.358) (0.683)
In-charge (omitted category: staff) 11.348 *** 3.825 *** 0.878 1.852 2.526 1.384 2.731 **
(7.627) (1.476) (0.354) (0.757) (1.226) (0.751) (1.139)
Male (omitted category: female) 0.370 1.578 1.801 2.804 2.060 0.221 ** 0.296 **
(0.353) (0.721) (0.829) (1.641) (1.066) (0.157) (0.156)
Aged <35 0.206 *** 0.711 1.694 0.982 2.014 ** 1.529 1.247
(0.103) (0.218) (0.561) (0.338) (0.710) (0.702) (0.434)
Facility characteristics
Urban (omitted category: rural) 3.831 1.208 0.931 0.316 *** 1.575 0.819 0.467 **
(2.966) (0.432) (0.348) (0.116) (0.623) (0.427) (0.168)
Type of facility (omitted category: MCHP)
Community Health Center 3.899 2.085 0.284 ** 1.823 1.764 0.309 1.907
(3.000) (1.055) (0.162) (1.024) (1.141) (0.243) (1.044)
Community Health Post 5.702 ** 2.509 ** 0.296 *** 1.223 1.988 0.379 1.595
(3.916) (1.040) (0.137) (0.526) (1.000) (0.238) (0.716)
District (omitted category: Moyamba)
Bo 0.397 0.819 1.780 2.121 1.872 0.771 0.623
(0.248) (0.269) (0.666) (0.825) (0.780) (0.428) (0.230)
Kenema 0.770 1.969 1.664 0.950 2.028 2.227 0.906
(0.505) (0.691) (0.634) (0.341) (0.851) (1.089) (0.354)
Observations 236 266 266 266 266 266 266
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Incomes from remote allowance, top-ups, private practice not shown.
***p<0.01.
**p< 0.05.
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[PBF] helps me because if you are getting your salary, then you
have a small amount adding to that (MCHAide in Kenema).
My salary is acceptable to me with the help of PBF (MCH Aide
in Moyamba)
However, the positive views of PBF payments were mitigated by
their non-financial features, such as the irregularity, the delays in
payment and the complicated and opaque sharing practices which
were caused by those delays (Bertone 2015).
Although some HWs complained that per diems were sometimes
not sufficient to cover transport to and lodging in the place of train-
ing, most agreed that a proportion could be saved and represented a
net revenue. As suggested by the quantitative evidence, interviews
confirmed that per diems were far from being negligible, and some-
times even substantial. One HW recounted, ‘[Once] we had about
600000 Le. [140 USD] for 5 days. I was joyful!’ (CHA/nurse in
Moyamba). Others said that DSA (acronym for Daily Subsistence
Allowance, which is how per diems are referred to in Sierra Leone)
‘is a good thing’ (MCH Aide in Moyamba), ‘is important for us’
(MCH Aide in Kenema). On the other hand, per diems were seen as
unstable and unpredictable, and difficult to depend on for regular
expenditures.
Finally, most HWs viewed engaging in income-generating activ-
ities as a necessary ‘back up’ to complement their revenues. Some
HWs reported to be setting up, or planning to set up, a small busi-
ness or petty trading, once possible. When that was not possible,
many chose to engage in agriculture activities.
500,000 [Leones – MCH Aide salary] is very small, so we have
to do business! (MCH Aide in Moyamba)
I am doing petty trading to back up (CHA/nurse in Moyamba)
I have a cassava field in the backyard. To do business here is im-
possible (MCH Aide in Bo).
Overall, it emerged from the HWs accounts that financial issues
were a major concern for most, and some mentioned income frag-
mentation as a specific problem. When asked about their financial
coping strategies, HWs recurrently said that they ‘manage’:
Well, if I gather everything together at the same time it helps [i.e.
my income is enough], but the money does not come together [at
the same time], it comes in little bits. So what I have at the mo-
ment, I manage with it. I have no other way to do it (CHA/nurse
in Kenema).
I have to manage my life with it [my income] (MCH Aide in
Moyaba)
Well it is not easy. You have to manage yourself (CHA/nurse in
Moyamba)
‘To manage’ can be rightfully interpreted in the sense that they sur-
vive, they ‘get by’, but also that they actively administer and organ-
ize their different incomes and spend them differently in order to
maximize financial options, deal with income instability and ensure
their subsistence and the livelihoods of their families.
Differential utilization of incomes
In-depth interviews provided evidence of the HWs’ differential util-
ization of their revenues, revealing how they take advantage of the
features of each income to choose how and what to use them for.
The general practice seemed to use the salary (i.e. the highest and
Table 4. Determinants of amount of revenue from a particular source (linear regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total income Salary PBF User fees Per diems Sale of drugs Gifts
HW characteristics
Cadre (omitted category: MCH Aide)
CHO 0.283 0.450 *** 0.118 1.215 ** 0.500 1.664 0.331
(0.193) (0.047) (0.283) (0.596) (0.309) (1.537) (0.415)
CHAþnurse 0.116 0.161 *** 0.054 0.758 0.141 0.924 0.044
(0.123) (0.030) (0.186) (0.395) (0.198) (1.192) (0.276)
In-charge (omitted category: staff) 0.529 *** 0.003 0.332 ** 0.082 0.132 0.292 0.459
(0.105) (0.027) (0.158) (0.295) (0.171) (0.532) (0.237)
Male (omitted category: female) 0.035 0.012 0.266 0.317 0.195 0.073 0.016
(0.126) (0.030) (0.173) (0.390) (0.195) (0.661) (0.277)
Facility characteristics
Urban (omitted category: rural) 0.012 0.018 0.109 0.039 0.626 *** 0.946 0.320
(0.099) (0.024) (0.141) (0.303) (0.174) (0.563) (0.240)
Type of facility (omitted category: MCHP)
Community Health Center 0.352 ** 0.021 0.022 0.003 0.283 2.106 0.107
(0.143) (0.037) (0.214) (0.400) (0.231) (1.451) (0.324)
Community Health Post 0.166 0.003 0.126 0.064 0.054 1.701 0.590 **
(0.114) (0.029) (0.161) (0.360) (0.184) (1.052) (0.260)
District (omitted category: Moyamba)
Bo 0.034 0.027 0.656 *** 0.138 0.441 *** 1.509 ** 0.388
(0.094) (0.023) (0.136) (0.311) (0.149) (0.612) (0.211)
Kenema 0.204 ** 0.028 0.160 0.109 0.541 *** 1.614 ** 0.226
(0.095) (0.023) (0.128) (0.322) (0.159) (0.580) (0.205)
Observations 266 241 163 72 198 34 197
R-squared 0.242 0.558 0.240 0.190 0.316 0.357 0.113
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Incomes from remote allowance, top-ups, private practice and non-health income generating activities not shown.
***p<0.01.
**p< 0.05.
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most stable source of revenue) for expenditures that are large and re-
current, such as school/college fees for children and supporting the
(extended) family’s financial needs and requests:
I use it [salary] to provide for my family. Sometimes 50,000
[Leones] remains with me after having spent everything [I need
to take care of the family], so that I buy food and bring it here
for myself (CHA/nurse in Kenema)
[After collecting my salary], I will always see my family and ad-
dress problems there before (CHA/nurse in Moyama).
Even yesterday, [. . .] one of my daughters called me for a certain
amount of money. I went down to the bank and collected the
money and sent it to her in Freetown (MCH Aide in Bo).
Like, the school fees and the college fees depend on the salary.
The side [incomes], I keep them for their feeding and all the
minor things at home (CHA/nurse in Moyamba).
Moreover, salaries are paid into bank accounts located in district
towns. HWs with these accounts were likely to be subject to the im-
mediate financial demands of family members living there. In some
cases, financial pressures exerted on the salary were unavoidable
due to the family’s knowledge (or rumors) of its amount. One HW
recounted:
When the free health care came in action, we were told that our
salary scale will be close to 1 million. This is creating a big prob-
lem in our marital home. Like. . . our husbands, some are not
educated, some did not go to school, so hearing this rumor, they
said it’s true. Then sometime in May-June, something was added
to our salary, so that month we got 1 million, and that rumor
went around. People were saying that our salary is now. that this
is what we are earning. So then when we received our normal sal-
ary [about 500,000 Le.], when I got home I told my husband,
‘here is the salary’, and he said, ‘this is a big lie’. So I told him,
‘let’s go to the bank, there you will find out if it is true or a
lie’(Female MCH Aide in Kenema).
In contrast, revenues from per diems, activities outside of the health
sector and in-kind gifts were used for the personal subsistence and
to address ‘emergency’ issues. Moreover, irregular incomes of an un-
known amount (such as per diems and PBF) have the advantage of
being more easily ‘hidden’ from family pressures, and revenues paid
in cash (i.e. per diems) are readily available to HWs and appear es-
sential for the subsistence of those in rural posts and those not
receiving a salary:
[interviewer] What do you mean, this [per diems] is the only
money you have? You have your salary as well. No. I mean, for
here. Because our salary is paid in our account. For here, we
don’t have any other way to have money’ (MCH Aide in rural
Moyamba).
[I use per diems because] I need things here. We don’t have ac-
cess to bank so we find things difficult (CHA/nurse in rural
Moyamba).
Sometimes DSA is useful because it is no easy to get money here,
because I am not on payroll. It is useful, it helps me (MCH Aide
in rural Bo)
Some HWs recounted using per diems specifically for themselves, in
contrast to other incomes that can be shared with the family. They
said that with per diems ‘I can buy something for myself’ (MCH
Aide in Kenema) or ‘I buy anything I want’ (MCH Aide in Kenema).
Income from activities outside of the health sector had also an
important function as it could provide flexible financial resources
which worked as a mechanism to smooth income and deal with the
irregularity of other revenues. Similarly to per diems, income from
non-health activities was also reported to provide a personal, less
visible allowance. Some mentioned:
I can use this if I run short of money (MCH Aide in Moyamba)
I have to do some little business, because if there are problems I
can solve my problems quietly (MCH Aide in Kenema—em-
phasis added).
In turn, however, the possibility of carrying out business-related
non-health activities depended on having substantial amount of un-
spent money from other sources to be re-invested. PBF, which can
represent a considerable amount paid at once, was seen as useful in
this sense. The emerging hypothesis that non-health income oppor-
tunities are more likely to be available for those with higher incomes
on PBF was tested using survey data, by regressing the amounts
earned from non-health activities on PBF amounts, controlling for
variables at individual and facility level. We found a positive and
significant coefficient (P¼0.05), which confirmed the hypothesis.
Discussion
This study set out to explore the remunerations of public primary
HWs in three districts of Sierra Leone and to investigate the individ-
ual and facility determinants of the income levels, and the implica-
tions that income fragmentation has for HWs. The results confirm
that the remuneration of HWs is made up of different sources, be-
yond the salary and incomes related to their official job. We found
that governmental payments (which include primarily salary and
PBF, as the remote allowance had been discontinued in 2012) repre-
sent the main share of HWs monthly income. This result is similar
to findings in Ghana, Burkina Faso and Nigeria (McCoy et al. 2008;
Akwataghibe et al. 2013). The high share of government pay reflects
the efforts towards harmonization and alignment of remuneration
undertaken by external actors (donors and NGOs) in Sierra Leone
around the launch of the FHCI. In particular, top-ups are found to
represent a very limited additional revenue (only one NGO in Bo
was still providing them at the time of the research). The harmoniza-
tion of incentives in Sierra Leone stands in contrast to the experience
of other countries where the introduction of fee exemptions did not
entail major reforms to ensure incentive alignment (Witter et al.
2016). On the other hand, the share of other incomes remain im-
portant for HWs. In particular, per diems account for an essential
part of their income (15–21%), and non-health activities seem quite
relevant for some workers, with 21% who declare engaging in them.
This compares with 42% of HWs practicing non-medical businesses
in Nigeria (Akwataghibe et al. 2013). In contrast with some of the
literature (Ferrinho et al. 2004a; Akwataghibe et al. 2013; McPake
et al. 2014), revenues from health-related private practice are found
to be limited. Although this could reflect underreporting, the finding
is likely to be explained by the fact that our sample includes lower
cadres of HWs, such as nursing aides, rather than doctors (the focus
of much literature on dual practice), posted in rural areas. In those
settings, HWs often live and work in the same building and do not
have the possibility of practicing in a separate facility. Potential
earnings from outreach or home visits would have been accounted
under ‘gifts and payments from patients’. Also, studies exploring
health seeking behavior in Sierra Leone stress that the alternative to
treatment in public facilities are traditional healers or drug peddlers,
rather than the private healthcare sector, which is underdeveloped
outside the capital (Scott et al. 2014).
Our results also show that in the three study districts there exist
differences between HWs which are explained by individual and
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facility characteristics, as well as differences across districts. In par-
ticular, we found that CHOs are more likely to sell drugs, possibly
given their position within the facility which allows better control of
drug stocks (Ferrinho et al. 2004b). HWs (re)trained after 2010 did
not receive the correct salary for their qualification and younger
ones were less likely to receive a salary, revealing the problems in
the Ministry payroll. In terms of rural-urban posting, we did not
find significant differences in the HWs overall income, despite some
literature suggesting that HWs prefer urban posts as they can earn
additional income in monetized urban economies (Witter et al.
2011). In fact, our findings show that per diems and gifts from pa-
tients were higher for those in rural areas, and there were no differ-
ences in earnings from non-health activities, which were often
linked to agriculture and not viable in towns. However, in the inter-
views HWs stressed their preference for business-related activities
where possible. Again, the absence of a rural–urban divide in in-
comes may be related to the sample which includes lower cadres in
mostly rural areas or smaller towns. A preference for posting in
urban areas remained in the narrative of the HWs, and it is likely to
be linked to factors such as transport and communication issues
(and related costs), working conditions, housing, social relations,
etc. While our results show no unfair economic advantage for HWs
in rural posts, they highlight the absence of specific incentives to
compensate the difficulties of those posts, which had in theory been
introduced with the remote allowance (then discontinued). Finally,
there were important income differences based on the district of
posting, which seems related to the presence of NGOs in the districts
(Bertone and Witter 2015b). All these differences are not in line
with the HRH strategies established at central level, and may have
potential negative effects on recruitment, distribution and motiv-
ation of HWs.
Qualitative interviews showed that features of payments, such as
regularity, reliability, ease of access, etc., are critical to define how
HWs perceive and value each income. It emerged that HWs do not
see incomes as perfect substitutes or fungible. Depending on their
features, revenues will be used differently. This echoes the literature
on ‘mental accounting’, which looks at the practice of assigning fi-
nancial activities to specific accounts, by labelling sources and uses
of funds and grouping them in categories constrained by mental
budgets (Thaler 1999). The main consequence of this practice is that
income in one category can be differently perceived from income in
another (for example, regular income is considered different from a
one-off windfall) and the assumption of fungibility of income be-
comes open for debate, with potential consequences on how we
think about individuals’ and households’ financial decision-making.
The existence of mental accounting has been confirmed in low-in-
come settings (Duflo and Udry 2003; Davies et al. 2009; Villa et al.
2011). We also identified practices to deal with financial pressures
from the extended family. These are in line with rich ethnographic
work on moral and affective economy in Africa (Hyden 2006) and
economics research exploring the effects of kin on financial choices
(Hoff and Sen 2005; La Ferrara 2007). In particular, the practice of
‘income hiding’ to avoid predatory demands from family members
has been documented in sub-Saharan settings, with qualitative and
experimental methods (Baland et al. 2011; Jakiela and Ozier 2012;
Beekman et al. 2015).
Our study has some limitations. Results are not representative of
the entire country, although they cover 57% of all primary care facili-
ties in three of fourteen districts, and our sample may slightly over-
represent in-charges compared to staff HWs. Moreover, HWs in-
comes were estimated using methods and data sources with varying
levels of reliability. Despite the longitudinal logbook method and the
thorough enumerators’ training adopted to limit response bias, it is
possible that certain revenues, and in particular the most sensitive
ones, such as those derived from user fees, illicit sale of drugs or
under-the-table payments, were underreported for fear of conse-
quences (in the case of illegal activities) and because of the negative
perceptions of the public around user fees even for non-exempted ser-
vices (Denney and Mallett 2014). However, although those amounts
are likely to be lower-end estimates, they are still far from negligible
for many respondents, and we are able to derive valuable information
about their existence within the remunerations of HWs.
Together, our findings have important policy implications for
how we go about (re)thinking the design of financial incentive strat-
egies. While salary in Sierra Leone represents more than half of the
HWs monthly revenues and remains their main income, the rest of
the remuneration is made up of sources for which there is no routine
information available and which often escape central-level actors
during the decision-making processes on financial incentive pack-
ages. As a consequence, these incomes can be subject to erroneous
perceptions. For example, despite the widespread views of actors at
central level of the relevance and distorting effects of salary supple-
mentations, our research reveals that this practice had been almost
completely discontinued for primary HWs in the study districts at
the time of the research. Notwithstanding the obvious difficulties in
collecting reliable routine data on all incomes, looking at salaries,
even in conjunction with other official allowances and bonuses may
not be enough to understand what financial incentives HWs face,
and how attractive or not some posts may be. A better knowledge of
the income structure and income opportunities for HWs is essential
to set rules and establish the right incentive environment to address
retention, distribution and motivation issues. In particular, there
seems to be room for coordination with donors and NGOs to align
remunerations from top-ups (as effectively done in the study dis-
tricts), as well as per diems (which remain problematic) and reduce
unfair differences among HWs deriving from those payments.
Importantly, it emerged from our study that HWs use different
incomes in different ways to such extent that incomes are not fully
fungible and the marginal effect of increasing one income source
will not necessarily be equivalent to the marginal effect of increasing
another source. How HWs value their revenue, in relation with one
another and within the broader incentive environment, should be
carefully considered. For example, salary increments could have lit-
tle effect if appropriated by the extended family. On the other hand,
while per diems have perverse effects (Vian et al. 2013) that must
undoubtedly be addressed, they could play a particular role as a sal-
ary complement that is easily accessible and can be sheltered from
family pressures. Similarly, activities outside of the health sector
may have negative effects as they increase absenteeism (Van
Lerberghe et al. 2002), but their revenues have an important role to
deal with income instability.
This study reflects the situation as it was in Sierra Leone before
the ongoing EVD outbreak. While at the time of the research most
of the top-ups from external organizations had been eliminated,
with the outbreak new payments have been introduced. A substan-
tial hazard pay of 196–495 USD/month has been added to the remu-
neration of HWs involved in the EVD response (NERC 2015) and
NGOs and donors are reportedly paying a variety of financial incen-
tives in the specific sites where they operate. These allowances are
poorly mastered at central level and their impact on the motivation
of workers is undocumented. Additionally, they raise questions
about the effects of their discontinuation, especially given their con-
siderable amount. The post-EVD reconstruction phase will undoubt-
edly require new approaches to health system strengthening, taking
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into account the role of incentives for HWs. This study can provide
useful lessons in this sense. It stresses the importance of rationaliza-
tion and alignment of incentives under the MoH lead, as well as the
need for an increased consideration of the underlying potential to
motivate HWs via financial and non-financial features of payments.
Conclusions
This paper highlights a series of important and understudied issues
about the remuneration of HWs, which are likely to have a pro-
found impact on retention and motivation and are of key policy rele-
vance. In particular, it stresses the importance of understanding (and
the potential for harmonization of) financial incentives beyond those
usually known and analyzed at central level, in order to reduce un-
justifiable income differences between HWs, which could have nega-
tive effects on their distribution, motivation and performance.
Additionally, we provide evidence that incomes are not fungible in
the views of HWs, so that the same increase in different income
components may not have the same effects. Reflecting on the fea-
tures and uses of incomes from a micro-level perspective is necessary
to better understand how changes in incomes’ level affect HWs.
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Abstract 
 
Background 
There is growing interest on the impact of performance-based financing (PBF) on health workers’ motivation and 
performance. However, the literature so far tends to look at PBF payments in isolation, without reference to the 
overall remuneration of health workers. Taking the case of Sierra Leone, where PBF was introduced in 2011, this 
study investigates the absolute and relative contribution of PBF to health workers’ income and explores their 
views on PBF bonuses, in comparison to and interaction with other incomes. 
Methods 
The study is based on a mixed-methods research consisting in a survey and an 8-week longitudinal logbook 
collecting data on the incomes of primary health workers (n=266) and 39 in-depth interviews with a subsample of 
the same workers, carried out in three districts of Sierra Leone (Bo, Kenema and Moyamba). 
Results 
Our results show that in this setting PBF contributes about 10% of the total income of health workers. Despite this 
relatively low contribution, their views on the bonuses are positive, especially compared to the negative views on 
salary. We find that this is because PBF is seen as a complement, with less sense of entitlement compared to the 
official salary. Moreover, PBF has a specific role within the income utilization strategies enacted by health 
workers, as it provides extra money which can be used for emergencies or reinvested in income generating 
activities. However, implementation issues with the PBF scheme, such as delays in payment and difficulties in 
access, cause a series of problems that limit the motivational effects of the incentives. Overall, staff still favor 
salary increases over increases in PBF. 
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Conclusions 
The study confirms that the remuneration of health workers is complex and interrelated so that the different 
financial incentives cannot be examined independently from one. It also shows that the implementation of PBF 
schemes has an impact on the way it does or does not motivate health workers, and must be thoroughly 
researched in order to assess the impact of PBF. 
 
Key words: Performance-based financing, remuneration, financial incentives, health workers, Sierra Leone 
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9.5.1 Introduction  
 
Performance-based financing (PBF) schemes are implemented in a growing number of low and middle-income 
countries and in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. At the moment, there are about 34 countries in Africa where at 
least one pilot or regional scheme is in place [1]. In a few countries, notably Burundi, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, 
the setting of this research, PBF has been introduced at national level. In a nutshell, PBF schemes entail the 
payment of a financial bonus to healthcare providers based on their performance, measured by the quantity of 
services provided (or the achievement of a coverage target), out of a list of pre-identified indicators, usually 
adjusted by a measure of structural quality. The performance bonus is normally used for facility running costs and 
individual staff incentives. PBF is envisaged to improve the quantity and quality of services provided by increasing 
the motivation of health workers and their responsiveness to patients’ needs. It is also expected to have positive 
systemic effects through the reorganization and clarification of roles and responsibilities between actors and 
increased autonomy of providers, transparency and accountability [2, 3].  
 
Research on the impact of PBF schemes has substantially expanded over the last years, and studies have 
focused on health outcomes and outputs [4–8], and some process indicators of quality of care [9] and motivation 
of health workers. This last aspect is the focus of this paper. Limited but growing evidence exists on the relation 
between financial incentives and health workers’ motivation and performance, with a focus on whether PBF 
affects intrinsic motivation [8, 10–14]. The evidence so far tends to look at PBF payments in isolation, without 
reference to the broader context of the overall remuneration and the other earning opportunities of health 
workers. However, we know that health workers, and in particular those in low and middle income settings, earn 
their revenues from a variety of official and unofficial sources, both related to their activities in the health sector as 
well as those outside [15–17].  
 
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap in the literature by exploring the role of performance-based payments in the 
context of the entire complex remuneration of health workers, and in relation to the other revenues that they 
receive [17]. Taking the case of Sierra Leone, where a PBF scheme was introduced for primary healthcare 
facilities in 2011, this study investigates the absolute and relative contribution of PBF to the overall income of 
health workers, explores the views of health workers on performance payments, and analyzes their perceptions 
of revenues and livelihoods with regards to PBF but also in interaction with other incomes. The analysis is based 
on a mixed-methods research, including a cross-sectional and longitudinal survey and in-depth interviews with 
public primary health workers, conducted in three districts in Sierra Leone.  
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9.5.2 Study setting 
 
In Sierra Leone, following the launch of the Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI) in 2010 which introduced fee 
exemptions for pregnant women and children under five, a series of complementary reforms has been introduced, 
many of which addressed issues related to the payment and motivation of health workers [18]. First, in 2010, the 
public payroll was cleaned to eliminate ‘ghost’ workers and add ‘volunteers’. At the same time, the salary was 
substantially increased for all technical health workers employed by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS). 
In 2011, a PBF scheme was introduced in primary healthcare facilities nationwide. This scheme was meant to 
complement the salary increase for staff and substitute the ‘cash to facility’ program in place before [18], and 
therefore includes a bonus to be shared between facility and staff. Finally, in 2012, a remote allowance for health 
workers employed in rural regions was also introduced, although it was discontinued towards the end of the same 
year, because of cash-flow issues. These reforms profoundly reshaped the remuneration of health workers, into a 
rational and coherent (at least in the design) package [19]. To align to the governmental policies on incentives, 
donors and many NGOs also gradually eliminated most of the top-ups payed to health workers, and often to 
those in charge of disease-specific services (e.g., TB and HIV/AIDS).  
 
The PBF design was purposefully simple and the scheme was introduced nationally without piloting, but limited to 
primary healthcare facilities and not including hospitals (later, a pilot scheme was also created for two hospitals in 
Freetown). Primary facilities include three types of health centers: Community Health Centers, Community Health 
Posts and Maternal and Child Health Posts1. The performance bonus is calculated quarterly as a fee-for-service 
payment based on the number of services produced for six indicators (Table 9.5) [20]. This means that the facility 
receives a sum equal to the payment corresponding to each one service provided which is included in the 
scheme (e.g., facilities receive 1,000 Le. for each delivery carried out, and a total of 20,000 Le. if 20 deliveries 
have been provided in a month, and so on for each of the six PBF-subsidized services). The bonus accrued from 
the quantity of services provided is then multiplied by a percentage quality score, calculated based on a pre-
defined checklist. The checklist includes items concerning the proper completion of the relevant registries for 
family planning, antenatal and postnatal visits, immunization, under-five consultations, the correct use of 
partograph for each delivery, the existence of a suitable environment for delivery (cleanliness and availability of 
equipment) and of a cold chain for immunization. The total bonus is the sum of the bonus based on the quantity 
provided, plus that same amount multiplied by the quality score (e.g. if the facility above has earned 20,000 Le 
based on services provided and has a quality score of 80%, it will receive in total 20,000+(20,000*80%)=36,000 
Le.). The verification of quantity (by cross-checking the facility registry and declaration) and quality (by compiling 
the checklist) is performed by the District Health Management Team (DHMTs) in collaboration with the Local 
Council, the administrative body at district level. The performance bonus is paid into the facility’s bank account 
every quarter, and can be used for two purposes: a minimum of 40% of the bonus has to be used to cover the 
facility’s running costs and small investments (e.g., sanitation and hygiene materials, furniture and small 
equipment, transport and communication means, stationery, repairs, etc.) and for the payment of casual staff, 
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such as traditional birth assistants (TBAs) and community health workers (CHWs). A maximum of 60% of the 
bonus can be used to pay performance bonuses to staff. The bonus for each health worker is determined 
according to a ‘points’ system based on the cadre of the health worker. For example, Community Health Officers 
(CHOs) and midwives receive 10 points, Community Health Assistants (CHAs) and nurses 9 points and Maternal 
and Child Health (MCH) Aides 8 points. Nurses in-charge of the facility, whatever their cadre, receive 2 extra 
points [20]. For example, if the staff of a facility is composed of one CHO in-charge (10+2 points), one nurse (9 
points) and two MCH Aides (8 points each), they will share the staff bonus in 37 parts (total points in the facility) 
and redistribute the bonus so that each receives as many parts as his/her points. If the bonus received is 36,000 
Le (as in the example above) and the staff decides to share 60% of it (the maximum allowed), i.e. 21,600 Le., 
each part will be of [(36,000*60%)/37]=584 Le. and the CHO will receive (584*12)=7,005 Le., the nurse 
(584*9)=5,254 Le., and the MCH Aides (584*8)= 4,670 Le. each.  
 
[insert Table 9.5 about here] 
 
Despite its simple design, the implementation of the PBF scheme faced numerous challenges. An external 
evaluation by an international NGO was performed in April 2014 looking over the two years of implementation. It 
revealed the weakness of the verification process and found large discrepancies between the indicators verified 
internally by DHMTs and Local Councils and used to calculate the performance bonuses. Moreover, practical and 
logistic challenges in the verification procedures resulted in delays of about one year in the payment of the 
performance bonus [21]. At district level, there is evidence [22] that the implementation of the PBF scheme 
partially depended on the presence of NGOs operating there. In particular, in Kenema, an NGO was supporting 
the PBF scheme, by contributing the logistic and financial means that the DHMT needed to carry out verification 
and supervisions, as well as by providing facilities with training, equipment and drugs focused specifically on the 
services included in the PBF scheme. In the districts of Bo and Moyamba, NGO support to facilities was more 
fragmented and not focused on PBF and PBF indicators.  
 
9.5.3 Methods 
 
This study is based on a mixed-methods research carried out in the districts of Bo, Kenema and Moyamba, 
between September 2013 and April 2014. Quantitative data were collected from about 200 primary healthcare 
facilities, where 266 health workers were interviewed. The sample includes the cadres of trained nurses working 
in health centers, i.e. CHOs (n=30); CHAs, nurses and midwives (grouped together in the analysis) (n=76); and 
MCH Aides (n=160).  
 
Quantitative data collection consisted in a cross-sectional survey and an eight-week longitudinal logbook 
collecting data on HWs incomes. Specifically, the survey focused on demographic information as well as on 
earnings from salary, remote allowance, PBF bonus, share of user fees, top-ups/salary supplementations, per 
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diems, and income-generating activities from outside of the health sector. The longitudinal logbook was left with 
the health workers to be filled in daily with the activities carried out and all the revenues earned each day. After a 
preliminary analysis, it was decided to estimate the total monthly income of health workers by using data from the 
survey where available (i.e. for data on salary, remote allowance, PBF bonus, user fees, salary 
supplementations, per diems, and non-health incomes), and from the logbooks for earnings from sale of drugs, 
gifts and payments from patients, and private practice [23]. Based on these data, we calculated the average 
monthly amount for each income for each individual health worker, including for PBF bonuses. We then 
computed their importance relative to total income, and estimated logistic and linear regressions to explore the 
determinants at individual and facility level of (i) the likelihood of receiving a PBF bonus, and (ii) of the amount of 
PBF bonus received. At individual level explanatory variables include gender, age, cadre, and role within facility, 
while at facility level they include type and size of facility, urban/rural, and district. Data on other factors which 
could influence the amount of PBF bonus via the quality component, such as correctly filled-in registries and 
availability of essential drugs, equipment and infrastructure were not collected.  
 
Qualitative data were collected based on two rounds of in-depth interviews with health workers. In total, 39 
interviews were carried out in November-December 2013 and March-April 2014. Interviewees were purposefully 
chosen as a sub-sample from the quantitative survey sample reflecting the mix of health workers in the districts, 
in terms of cadre, rural/urban post, gender, type of facility and district of posting. A semi-structured interview 
guide was prepared and flexibly used to inform the interviews, while allowing space for new themes and views to 
emerge. The interviews did not focus exclusively on the health worker views of PBF and the changes it brought, 
but were more broadly centered on all the different incomes and sources which make up the total remuneration of 
health workers. Although the topic guide was iteratively adapted during the interviews, the main themes of focus 
remained (i) the health workers’ income sources (including PBF), and views on level and fairness, and (ii) non-
financial features of the incomes which affect the way health workers perceive and use their remunerations. 
Interviews were then recorded, transcribed and manually analyzed using content framework analysis [24]. Coding 
was carried out using a series of pre-defined themes (such as, income features (e.g., how it is paid, timeliness, 
regularity, etc.), health worker income maximization strategies and income uses), as well as by identifying 
emerging themes in the health workers in their narratives. Critically, ‘motivation’ was one of such emerging 
themes, in particular with reference to PBF payments. While all incomes are analyzed together in another 
publication [25], because of the relevance of issues concerning PBF and motivation in the current international 
debate, a separate analysis is carried out in this paper, specifically referring to the health worker views on PBF. 
 
Ethical clearance for all components of the research was obtained from the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine and the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee. Information on the study was 
provided to participants, and their written consent was obtained before the survey and interviews.  
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9.5.4 Results 
 
What PBF contributes to overall health worker income 
 
The descriptive analysis of the health workers’ overall revenues reveals that PBF accounts for 9-11% of the total 
monthly income across the different cadres (Figure 9.2). In comparison, salaries are the main source of revenue 
for health workers, representing between 55% and 63% of the income, while per diem payments are the second 
most important and account for up to 20% of the income. In absolute terms, looking for example at CHAs and 
nurses, this means that salary accounts for about 130 USD monthly, while PBF bonuses contributes 20 USD per 
month and per diems about 50 USD (total monthly income is 235 USD). Other revenues, such as those from non-
health activities (usually farming or small trading businesses) and gifts from patients (usually in-kind support from 
the community) are quite important and together add up to about the same amount as PBF payments.  
 
[insert Figure 9.2 about here] 
 
Determinants of PBF income 
 
The multivariate models presented in Table 9.6 explore which health workers are more likely to receive PBF 
bonuses and higher bonuses. Results show that individual factors do not influence these issues, with the 
exception of being in-charge of the facility. Health workers in charge are more likely to receive a PBF bonus and 
to receive a higher PBF amount than others. The second finding suggests that the scheme is implemented as 
designed, since being in-charge grants more ‘points’ in the calculation of their bonus.  
 
Looking at facility-level characteristics, it emerges that health workers posted in Community Health Posts are 
more likely to receive a PBF bonus, thus pointing to unexpected differences between facilities in the 
implementation of the scheme. Finally, there are important variations at district level, as health workers are more 
likely to receive PBF bonuses in Kenema and receive significantly less in Bo compared to Moyamba. These 
patterns confirm what was found at meso-level in the districts about the implementation of PBF and the effects of 
the presence of NGOs supporting the scheme, for example by providing drugs and technical support on MCH 
services or supporting the DHMT for the verification procedures [22]. In particular, in Bo, the fragmented NGO 
support, which did not cover all facilities, may have resulted in lower PBF bonuses for health workers. 
 
[insert Table 9.6 about here] 
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Health worker views of PBF and motivation 
 
While the quantitative data allow us a preliminary understanding of the relative importance and the potential 
motivational impact of PBF, the qualitative interviews complete and enrich this picture. Overall, health workers 
had positive views on the idea of being paid based on their performance, and reported that effort exerted 
increased following the introduction of performance-based payments. Health workers said:  
 
“It [PBF] helps us improve more in our work. […] You will put more effort” (CHA/nurse in Kenema)  
“We work harder [with PBF]” (CHA/nurse in Kenema)  
“It’s a good system because then you perform. If you do not perform well, you do not receive the money” 
(MCH Aide in Kenema) 
“PBF motivates us. Where do I feel there is a lack? Why are my friends getting more than me? What was 
my problem? Then you sit down and check yourself” (MCH Aide in Kenema).  
 
It is interesting to note that all those quotes were from health workers posted in Kenema, where measures to 
complement the PBF scheme were supported by an external NGO covering all facilities. Moreover, the last 
quote points to the fact that PBF entail a self-reflective process in which in-charges compare themselves to 
their colleagues in other facilities to improve service delivery.  
 
When asked about their views on PBF as an income, health workers seemed to be satisfied and positive, 
especially if compared to the generally negative comments on their salary, even if the latter is their main source of 
income. Health workers said that PBF “helps” (two MCH Aides and a CHA/nurse in Bo, Kenema and Moyamba), 
is “good money” (two CHA/nurses in Bo and Kenema), or “really enough” (MCH Aide in Kenema). The positive 
perception of PBF compared to salary seems to be linked to the fact that PBF bonuses, given the unpredictability 
of the payment, are seen as complement or windfall, with less sense of entitlement compared to the salary. A 
health worker said, 
 
“It [PBF] is manageable, it is just an addition” (CHA/nurse in Kenema) [where ‘manageable’ indicates that 
its level is financially satisfying] 
 
Despite these positive views, when directly probed on whether they would prefer a salary increase or an increase 
in PBF fees allocated for each service provided, health workers agreed that they would prefer a salary increase: 
 
“I would prefer an increase in salary, because PBF depends on us, on the way we work” (MCH Aide in 
Kenema) 
“We have PBF but not all the times. Instead of waiting for PBF, let our salary increase” (MCH Aide in Kenema) 
 
Non-financial aspects of PBF found to motivate health workers 
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During the interviews, health workers spontaneously mentioned that non-financial aspects of the PBF scheme 
contributed to their increased motivation and performance. In the quotes below, they reported that they 
understood better their tasks and responsibilities, because of how the service delivery requirements are 
detailed in the PBF contracts and in the quality checklist.  
 
“PBF is good, but not only the money. You receive the money and you eat it, but when you are used to [fill 
in] the partograph, then you enjoy your job” (MCH Aide in Moyamba) 
“I prefer PBF because it helps me. Now I know what to do and what not to do” (MCH Aide in Kenema) 
 
Health workers also found motivation through the improvements in the working environment that are paid for 
with the facility component of the bonus. One health worker said, 
 
“The part used for the facility is motivating. We are improving, we are managing the center” (CHO in Bo). 
 
Other features of PBF payments that (de)motivate health workers 
 
Moreover, PBF bonuses also have features of which health workers can take advantage within their income 
utilization strategies. As the quarterly PBF bonus can be a relatively substantial amount of money earned at once, 
compared to other incomes which are paid in a more fragmented way, it can be saved from family pressures and 
routine expenditures, and reinvested in non-health income generating activities. An analysis of the quantitative 
survey data confirmed that income from non-health activities were significantly higher for those with higher PBF 
bonuses (p=0.05). In turn, revenues from non-health activities provide a certain income stability which allows 
dealing with the instability of most incomes (e.g. PBF and per diems). One health worker explained, 
 
“I do some little trading, I plan to buy palm oil [with unspent PBF money] and store until the price is 
favorable. I don't really schedule because PBF doesn’t come every day, but whenever money is coming 
you get uses” (CHA/nurse in Bo). 
 
On the other hand, a complaint concerned how PBF is shared -or not- by in-charges with the other workers. In 
other cases, though, sharing practices, highlighting the existence of team spirit within facilities, were found, in 
particular in health centers with fewer staff. In some cases, health workers posted immediately after training were 
given individual bonuses despite not being eligible for it as not working in facility when the bonus was accrued. 
This practice was justified by the fact that they were not yet on payroll and would have little alternative financial 
means to support themselves.  
 
“Last time I went for a meeting, there was a lady who went with a complain, saying that her colleague did 
not recognize her with the PBF” (MCH Aide in Bo). 
“She [the in-charge] is encouraging me by giving it [share of PBF] to me” (MCH Aide in Bo). 
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“She [the other nurse] was not here, but even if when I receive PBF I give her something” (MCH Aide in 
Moyamba). 
 
PBF implementation issues and health worker motivation 
 
One of the problems indicated by health workers are the long delays in the payment of PBF. Those delays are a 
key issue that affects the scheme, because they effectively remove the link between effort at facility level and 
payment provided. Moreover, the delays in payment entail complicated bonus sharing practices. Indeed, often 
those who worked in the facility when the bonus was accrued are posted elsewhere by the time of its receipt after 
one year. As a consequence, ‘old’ and ‘new’ staff in the facility have to travel and meet in person, in order to 
make sure the payment is shared with the worker entitled to receive it. This system is extremely complicated 
given the absence of bank transfers and the difficulties in communication and travel in Sierra Leone, and it relies 
on the transparency of the in-charges in informing and tracing the staff to provide them the correct payment. 
Instances of misappropriation or mismanagement of PBF bonuses by some in-charges, as well as 
implementation failures and mistakes have been recounted during the in-depth interviews: 
 
“I have no access [to PBF] now, because the nurse that was in this center before took the registry and 
went with it” (MCH Aide in Moyamba). 
“12 health centers where left out [never received PBF payments – out of 99 in Moyamba district]. Maybe the 
computer jumped our name...? We don’t know” (MCH Aide in Moyamba). 
 
Another issue around PBF which limit its potential for motivating health workers are the difficulties they 
experience in accessing the payment. The bonus is received via the facility bank account which is usually located 
in the district town, far from the rural facilities, and there is often no information on when it will be paid. In the 
quote below, a health worker in Kenema recounts the problems in accessing PBF: 
 
“PBF does help actually, but the time to get out PBF is our problem. Because the time when it [the PBF 
bonus] comes, we have to go through a lot of process before ever accessing it. Certain times you pay 
transport to Kenema and be there for one or two days and you are not able to access the money, or they 
tell you to come another time” (CHA/nurse in Kenema). 
 
9.5.5 Discussion 
 
The findings presented in this paper show the potential for motivation of performance-based pay in Sierra Leone 
and of the possible paths through which PBF can motivate health workers, as seen from their own perspective. 
The analysis allows us a first understanding of the relative importance of PBF, in comparison with the other, 
formal and informal, income sources. It emerges that, in the context of primary healthcare facilities in Sierra 
Leone, PBF payments are of a relatively small amount (about 10%) compared to the overall income. However, as 
found in other settings [26], other factors beyond the face monetary value influence the perceptions of health 
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workers. PBF as a scheme seems to be well perceived and relatively motivating for health workers because of 
some non-financial features in its design. One of these is the clarification of responsibilities and tasks in service 
delivery, which resonates with similar findings in the context of Burundi [27]. Another is the perceived 
improvement in the physical working environment thanks to the facility component of the bonus, which is also 
noted in Nigeria [26] and Malawi [28]. Our findings highlight a tension in the narratives of the health workers 
between seeing PBF bonuses as a reward for effort and viewing them as a windfall, as both notions are there for 
the staff. Often, the unexpected addition to the income provided by PBF payments is seen as a windfall, which 
takes a different place in the “mental accounts” of health workers and can be spent differently [25]. Health 
workers also take advantage of the fact that the amount of the payment can be substantial within their income 
utilization strategies, where PBF is useful to complement and balance the features of other incomes. The 
strategies for differential use of different incomes by health workers in Sierra Leone are further explored in 
another publication [25]. 
 
On the other hand, a series of design and implementation issues act as ‘demotivators’ and limit the motivational 
effects of the incentive. Delays in the payment of the PBF bonus, due to lengthy verification procedures or other 
issues, are reported across different schemes [26, 29–31] and acknowledged to be a major challenge, in 
particular because of the disconnection that they cause between effort/performance and payment which is in fact 
a key point in the theory of change of PBF incentives. Another tension in PBF schemes comes from the fact that 
performance is measured at facility rather than individual level, and that individual rewards are calculated 
afterwards, either based on cadre and hierarchy as in the case of Sierra Leone, or on a measure of individual 
effort, as done in other contexts [26, 30]. A previous study in Sierra Leone [32] found that health staff were 
motivated by PBF but frustrated by the erratic and unpredictable nature of the payments and because the bonus 
is shared based on cadre, systematically privileging those in-charge. As found in another setting [30], our findings 
show mixed results regarding the potential of performance bonuses paid to the facility for the motivation or 
demotivation of the staff as a team. Some health workers reported sharing payments with those newly arrived 
who are not entitled to them, pointing to collaboration and reciprocity between staff, while others stressed their 
discontent for not receiving their rightful bonus. MoHS staff at central level mentioned that “PBF is seen as 
motivating, but not fair”2. While it has been explored in high-income settings [33] and in experimental economic 
studies outside of the health sector [34, 35], the impact on motivation and performance of the sharing practices 
within the facility team is an issue which deserves further research across PBF schemes and in low-income 
settings [14]. Finally, compared to other countries [26, 36], health workers in Sierra Leone did not raise the issue 
of being demotivated by increased workload linked to PBF, likely because PBF was introduced relatively shortly 
after the introduction of the free health care initiative which had already entailed a substantial increase in patient 
load [19] and possibly also because PBF as implemented in Sierra Leone did not entail additional reporting 
requirements. 
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Our study has some limitations. Despite the use of different techniques (i.e., survey, longitudinal logbook and in-
depth interviews) to triangulate information and avoid biases, one issue concern the reliability of data on income 
amounts, especially for the most sensitive ones (user fees, gifts and payments from patients, sale of drugs, etc.). 
However, we consider that for official incomes, such as PBF, the estimate is likely to be reliable. In terms of data 
analysis, variables at facility level concerning the availability of filled-in registries, drugs, equipment, infrastructure, 
and other factors which could influence the amount received as PBF bonus were not included. However, we 
provide qualitative information in terms of the varying support that facilities receive from NGOs in the districts 
which could partially explain some of the differences. Finally, the results discussed above are closely related to 
the specific context, as well as the design features and implementation challenges of the PBF scheme in Sierra 
Leone and may not be valid for other contexts and PBF schemes. This stresses the importance of understanding 
the setting and the specific challenges in the study of PBF schemes.  
 
Beyond the context-specific findings, what our study points to in a generalizable manner is the importance of 
research focusing not only on the outputs and outcomes of a PBF scheme, but also on the design and the 
implementation details [30, 31], in order to unpack and understand the underlying mechanisms by which PBF can 
motivate or demotivate health workers in practice, and from their own perspective. Our analysis also stresses that 
the remuneration of health workers is complex and interrelated, so that not only the monetary value of the 
financial incentive is relevant for their motivation, but also other features of the payments, which affect the way 
they are utilized and perceived by the health workers.  
 
9.5.6 Conclusions 
 
This study provides a description of the absolute and relative importance of PBF payments within the income of 
public primary healthcare workers in Sierra Leone and of their views on the motivation provided by performance 
payments in the context of the overall revenues and incomes.  
 
For policy makers in Sierra Leone, these findings are particularly relevant in the current post-Ebola Virus Disease 
(EVD) health system strengthening efforts. During the EVD outbreak, the PBF scheme continued to function, 
although under an even simpler model (e.g. payments were based on data of the health information system with 
no verification performed) [37], which is likely to have heightened the problems observed above and created 
others. At the same time, a new scheme was briefly piloted by an NGO in 2015 in the district of Bombali under a 
different design (so-called “PBF Plus”). While this pilot addressed some of the issues of the ‘simple’ PBF scheme, 
other challenges emerged, in particular concerning costs and sustainability. At the moment, the future of PBF in 
Sierra Leone is uncertain and potential new models are being discussed. Given the critical role that PBF seem to 
play for health workers and facilities despite the numerous weaknesses, it is important that the future 
development of the PBF scheme capitalize on the lessons learned and builds on them to guarantee an effective 
role of PBF towards health system strengthening. 
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Overall, the results confirm the importance of looking beyond each single financial incentive available to health 
workers separately, but to include all incomes and explore the interrelated dynamics between them which 
contribute to motivation and performance at individual and team level. As health workers put in place 
compensating and coping strategies for income use, it is important that researchers and policy-makers look at the 
effects on motivation of each revenue stream (including performance payments) in relation to one another and 
considering the broader incentive environment. Findings also stress that the implementation of a PBF scheme at 
national, district and facility level has a critical impact on the ways it motivates or demotivates health workers and, 
therefore, must be thoroughly researched in order to assess the impact of PBF. 
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Endnotes 
1 Maternal and Child Health Posts are the lowest level of primary healthcare centers in the health system, and 
provide only services related to immunization and child health, delivery and maternal health, family planning and 
nutrition. They are staffed by one or two nursing aides (Maternal and Child Health/MCH Aides). At a higher level 
are Community Health Posts and Community Health Centres provide a broader range of curative services and 
are staffed with non-physician clinicians (Community Health Officers/CHOs and Community Health 
Assistants/CHAs), nurses and midwives. Community Health Centres are the largest health centers of all and 
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usually headed by CHOs, who are also responsible for supervising the Maternal and Child Health Posts in their 
area. 
2 Personal communication with MoHS.   
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Figure 
 
Figure 9.2: Absolute and relative average income by cadre and by component, including PBF payments (n=266) 
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Tables 
 
Table 9.5: Indicators included in the PBF scheme 
Indicator Payment per service 
provided 
 Leones USD 
New and current users of family planning 1,000 0.25 
Pregnant women completing four antenatal consultations 6,000 1.40 
Women in labor assisted by skilled personnel at facility  10,000 2.30 
Women completing three postnatal consultations 6,000 1.40 
Children under 12 months completing their immunization course 6,000 1.40 
Outpatient visits of children under five years 300 0.07 
Note: Exchange rate at the time of data collection (October 2013): 1 USD = 4,270 Leones 
 
Table 9.6: Determinants of receiving a PBF bonus (logistic regression) and of the amount received (linear 
regression) 
  (1) (2) 
 Did receive PBF 
bonus (1=yes) 
Amount of PBF 
bonus 
Health worker characteristics      
Male 0.456 
(0.457) 
  0.266 
(0.173) 
  
Age  -0.341 
(0.307) 
  -   
In-charge 1.342 
(0.386) 
*** 0.332 
(0.158) 
** 
Cadre (omitted category : MCH Aide)     
     Community Health Officers -0.884 
(0.701) 
  0.118 
(0.283) 
  
     Community Health Assistants + nurses -1.057 
(0.442) 
** 0.054 
(0.186) 
  
Facility characteristics      
Type of facility (omitted category: Maternal and Child Health Post) 
      Community Health Centre 0.735 
(0.506) 
  0.022 
(0.214) 
  
      Community Health Post 0.920 
(0.415) 
** -0.126 
(0.161) 
  
Urban 0.189 
(0.358) 
  0.109 
(0.141) 
  
District (omitted category: Moyamba)     
       Bo -0.199 
(0.328) 
  -0.656 
(0.136) 
*** 
       Kenema 0.677 
(0.351) 
* -0.160 
(0.128) 
  
Obs  266   163   
R-squared -   0.240   
Log-likelihood -163.335  -  
Proportion of correct answers predicted 65.8%    
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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10. Exploring the consequences of the complex remuneration 
on HWs’ productive activities 
 
 
10.1 Preface 
 
The papers included in Chapter 9 described the complex remuneration of HWs and explored its causes, or 
determinants, at individual, facility and district level. An analysis of the consequences of the complex 
remuneration structure, from the perspective of the HWs, on their financial coping strategies and their motivation 
was also carried out in the two research papers. 
 
In the present chapter (Chapter 10) another of the possible consequences of the complex remuneration is looked 
at, and specifically its potential effects on the activities that HWs do. The hypothesis, brought forward by agency 
theory, is that agents who can make unconstrained choices would select the activities they carry out in order to 
maximize earnings while minimizing effort. In this chapter, I investigate if agency model is applicable to the 
context of primary health care in Sierra Leone and examine the multiple factors and actors constraining HWs 
activities and influencing the organization of service delivery at facility level. Secondly, I explore the effects that 
these have on the relative and absolute time spent by HWs on a range of productive activities, and understand 
the drivers of the heterogeneity. The district of posting of the HWs emerges again as one of the key elements to 
define the variability in the time use of the HWs. By building on the analysis carried out at meso level on the 
dynamics between actors in the districts (Chapter 7), the present chapter explores the reasons for the variability 
and the mechanisms behind it, and how the influence of district dynamics extends to the HWs activities and 
contributes to defining their complex remuneration.  
 
This chapter is written as a thesis section, rather than a research paper. While its organization reflects the 
traditional structure of the journal article, the chapter does not repeat sections already described previously (e.g., 
the study setting and the methods for data collection) and contains direct links and references to the rest of the 
work in this thesis, on which it closely builds. 
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10.2 What do health workers do, and why? A preliminary study of the 
activities performed by primary healthcare workers in Sierra Leone 
 
Abstract 
 
Background: What health workers (HWs) do, how much time they spend on clinical, administrative or disease-
specific tasks, or on work outside of facilities are central elements in determining HWs performance and service 
delivery. Agency theory predicts that multitasking agents who can make unconstrained labor supply choices will 
aim to maximize earnings while minimizing effort. This study, first, investigates if agency theory’s model is 
applicable to the context of primary health care in Sierra Leone and examines whether HWs have unconstrained 
choices or conversely, which are the multiple factors and actors constraining HWs’ activities and influencing the 
organization of service delivery at facility level. Secondly, quantitative data are used to analyze the effects that 
this has on the relative and absolute time spent by HWs on a range of productive activities, and explore the 
drivers of the heterogeneity. 
 
Methods: Data were collected in three districts of southern Sierra Leone from 266 primary HWs, who filled in a 
logbook recording their activities each day for 8 weeks. A series of 39 in-depth interviews were also carried out 
with a sub-sample of the same HWs. 
 
Results: From the HWs interviews, it became apparent that HWs’ discretion in the choice of activities is 
constrained. This is due both to the existence of service delivery schedules at facility level as well as to the 
interactions of HWs with a variety of actors, including District Teams and NGOs. Although HWs are not formally 
accountable to all of them, these dynamic interactions play a crucial role in influencing service delivery according 
to the actors’ own priorities, by introducing reporting requirements, being physically present within the facilities 
and providing material and technical support. The externally-defined constraints and influences are reflected in 
the activities that HWs do. Logbook data reveal little difference based on individual characteristics, while the 
district of posting significantly affects the time spent on disease/service-specific activities and on activities outside 
of the facilities (e.g., training, campaigns, outreach). 
 
Conclusions: Although preliminary, this study is useful to illuminate the HWs’ organization of time over tasks and 
how it affects service delivery. Both qualitative and quantitative findings concur in highlighting the role of external 
actors. It is not only the utility maximization of HWs who are constrained in their activity choice, nor the formal 
accountability links which define service delivery at facility level, but a broader network of relations within the local 
health system, which critically includes the provision of material and technical support that HWs need to be able 
to carry out their tasks. 
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10.2.1 Introduction 
 
What health workers (HWs) do, how much time they spend on each of their clinical and administrative tasks and 
how much time outside of the facilities are central elements in shaping service delivery. Indeed, how HWs choose 
between productive and non-productive activities and how they choose to spend their time while working can 
have a direct impact on access to health care services for the population. Furthermore, the time spent working 
within facilities rather than outside, or on integrated rather than disease/service-specific tasks is important to 
shape the nature and organization of the services delivered to patients.  
 
Given the overall topic of this research, in this chapter, I am particularly interested in assessing the potential 
consequences of the HWs’ complex remuneration on the activities and tasks carried out. Agency theory in 
economics provides a theoretical framework to explain the relation between income and tasks undertaken. 
Agency refers to a situation where someone (a principal) needs a task to be performed, and delegates its 
performance to a second person (an agent) is described by the agency model. This model has been applied to 
health care labor markets, where HWs are seen as agents of both their employer (typically the Ministry of Health, 
in low-income countries) and patients (Arrow, 1963; McPake et al., 2002). In the simple agency model, in order to 
maximize utility, the agent aims to maximize earnings while minimizing effort. Therefore, to elicit the desired 
behavior and obtain optimal effort levels, the principal needs to ensure that the agent’s remuneration structure is 
in line with the principal’s own objectives, by using the appropriate ‘power’ of incentives (e.g., the extent to which 
the remuneration is linked to production) in the contract of the agent, given the level of monitoring and 
performance measurement that can be put in place. A particular case arises when agents are multitasking. In this 
situation, if tasks are substitutes (i.e. exerting more effort on one increases the marginal cost of the other task), 
stronger incentives to perform one task will drive the agent’s effort away from the other task(s) (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991).  
 
This chapter focuses on HWs as multitasking agents in charge of providing a range of health services to the 
population. In Sierra Leone, HWs working in the public sector are paid a salary to perform tasks related to their 
job. These tasks include general clinical work, as well as disease or service-specific activities (nutrition, HIV, 
family planning, etc.) and activities outside of the facility (e.g., outreach, administrative meetings, training, 
immunization campaigns). At the same time, I have shown in Chapter 9 (Bertone and Lagarde, 2016) that, on top 
of their salary, that they also receive a number of other payments. Some of these payments are related to specific 
activities. For example, through the quarterly performance-based financing (PBF) bonus allocated to their facility, 
HWs receive a payment to carry out six maternal and child health (MCH) services1. PBF payments are found to 
represent about 10% of the total income of primary HWs. HWs also receive per diems to carry out work outside of 
the facilities (training, meetings at district level, immunization campaigns), which account for about 18% of their 
                                                          
1
 The PBF bonus allocated to each facility is based on the number of services provided related to family planning, antenatal consultations, 
assisted deliveries, postnatal consultations, immunization and consultations for children under 5 (MoHS, 2011).  
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total income. Finally, they receive fee-for-service payment for their health-related private practice and for activities 
outside of the health sector (business, trade or agriculture), accounting for about 5% of the total income2.  
 
While salary creates a weak incentive to perform the worker’s tasks as it is received regardless of the number of 
services provided, other payments such as PBF bonus, per diems, and fee-for-service for private practice set 
stronger incentives, because the payments are directly linked to the activities carried out. As a consequence, 
agency theory predicts that HWs would focus their effort for example on linked to PBF payments, as well as 
trainings and immunization campaigns which allow them to earn per diems to, and would neglect activities which 
do not lead to extra income. However, this is a valid hypothesis only if the fundamental assumption on which the 
agency model hinges is actually met in the context of the study: that individuals’ labor supply choices are 
unconstrained. In other words, this implies that all workers studied are actually (and equally) offered the 
possibility to perform the different types of activities, and that they are free to choose the effort (e.g. the number of 
hours of work) they do.   
 
In this chapter, first, I use qualitative methods to investigate whether the agency model is applicable to the 
context of primary healthcare in Sierra Leone by examining if, in this setting, HWs are free to choose from the 
different sets of activities. The analysis highlights challenges and limitations in the practical application of the 
model to our case as it is found that there are limits to HWs’ choices. The HWs’ narratives provide a rich 
description and further investigation of the multiple factors and actors constraining the choice of activities to be 
undertaken by HWs, and therefore influencing the organization of service delivery at facility level. In the second 
part of the chapter, I use quantitative data to analyze the effects of these constraints on the relative and absolute 
time spent by HWs on a range of productive activities, and explore the heterogeneity in our results in order to 
unpack its drivers at individual, facility and district level.  
 
10.2.2 Methods 
 
Sampling of HWs and methods for data collection are described in detail in Chapter 5. This section briefly 
presents the quantitative and qualitative data collection approaches used specifically for HWs’ activities. I then 
focus more attention on the analysis methods. 
 
Data collection approaches 
Qualitative in-depth interviews 
 
Two rounds of in-depth interviews were carried out in November-December 2013 and March-April 2014, following 
the quantitative data collection in the facilities. Interviews included a sub-sample of 39 HWs purposefully selected 
                                                          
2
 Table 10.4 in the Annex to this chapter presents a summary of the main categories of activities that HWs do and the payments received 
for each 
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among the 266 which were administered the income survey and activity logbook (see below). The selection of the 
interviewees aimed to maximize individual and facility-level differences and to reflect the composition of the 
workforce at primary healthcare level (Chapter 5, par. 5.2.5). During the first round, interviews focused mostly on 
the enumerations of the actors visiting the facility and the description of the reasons of their visits (monitoring, 
supervision, etc.) as well as of the reactions to their visits from the perspective of the HWs. For the second round, 
new elements were added focused on the organization of service delivery, its schedule over the week, the 
internal division of work and the repartition of clinical and administrative tasks. In order to provide a context and 
practical relevance to the questions, I often used the HW’s logbook or other documents available within the 
facility, such as the facility schedule or the visitors’ book, as a basis to start the conversation. 
 
Quantitative logbooks 
 
As described in Chapter 5, a sample of 266 HWs was selected in the three districts and was administered an 
income survey. After the survey, the same HWs were also given logbooks to fill in daily for a prospective period of 
eight weeks. In their logbooks, HWs had to report their activities as well as revenues earned each day, in a pre-
printed table. While written and oral instructions on how to fill in the logbook and on the categories of activities to 
report on were provided, the logbook did not ask to fill in the number of hours worked on each category of activity, 
but was purposefully left open-ended (i.e. it only listed the hours of the day leaving to the HWs to indicate how 
much time she had spent, and on what) to increase ease and flexibility when filling it, thereby hopefully increasing 
the response rate3. Each HW was visited by the same enumerator three times over the 8 weeks, and received 
regular calls and text reminders to fill the logbooks. During the last visit, HWs were administered an end-line 
questionnaire to check completeness of entries and clarify, validate, corroborate the information provided in the 
logbooks (Corti, 1993). Despite its disadvantages in terms of misclassification and reporting bias, the self-
reported approach to collect data on activities was chosen for its practical advantages in terms of enumerators’ 
time and skills required and costs compared to observational methods (Jacobs, 1998; Bratt et al., 1999; Pitt et al., 
2009). 
 
Data analysis  
Qualitative data analysis 
 
In-depth interviews were recorded, transcribed and manually analyzed. Overall, the analysis focused on the 
exploration of the setting in which HWs make their choice of activities and was based on pre-identified concepts 
as well as on those emerging from the HWs’ narratives. Coding of qualitative data looked at (i) the facility’s 
weekly schedule as described by the HWs and (ii) the actors and factors influencing service delivery. This second 
theme was initially guided by codes referring to the upward accountability relations of the HWs, conceptualized in 
                                                          
3
 Chapter 5 & Appendix 9 provide a detailed description and a copy of the tool. 
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terms of ‘answerability’ and ‘sanctions’ (Brinkerhoff, 2004), and then inductively extended to cover emerging 
themes on multiple factors that influence service delivery, which I broadly refer to as ‘material and technical 
support’ and are further described in the findings section. A full description of the data analysis process is 
provided in Chapter 5 (par. 5.2.5) and the coding framework can be found in Appendix 7.   
 
Quantitative data analysis 
 
Based on the activities recorded by HWs in their logbooks and consolidated in the end-line interview, a summary 
of the time spent on each activity along a predefined set of categories (Table 10.1, column (1)) was initially 
prepared manually by the enumerators. The broader categories were chosen with the aim to provide synthetic 
and consistent information across all logbooks. Only the summary calculations were entered in an electronic 
database. For the purpose of the analysis, the 12 types of activities were then regrouped into 6 categories, two of 
them also including disease/service-specific sub-categories (Table 10.1, column (2)): 
 General clinical activities 
 General administrative activities 
 Disease/service specific clinical activities (with subcategories) 
 Disease/service specific administrative activities (with subcategories) 
 ‘Outside’: i.e., activities related to public job carried out outside of facilities, such as outreach, meetings 
outside of facility and training/workshops  
 Income generating activities outside of public job, such as trade or business, agriculture, etc. 
 
Table 10.1: Categories used to summarize activities, for data entry and for analysis 
 (1) (2) 
 Categories of activities (data entry) Categories of activities (analysis) 
W
it
h
in
 f
ac
ili
ty
 
General clinical activities 
General clinical activities Night guards and other extra work 
Other activities within facility (not included in this list) 
General administrative work  
General administrative activities 
Meetings within the facility 
Disease/service specific clinical activities: Disease/service specific clinical activities: 
 Nutrition   Nutrition  
 Immunization  Immunization 
 Family Planning  Family Planning 
 HIV  HIV 
 Others  Others 
Disease/service specific administrative activities: Disease/service specific administrative  activities: 
 Nutrition   Nutrition  
 Immunization  Immunization 
 Family Planning  Family Planning 
 HIV  HIV 
 Others  Others 
O
u
ts
id
e 
Outreach activities in the community 
Activities outside of facilities, related to public job (‘outside’) Meeting outside of the facility 
Training, workshop, etc. 
Private practice (pp) 
Income generating activities outside of public job (private 
practice + non-health activities, such as trade/business or 
agriculture) 
Non-health activities that generate income (e.g., trade, 
business, agriculture) 
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The average time spent on each of the 6 categories over the 8 weeks was calculated and descriptively analyzed. 
Hours spent on productive activities were then converted into a proportion of the total time worked to calculate the 
relative time dedicated to each. The use of proportion was preferred because HWs were found to work extremely 
different amounts of hours per week, and therefore this approach provided a way to standardize the total time on 
productive activities across HWs. The proportion of time spent on each activity was then converted into averages 
over 8 weeks4.   
 
To look at the determinants of the proportion of time spent on each type of activity, I used a fractional multinomial 
logit regression (fmlogit in Stata) (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). This model estimates each proportion as a 
function of individual (i.e., gender, age, cadre, role within facility) as well as facility (i.e., type and size of facility, 
urban/rural, district) characteristics. The base category used was ‘general clinical activities’, as these were found 
to take up the majority of the HWs productive time. Marginal effects were computed from the estimated 
coefficients (dfmlogit in Stata). Disease/service specific administrative activities, as well as private practice and 
non-health activities were discarded from the regression analysis because their distribution was found to be 
highly skewed (Figure 10.6 – Annex to this chapter) and HWs spend less than 0.5% of time on each of them. The 
proportions of time spent were recalculated for all other remaining activities. 
 
10.2.3 Findings 
 
Are labor supply choices of HWs unconstrained?  
 
The in-depth interviews with HWs focused on the process of activity choice process and the factors influencing it, 
and revealed that HWs have little discretion and autonomy on their daily activities. This is partially due to a fixed 
weekly schedule defined for each facility which determines the main service to be provided on that day, but 
importantly also to other factors, including their upward accountability to DHMTs, as well as the broader network 
of actors (and NGOs in particular) present at facility level. I analyze these elements in turn below. 
 
The HWs’ accounts and direct observation pointed to the fact that most health facilities operated under a weekly 
schedule, sometimes taped to the facility wall (see an example in Figure 10.1). The schedule defines which 
services are to be provided primarily each day (e.g. vaccination, antenatal/postnatal visits, child health, nutrition, 
outreach, etc.), although it still allows flexibility on some days (e.g. ‘general consultation’ or outpatient (OPD) days 
when all services are provided) and emergencies or deliveries are attended to at any time of the week and 
weekend.  
                                                          
4
 The overall average was calculated by using all the logbooks available for each HW. If 8 logbooks were available for one HW, they were 
all used to calculate the average, while if only the logbooks for the 5 first weeks were available, those 5 were used to calculate the 
average. 
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Detailed information on the weekly schedules was collected during the in-depth interviews and from its analysis it 
appears that the schedules vary significantly between facilities. However, as a general pattern, it seems that 
facilities in Moyamba tended to provide nutrition services (and in particular, Outpatient Therapeutic Program 
(OTP)-related services, rather than Supplementary Feeding Program - SFP) every week or every two weeks, 
which is more often than in Kenema and Bo. When asked about who established the schedule, six HWs said that 
it was ‘them’ as facility staff or in-charge (i.e. facility manager) to decide. However, one stressed that it was the 
DHMT who required that they have a weekly schedule (CHA/nurse in Moyamba), and another indicated that that 
“they [NGO] decided to feed the people every week. We are to choose our own day, so we chose Tuesday” 
(CHA/nurse in Moyamba).   
 
Figure 10.1: Picture of weekly schedule posted on a facility wall 
 
 
While the facility schedule emerged as a first element to define what activities HWs can do, the in-depth 
interviews allowed me to explore also the influence of other factors. Based on an initial hypothesis on the role of 
accountability, the analysis focused initially on the formal upward accountability relation of HWs. Upward 
accountability is defined as a “contract-like connection in which policymakers [or their representatives] specify 
objectives, procedures, standards; provide resources and support; and exercise oversight relative to providers. In 
exchange […], providers carry out the agreed-upon desires and directives” (Brinkerhoff and Bossert, 2008: p.8). 
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This type of formal accountability represents in theory an obvious constraint to the activity choice of HWs. 
Specifically, in the case of primary healthcare in Sierra Leone, HWs at facility level are formally accountable to 
the managers in the District Health Medical Teams (DHMTs), under whose direction they operate and who are in 
charge of providing them with the necessary support and resources. However, based on the HWs’ accounts, the 
analysis was further extended beyond the role of the DHMTs to explore the relations of HWs with other actors 
who are present at facility level and appeared to be influencing the possibility to undertake certain activities. In 
this sense, the HWs’ narratives allowed me to map and describe a wide network of actors visiting facilities and 
provide key insights on the constraints that such networks create and the influence it has on what HWs do. 
Below, I look first at the role of DHTMs, before moving to the analysis of the broader network of actors present at 
facility level. 
 
The HWs interviewed undoubtedly felt that they primarily respond to DHMTs, to which they are directly 
accountable. As some clearly stated, “they [DHTM staff] are our immediate bosses” (CHAs/nurses in Kenema 
and Moyamba). However, when attempting to unpack the relation and its role in influencing HWs’ activities, the 
picture emerged as rather blurred. Indeed, although DHMTs are in principle responsible for overseeing HWs and 
sanctioning them for not respecting directives or being absent from the facility (for example, because 
moonlighting on another job), a role which could influence the choices of HWs, in practice the potential for 
sanctions emerged as relatively weak in the accounts of the HWs. The sole element by which DHMTs appeared 
to exert some control of the activities and services carried out by HWs was by providing (or not) critical inputs. 
Provision of inputs, such as drugs and vaccines, was found to be irregular and many facilities reported long 
periods where they remained out of stock because of delayed procurement by the DHMT. The lack of inputs had 
a direct consequence on the activities carried out by HWs, as when essential inputs were not available they could 
not provide certain services, including those which were, in theory, envisaged by the facility schedule, as 
described by one HW: 
 
“Mondays I have under five clinic and I give immunization to children. But today is unfortunate 
because I don’t have all the various vaccines” (MCH Aide in Moyamba). 
 
At the same time, the interviews revealed that the HWs interacted with a number of other actors, although they 
were not directly accountable to them. In particular, the staff of local and international NGOs and (more rarely) of 
donor agencies regularly visited the facilities. I have described elsewhere (Chapter 7) (Bertone and Witter, 2015), 
based on key informant interviews at district level, the type of health NGOs present in each district, their main 
activities and priorities, and the extent of their support in terms of facility coverage within the districts. It had 
emerged that in Kenema and Moyamba fewer NGOs supported all or most facilities, while in Bo NGOs support 
was more fragmented and limited to few facilities. Importantly, NGOs in Kenema and Bo tended to focus on a 
wide range of MCH services, while in Moyamba NGOs focused exclusively on nutrition. The interviews with the 
HWs analyzed for this chapter provide further information and differentiate NGOs based on the type of technical 
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and material support they provided, and the consequences this had in terms of constraining or allowing certain 
activities, thus influencing service delivery. The NGOs technical and material support could include: provision of 
inputs and in-kind support, regular supervision and guidance to staff, and direct support to service delivery by 
being present at the facility during the provision of (some) services.   
 
Inputs in the form of drugs, nutritional supplements and equipment emerged as essential to guarantee the 
delivery of services. Many HWs mentioned that, if they have no drugs or ‘food’ (which is how nutritional 
supplements are usually referred to) they will not be able to carry the related activity, even if planned in the 
weekly scheduled. The presence of an NGO providing inputs helped address those issues. This was the case of 
one NGO-supported facility in Bo, and of almost all facilities in Kenema which were supported by one NGO with a 
broad MCH focus. 
 
“With their presence, we never run out of drugs” (CHO in Bo) 
“[NGO] brings us drugs (...). There are times we don’t have free healthcare drugs so we use the 
[NGO] drugs to treat” (CHA/nurse in Kenema). 
 
Some NGOs were also directly defining the service to be delivered by having a representative present at the 
facility. This was the case for several facilities in Moyamba where NGO staff was physically present on ‘feeding’ 
days to support the delivery of nutrition services and coordinate the facility staff. This resulted in all HWs working 
on that service for the day (mentioned by 4 HWs in Moyamba). Similarly, NGOs were seen to influence service 
provision also by providing regular supervision and guidance, as well as introducing reporting requirements on 
certain activities (which likely affected the time spent by HWs on clinical/service-specific administrative activities). 
This was the case in Kenema where the support referred to the entire range of services provided by the facilities, 
and even more clear in Moyamba where it focused on nutrition services, as described in the quote: 
 
“[NGO] they come and teach us some paperwork we don’t understand. [...] When they came, 
they teached me how to enter the documents they are sending” (MCH Aide in Moyamba) 
 
In summary, the analysis of the HWs’ interviews suggests that, although HWs are not formally accountable to all 
of these actors, their dynamic interactions, realized through different mechanisms, play a crucial role in 
constraining or allowing the provision of certain services, thus defining service delivery. In the next section, the 
quantitative analysis of the time spent on activities by HWs, as recorded in the logbooks, provides evidence on 
the consequences of these externally-defined influences on the activities that HWs end up doing and confirms the 
importance of drivers at district level, rather than individual choices. 
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Sample of HWs for quantitative analysis 
 
A sample of 266 HWs was approached for the cross-sectional survey and asked to fill in the logbooks. Within the 
sample, the attrition over time was found to be relatively low, with 8 individuals (3%) lost in the first 3 weeks, 20 
individuals (8%) by week 7 and 53 individuals (20%) by week 8 (Table 10.2). According to the enumerators, the 
factors that explained the loss to follow-up were related both to the extra work required by the logbook as well as 
to personal circumstances (e.g. HWs moved to another facility, travelled to town, were sick or pregnant). Finally, 
the low number of logbooks filled in for the 8th week is mostly due to logistic reasons, as some HWs were visited 
mid-week and did not have time to fill in the full week-long logbook.  
 
Table 10.2: Loss to follow-up over the 8 weeks covered by the logbooks 
Week HWs lost to 
follow-up 
Proportion of 
HWs lost to 
follow-up 
HWs having filled in 
their weekly logbook 
w1 8 3% 258 
w2 8 3% 258 
w3 8 3% 258 
w4 12 5% 254 
w5 19 7% 247 
w6 19 7% 247 
w7 20 8% 246 
w8 53 20% 213 
 
 
Total working hours  
 
HWs declare to be spending on average 66.8 hours a week (with a median of 64 hours) on productive activities 
(Figure 10.2), ranging from a minimum of 40.5 hours per week, to a maximum of 109.62 hours (Figure 10.3). The 
high number of hours worked per week is likely to be due to the fact that the working week for many facilities 
comprises 6 days. Moreover, most of the HWs included in the sample, and in particular those posted in rural 
areas, live within or next door to the facility and are on call 24 hours a day, for 7 days a week for emergency 
procedures, which would have been included in the logbook of productive activities.  
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Figure 10.2: Average hours spent on activities, per week 
 
 
Figure 10.3: Distribution of total hours worked, average for 8 weeks 
 
 
The absolute number of hours spent on activities also varies between week, from a minimum of 62.57 hours on 
week 4 to a maximum of 71.12 hours on week 6 (Figure 10.2). It seems that the increase in working hours in 
weeks 3, 6, 7 and 8 was driven by an increase in the ‘outside’ activities5.  
 
Proportion of time spent on different activities 
 
The analysis of the proportion of time spent on each of the productive activities reveals that HWs spend the 
majority of their time (86.12%) within the facilities. 64.29% of their time is dedicated to general clinical activities 
                                                          
5
 Through direct observation in the districts at the time of the data collection, I know that on week 3 a pilot Human papillomavirus (HPV) 
vaccine campaign took place in some chiefdoms in Bo, while in weeks 6-7-8 a polio vaccine campaign was ongoing, affecting (at different 
times) many facilities in all 3 districts. 
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and 9.98% to general administrative activities, such as filling in registries and staff meetings. A total of 11.85% of 
their time is spent on disease/service specific activities, of which the vast majority (11.43%) on clinical tasks and 
only a small portion (0.43%) on administrative tasks. The time spent outside of the facilities accounts for about 
13.88%. Of this, only 1.34% is declared to be spent on private practice and non-health activities, while 12.54% is 
spent on activities related to the main public job, but outside of the facility. These include outreach, immunization 
campaigns, workshops and training, supervision to other facilities (in the case of the higher cadres), meeting at 
district or chiefdom level, etc. (Figure 10.4).  
 
Figure 10.4: Proportion of time spent on activities, per week and on average 
 
 
Looking at the detailed of the specific clinical activities undertaken, it emerges that the time on those is equally 
shared between time on family planning (4.24% of the total weekly hours worked), immunization (3.38%), and 
nutrition and feeding (3.08%), while very little time is spent on HIV (0.25%) and other specific activities (0.41%) 
(Figure 10.7 in Annex). 
 
The disaggregated analysis by district seems to confirm the patterns highlighted by qualitative analysis, in terms 
of the consequences of the constraints and influence exercised by external actors at district level (Figure 10.5). It 
shows that HWs in Bo spent a higher proportion of their times on ‘outside’ activities (16%), compared to those in 
Moyamba (13%) and Bo (9%, p<0.0001). Also the time spent on disease/service specific clinical activities varies 
across districts, accounting for 14% in Moyamba compared to 11% in Kenema and 10% in Bo (p<0.0019). In the 
next section, the regression analysis of the determinants of the proportion of time spent on each of the activities 
confirms these patterns. 
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Figure 10.5: Average proportion of time spent on activities, by district 
 
 
Determinants of the proportion of time spent on activities    
 
Table 10.6 presents the results of the fractional multinomial logit regression. The analysis shows that the most 
consistent factor that appears to determine the proportion of time spent on activities is the district of posting. 
Those working in Bo and Kenema are likely to be doing less specific clinical activities, compared to those in 
Moyamba (respectively -3.92 and -2.13 percentage points). Moreover, HWs in Kenema are likely to be doing 
substantially less ‘outside’ activities (-4.02 percentage points) compared to those in Moyamba and Bo. By 
contrast, the results reveal that there is no difference in the way HWs allocate their time based on individual 
characteristics. At facility level, one difference found is that HWs in CHCs are likely to be doing less specific 
activities, and more general clinical activities, compared to those in MCHPs (-2.18 percentage points).  
 
Similar regressions were run for the sub-categories of ‘special clinical activities’ (Table 10.5 - Annex). Results for 
the district determinants complement the findings on HWs in Bo and Kenema doing less specific activities and 
provide further details. It emerges that HWs in Bo and Kenema are likely to be doing less nutrition activities, and 
more general clinical activities, compared to those in Moyamba (respectively -3.2 and -1 percentage points). 
Those in Kenema are likely to be doing less immunization activities (-1.5 percentage points) and to be doing more 
HIV activities (0.2 percentage points), compared to those in Moyamba.  
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Table 10.3: Results of fractional multinomial logit regression on average proportion of time spent on each activity 
(reference for comparisons ‘general clinical activities’) 
    Coef. Std. Err.  p-value    
Marginal 
effects 
G
en
 a
d
m
in
 
Male 0.3820 0.1991 0.055   0.0369 
Young 0.1282 0.1455 0.378 
 
0.0082 
CHO 0.2082 0.3095 0.501 
 
0.0138 
CHA+nurse -0.0418 0.1971 0.832 
 
3.40E-04 
In-charge -0.0532 0.1659 0.749 
 
-0.0059 
Small facility -0.2752 0.1671 0.100 
 
-0.0229 
CHC -0.2625 0.2247 0.243 
 
-0.0221 
CHP -0.1733 0.1788 0.332 
 
-0.012 
Urban -0.1473 0.1625 0.365 
 
-0.0106 
Bo 0.1315 0.1642 0.423 
 
0.0145 
Kenema 0.0810 0.1577 0.608   0.0155 
C
lin
 s
p
ec
ia
l 
Male -0.2148 0.1702 0.207   -0.0283 
Young 0.1266 0.1076 0.239 
 
0.0091 
CHO 0.1581 0.2309 0.493 
 
0.0095 
CHA+nurse -0.1240 0.1330 0.351 
 
-0.0089 
In-charge -0.0415 0.1336 0.756 
 
-0.0053 
Small facility -0.0633 0.1172 0.589 
 
-0.002 
CHC -0.0307 0.1636 0.851 
 
7.40E-04 
CHP -0.2493 0.1253 0.047 ** -0.0218 
Urban -0.1246 0.1373 0.364 
 
-0.0096 
Bo -0.3680 0.1335 0.006 *** -0.0392 
Kenema -0.2611 0.1186 0.028 ** -0.0213 
O
u
ts
id
e 
Male 0.2441 0.1704 0.152   0.0252 
Young 0.1625 0.1152 0.158 
 
0.0145 
CHO 0.2765 0.2744 0.314 
 
0.0267 
CHA+nurse -0.2252 0.1719 0.190 
 
-0.0215 
In-charge 0.1184 0.1436 0.410 
 
0.014 
Small facility -0.0896 0.1332 0.501 
 
-0.0054 
CHC -0.0639 0.1951 0.743 
 
-0.0033 
CHP -0.0557 0.1444 0.700 
 
-5.30E-04 
Urban -0.0823 0.1515 0.587 
 
-0.0054 
Bo 0.1339 0.1261 0.288 
 
0.0182 
Kenema -0.4104 0.1380 0.003 *** -0.0402 
   Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
10.2.4 Discussion 
 
How HWs spend their time and what influences their choice of activities is a question of key importance because 
of its potential effects on service delivery at facility level. Although several studies have been carried out to 
explore HWs’ time use, the existing research tends to look at the ratio between productive and unproductive time 
with the aim of assessing HWs’ productivity (Manzi et al., 2012; Maestad and Mwisongo, 2013), or to focus 
exclusively on time spent on specific activities, such as TB and HIV or immunization (Abotsi, 2011; Hontelez et 
al., 2012; Odendaal and Lewin, 2014). The only study retrieved in the literature which looks at time use from a 
broad perspective was carried out in Cameroon in 1989. It found that primary HWs (nurses, nursing aides and 
community assistants) in rural facilities spent 73% of their time on unproductive activities (i.e., not working). The 
Chapter 10 – Exploring the consequences of the complex remuneration of HWs’ productive activities | 167  
remaining time was spent for 17.5% on clinical activities (65% of productive time), 5.4% on hygiene (20% of 
productive time), 3.3% on administrative (12% of productive time) and 0.8% on outreach (3% of productive time) 
(Bryant and Essomba, 1995). Although only focused on productive activities, data collected for the present study 
provide a strikingly unchanged assessment of what rural primary HWs do in the context of Sierra Leone in 2013. 
HWs declared to spend the majority of their time within facilities, doing clinical activities (64% on general clinical 
and 11% on specific clinical activities). 10% of time is spent on administrative activities. Productive work outside 
facilities accounts for 14% of the total (which is the only category substantially changed, and higher than what 
was in Cameroon) and is mostly spent on activities related to the main public job, such as training, meetings, 
outreach and campaigns. The analysis conducted here goes further and also points to the drivers of the variability 
in the time spent on activities, highlighting the key role of district, rather than individual variables. 
 
However, it is important to note that, the data collected for this study on HWs activities have a number of 
limitations. One of the main biases reflects the nature of the logbooks and the fact that a self-reported approach 
was chosen, rather than the observational approach which is most often adopted for analyses of time use (i.e., 
time-and-motion studies). With the use of self-administered logbooks, it is likely that HWs provided in some cases 
“normative desirable answers” (Jacobs, 1998) and filled in what they are supposed to do accordingly to the 
weekly schedule, rather than what they actually did. A second problem is the inconsistency in the level of detail 
reported, which made it difficult to reconcile the information into detailed categories. Indeed, while some logbooks 
provided rich accounts of the productive time of HWs, others provided a much lower level of detail in the activities 
which did not allow for disaggregation. Another problem relates to the length of the follow-up period. It is 
impossible to know whether HWs became more accurate in their logbooks as time passed, or conversely 
logbooks were increasingly less precise because of a fatigue effect over time.  
 
In this chapter, I specifically set out to analyze the time spent by HWs on different activities with the aim of 
exploring whether the complex remuneration of HWs has implications for the activities they do. In other settings, 
this has proven a plausible hypothesis, in line with agency theory’s predictions. For example, in a study carried 
out in Nigeria, it was found that giving priority to activities that enabled the earning of per diems was an essential 
financial coping strategy and 56% of primary and secondary HWs sampled reported to be doing it (Akwataghibe 
et al., 2013). A qualitative study in Malawi and Uganda reported that participants (in that case, managers with 
Ministry of Health at central and district level, nursing school, health facilities and NGOs) described that per diems 
influence their allocation of time, as they try to work more on activities which have per diems associated to them 
(Vian et al., 2013). However, in the context of primary healthcare in Sierra Leone, this analysis points to the fact 
that, although in theory HWs could choose from a range of activities and somewhat increase their income, in 
practice their choice is constrained by external factors: on the one hand, the activities on offer outside of the 
facility (e.g. whether a training or meeting is planned) and on the other, within facilities, a fixed weekly schedule 
determining the activities to be provided and by the availability of inputs or technical support necessary to carry 
out these activities. This finding confirms the strong evidence found in empirical economic literature against the 
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hypothesis of unconstrained labor supply choices for workers in non-experimental settings (Kahn and Lang, 1991; 
Dickens and Lundberg, 1993), as it suggests that the variability in what HWs do is related to options available 
rather than active individual choices. 
 
In particular, in the context of this study, district-level elements emerge as the main driver of the differences in the 
activities undertaken by HWs as they define the patterns of NGO presence and of provision of material and 
technical support for specific activities, which are reflected in the variability of the time spent on these activities by 
HWs, based on the district of posting. It appears that HWs have no control over the priorities and decisions taken 
by external actors, but in turn these decisions constrain their choice of activities or influence their daily practices 
of service delivery. The analysis of the HWs narratives provides evidence over the mechanisms through which 
this influence is exerted, i.e. by supplying (or not) the necessary inputs, providing guidance, support, introducing 
reporting requirements for certain activities, or being physically present at the facility to oversee the delivery of 
some services.  
 
The possibility of DHMTs influencing providers practices has been highlighted by Gilson and others, who pointed 
to the role of managers in “aligning resources and organizational environment to support HWs towards policy 
goals” (Gilson et al., 2014: p.iii63). However, the findings of this research suggest that, in the study districts in 
Sierra Leone, the provision of material and technical support that may shape service delivery is not the 
prerogative of the DHMTs and only partially reflects upward accountability structures. Importantly, other actors, 
and in particular the NGOs active at district or sub-district level, also exercise this influence, and this is done 
towards their own specific set of goals and priorities.  
 
Looking at the role of external actors, I had shown in Chapter 7 (Bertone and Witter, 2015) how the political 
economy dynamics between NGOs and DHMTs at district level defined the HRH incentive practices, such as 
selective supervision, salary supplementation and per diem payments, with effects that ultimately extend to the 
remunerations of individual HWs. The present analysis takes that result further by revealing that this is done by 
shaping local health priorities. The different agendas of NGOs are reflected in the activities carried out by HWs, 
and, critically, these activities influence in turn HWs incomes. For example, HWs would have higher per diem 
payments if there are more ‘outside’ activities available, or higher PBF bonuses if material and technical support 
is provided for the MCH indicators included in the scheme. While I had started out this study with the aim of 
investigating the hypothesis that the complex remuneration of HWs may define their choice of activity, I found 
that, in fact, it is rather the activities available to HWs, driven by external actors and their priorities, which 
contribute to define the HWs remuneration structure and level, and explain the significant differences that I 
observed in HWs income between districts (Chapter 9 - Bertone and Lagarde, 2016).  
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10.2.5 Conclusions 
 
This study is useful to illuminate the organization of HWs time between tasks and how it affects service delivery. It 
points to the fact that HWs spend the majority of their productive time within facilities undertaking clinical work, 
while the time spent working outside depends on the need to carry out activities as defined by external actors. 
The analysis also reveals that the district of posting seems to have a significant impact on HWs activities. Indeed, 
both qualitative and quantitative findings concur in highlighting the importance of the role of external actors, and 
NGOs in particular, in defining what HWs do and therefore shaping service delivery. It is not only the utility 
maximization of HWs who are constrained in their choice of activities, nor the formal upward accountability links 
which define service delivery at facility level, but a broader network of relations within the local health system, 
which critically includes the provision of material and technical support that HWs need to be able to carry out their 
tasks.  
 
Further research is therefore necessary in order to explore such network of relations not only at district level as 
we did in Chapter 7 (Bertone and Witter, 2015), but also around facilities and individual HWs. In particular, it is 
essential to understand the role of these networks in defining service delivery and policy implementation, and 
whether or not this influence is conducive to better performance at facility and HW level. Moreover, the finding 
that external actors active at district level can influence service delivery and shift local health priorities requires a 
re-thinking of governance beyond the formal upward accountability which is usually examined (Cleary et al., 
2013). From a policy perspective, this is particularly relevant in those (local) health systems where numerous, 
poorly coordinated external actors are presented who do not necessarily work together or respect the country 
priorities (Mikkelsen-Lopez et al., 2011).  
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10.2.7 Annex 
 
Table 10.4: Link between activities and related payment 
   
 Categories of activities Payment related to activity 
W
it
h
in
 f
ac
ili
ty
 
General clinical activities Salary + PBF bonus (for 6 MCH activities) 
General administrative activities Salary + PBF bonus (for 6 MCH activities) 
Disease/service specific clinical activities:  
 Nutrition  Salary 
 Immunization Salary + PBF bonus 
 Family Planning Salary + PBF bonus 
 HIV Salary 
 Others Salary 
Disease/service specific administrative  activities:  
 Nutrition  Salary 
 Immunization Salary + PBF bonus 
 Family Planning Salary + PBF bonus 
 HIV Salary 
 Others Salary 
O
u
ts
id
e 
Activities outside of facilities related to public job (e.g., 
outreach, immunization campaigns, meetings, training 
and workshops) 
 
Salary + per diems 
 
Income generating activities outside of public job (private 
practice + non-health activities, such as trade/business or 
agriculture) 
 
Fee-for-service and other earnings 
 
 
Table 10.5: Results of fractional multinomial logit regression on average proportion of time spent on specific 
clinical activities (reference for comparisons ‘general clinical activities’) 
     Coef.   Std. Err.   p-value    
Marginal 
effects   
N
u
tr
it
io
n
 
Male 0.0281 0.2405 0.907 
 -8.70E-04 
Young 0.3828 0.1673 0.022 ** 0.0096 
CHO 0.2974 0.3836 0.438 
 0.0063 
CHA+nurse -0.0012 0.2027 0.995 
 0.0012 
In-charge -0.1933 0.2382 0.417 
 -0.0051 
Small facility -0.2391 0.1975 0.226 
 -0.0047 
CHC 0.1723 0.3262 0.597 
 0.0059 
CHP -0.2721 0.2701 0.314 
 -0.0056 
Urban -0.3248 0.2084 0.119 
 -0.0069 
Bo -1.3938 0.2069 0.000 *** -0.0323 
Kenema -0.4264 0.1706 0.012 ** -0.009 
Im
m
u
n
iz
at
io
n
 
Male -0.2433 0.2700 0.367   -0.0093 
Young 0.0938 0.1506 0.534 
 0.0016 
CHO 0.0824 0.3536 0.816 
 2.00E-04 
CHA+nurse -0.1795 0.2178 0.410 
 -0.0044 
In-charge 0.0759 0.1744 0.663 
 0.0026 
Small facility -0.2043 0.1793 0.254 
 -0.0049 
CHC -0.1589 0.2535 0.531 
 -0.0037 
CHP -0.1771 0.2032 0.383 
 -0.0042 
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Urban 0.1263 0.1785 0.479 
 0.0059 
Bo -0.2724 0.1913 0.154 
 -0.0084 
Kenema -0.5302 0.1695 0.002 *** -0.0146 
F
am
ily
 P
la
n
n
in
g
 
Male -0.4672 0.2721 0.086 
 -0.0188 
Young -0.0460 0.1510 0.761 
 -0.0038 
CHO 0.1464 0.3520 0.677 
 0.003 
CHA+nurse -0.1262 0.1982 0.524 
 -0.0033 
In-charge -0.0593 0.2012 0.768 
 -0.0024 
Small facility 0.0674 0.1824 0.712 
 0.0052 
CHC -0.2112 0.2358 0.370 
 -0.0067 
CHP -0.2190 0.1782 0.219 
 -0.0068 
Urban -0.1725 0.2027 0.395 
 -0.0052 
Bo 0.0924 0.1739 0.595 
 0.0043 
Kenema 0.0332 0.1660 0.841   0.004 
H
IV
 
Male 1.5988 0.5987 0.008 *** 0.0034 
Young 1.0097 0.5685 0.076 
 0.0016 
CHO -0.3590 0.8686 0.679 
 -4.70E-04 
CHA+nurse -1.9517 0.8281 0.018 ** -0.0019 
In-charge 0.7705 0.6086 0.205 
 9.40E-04 
Small facility 0.1321 0.4618 0.775 
 2.50E-04 
CHC 1.5647 0.5601 0.005 *** 0.0029 
CHP 0.3863 0.6751 0.567 
 6.10E-04 
Urban -0.2372 0.5283 0.654 
 -2.40E-04 
Bo -0.5278 0.6796 0.437 
 -6.20E-04 
Kenema 1.2430 0.4850 0.010 * 0.0022 
O
th
er
 
Male -0.9854 0.5178 0.057 
 -0.0027 
Young 0.6237 0.4324 0.149 
 0.0022 
CHO 0.3344 0.7348 0.649 
 9.60E-04 
CHA+nurse 0.3927 0.6374 0.538 
 0.0016 
In-charge 0.0583 0.4080 0.886 
 2.00E-04 
Small facility -0.8794 0.5569 0.114 
 -0.0027 
CHC -1.2571 0.7195 0.081 
 -0.0036 
CHP -1.0954 0.6269 0.081 
 -0.003 
Urban -0.5580 0.6678 0.403 
 -0.0015 
Bo 0.0700 0.4679 0.881 
 2.70E-04 
Kenema -0.7599 0.5596 0.174   -0.0021 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 10.6: Distribution of average proportion of time spent on each activity 
General clinical activities    General administrative activities 
  
Disease/service-specific clinical activities   Disease/service specific admin. activities 
  
‘Outside’ activities     Private practice and non-health activities 
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Figure 10.7: Detail of the proportion of time spent on each type of ‘special clinical activity’, per week and on 
average  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III  -  DISCUSSION 
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11. Discussion and conclusions 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
The primary aim of this research was to analyze the complex remuneration of primary HWs in Sierra Leone, 
explore its causes and drivers at different levels, as well as the consequences it has for the HWs and on the 
activities they perform. In Chapter 2, a review of the available literature suggested that the topic of financial 
incentives of HWs in low and middle-income settings had been discussed in a variety of studies pertaining to 
different literatures and disciplines. However, the existing research tends to focus on each of the income sources 
separately and I proposed a broad research agenda to provide a comprehensive look at the financial incentive 
available for HWs and analyze them simultaneously (Bertone and Witter, 2015a). Based on that initial proposition, 
I set out to provide a detailed analysis of the remuneration of primary HWs in Sierra Leone (before the Ebola 
epidemic). 
 
The specific research objectives for this work were the following (see Chapter 3): 
1. Describe the official financial incentives available for HWs, by analyzing the HRH policies and policy-
making processes at macro (central) level which developed in Sierra Leone during the post-conflict 
period. 
2. Investigate the factors and dynamics between key actors of the health system at meso (district) level 
which contribute to re-shape the financial incentive package. 
3. Estimate the absolute and relative contribution of each income to the remuneration of HWs, and analyze 
the determinants of the remuneration at micro (individual HW) level. 
4. Explore the views of HWs on their remunerations, as well as their income use and financial coping 
strategies, and how these affect their motivation. 
5. Investigate the possible links between remunerations and activities performed. 
 
The present chapter synthesizes the key findings of the thesis, it discusses the overall limitations of the study, 
and identifies its contribution to knowledge as well as its policy implications. Finally, potential areas for future 
research are mentioned.  
11.2 Summary of main findings 
11.2.1 Key findings in relation to the research questions 
 
This thesis brings together the findings of a broad and innovative body of work focused on the issue of the complex remuneration of HWs. This section provides an overview of 
the key findings of this research in relation to the specific research questions identified in Chapter 3 (Table 11.1 below).  
 
Table 11.1: Overview of research questions and key findings 
 Research 
objectives 
Chapter Research questions 
(HT: hypothesis testing) 
(EX: exploratory or descriptive) 
Key findings 
C
en
tr
al
 le
ve
l Setting the 
background by 
describing the 
official HRH 
incentive package 
in Sierra Leone 
Chapter 6 
 What dynamics and processes at central level have led to the 
definition of the HRH incentive policies in Sierra Leone over the 
post-conflict period? (EX) 
 Was there a political ‘window of opportunity’ for reform in the 
immediate post-conflict period? (HT) 
 What type of financial incentive package for HWs emerged after 
the decade of post-conflict reforms? (EX) 
 The main drivers of HRH policy-making in post-conflict Sierra Leone were (i) sense 
of need for radical change, (ii) increasingly clear political direction, (iii) availability of 
funding 
 A ‘window of opportunity’ for reform did not open in the immediate post-conflict 
when leadership and capacity were weak and focus on ‘fire-fighting’ measures, but 
8 years later when the FHCI was announced, which played as a major catalyst for 
reform 
 Notable efforts were made overtime for the harmonization and alignment in the 
design of the official financial incentives for HWs  
 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
le
ve
l 
Exploring how HRH 
remuneration is re-
shaped at district 
level 
Chapter 7 
 Which factors and dynamics between local-level actors contribute 
to re-shaping the financial incentives of HWs? (EX) 
 What is the impact of such influence on the actual financial 
incentives experienced by HWs? (EX) 
 
 
 Implementation gaps in official HRH incentive policies, as well as dynamic 
interactions between DHMTs and NGOs (characterized by asymmetry of power 
between them in favor of NGOs) contribute to the emergence of  informal practices 
at local level (e.g. selective supervision, payment of salary top-ups and per diems) 
 Such informal practices result in inequalities in the remuneration of HWs across 
districts 
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In
d
iv
id
u
al
 le
ve
l 
Estimating HWs’ 
complex 
remuneration  
Chapter 8 
 What are the different estimates of HWs’ incomes based on the 
three methods used (i.e., survey, indirect questioning, prospective 
daily logbook)? (EX) 
 How do results of income estimates compare to the  hypotheses 
on biases that had been formulated initially? (HT)  
- Recall bias in survey responses lead to underestimation of 
income amounts 
- Indirect questioning reduces reticence in response to 
questions on sensitive (i.e. informal or illegal) incomes and 
address normative bias 
- Daily logbooks can help address the issue of recall bias and 
capture variation overtime, but suffer from low response 
rate. 
 
 
 Survey estimates are higher than other estimates, which challenge the assumption 
of recall bias leading to underestimation of incomes. 
 Respondents are still reticent to talk about sensitive issues, even when using 
indirect questioning methods’ 
 The attrition rate for longitudinal logbooks is acceptable, however their lack of 
completeness and low quality are major issues 
 Each methods has advantages and disadvantages and collecting data on HWs’ 
incomes remains a challenge. A potential solution could be to run multiple surveys 
over time. Additionally, mixed-methods approaches proved useful in providing 
essential information to interpret data and improve collection tools 
Analyzing the 
complex 
remuneration of 
HWs 
Chapter 9 
 
 
 What is the contribution of each income to the remuneration of 
HWs? (EX) 
 Which factors at individual, facility and district level drive the 
differences in the total remuneration and between components? 
(EX) 
 What are the views of the HWs on their incomes, and their 
satisfaction in relation with their livelihood strategies? (EX) 
 Salaries make up about  60% of the income of primary HWs in Sierra Leone, while 
the rest is composed of a variety of formal and informal incomes. 
 There is much heterogeneity in the total income as well as in the revenue 
breakdown. Results show significant differences in total income across district, for 
in-charges and HWs in Community Health Centres. 
 The satisfaction of HWs in relation to their remunerations also depends on the non-
financial features of the different income streams, and on how these features allow 
them to use each of their incomes differently to cope financially. 
 Analysis conducted specifically on PBF bonuses shows that they contribute to 
about 10% of the total remuneration of primary HWs. However, views on the bonus 
are rather positive, because of the role that it plays within the income use strategies 
of the workers 
Exploring the links 
between complex 
remuneration and 
HWs’ productive 
activities 
Chapter 10 
 Is the choice of activities of HWs driven by their effort to maximize 
income and minimize effort (as hypothesized by agency theory)? 
(HT) 
 Which factors constrain the choice of activities of HWs and 
influence the patterns of service delivery at facility level? (EX) 
 Agency’s hypothesis cannot be tested as one of its key assumptions (i.e., that HWs 
can freely choose which activities to perform) does not hold 
 Two main factors constrain the activity choice: (i) a schedule which dictates which 
services are to be provided each day; (ii) the availability of material (drugs, 
equipment) and technical (supervision) support to actually provide those services 
 Qualitative and quantitative results point to the fact that external actors, such as 
NGOs. play a key role in defining the activities of HWs by providing material and 
technical support to them. 
 
The following section highlights three broader findings that emerge from the overall analysis carried out for this thesis, beyond those specific to each research paper, and 
discusses them against the backdrop of the original conceptual framework.  
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11.2.2 Main overall findings of the research  
 
Beyond the results of each research paper related to the specific research questions, the overall research and 
analysis carried out in the thesis highlighted three broad findings. The first, key finding of the analysis of the total 
income estimate for HWs is the confirmation that the complex remuneration exists and it is a relevant 
phenomenon to study. In the context of three rural districts of Sierra Leone, the remuneration of primary HWs is 
indeed composed of a variety of formal and informal remunerations, of which the government salary remains the 
main one providing just more than half of the total income (60%). In this setting, the efforts undertaken by 
government, donors and NGOs have led to some harmonization and alignment of the HRH remuneration 
(Bertone et al., 2014), which is reflected in the high share of government pay for primary HWs, as well as the low 
revenues from top-ups found in Chapter 9 (Bertone and Lagarde, 2016). Despite these efforts, however, the 
remuneration of HWs in Sierra Leone remains complex and other formal and informal incomes beyond the 
government payments contribute to a large share of it. It could be argued that the complex remuneration of HWs 
is not a problem per se. Indeed, as highlighted in our third overall finding (below), from the individual perspective 
of the HWs, the complex remuneration, which allows for the differential use of different income streams, is an 
understandable and constructive response to the specific problems that primary HWs face in Sierra Leone, and 
specifically to address their concerns over low salaries and delayed official payments. However, from a systems’ 
perspective, the complex remuneration reveals more fundamental problems which affect the healthcare sector. In 
particular, the causes of the complex remuneration, i.e. the factors that lead to and define it, are related to 
fragmentation and misalignment in the local health system which is introduced, despite the efforts at central level, 
because of a substantial implementation gap between the official policies and the field reality, and because of the 
external actors who re-shape the local health priorities, thus influencing HWs’ activities and incomes.   
 
Further illustrating this last point, the second main finding of this thesis shows the key role of the dynamic 
interactions at district (meso) level in shaping the HWs’ remuneration and activities in Sierra Leone. The analysis 
of the political economy dynamics between DHMTs and NGOs (Chapter 7) unravels the mechanisms by which 
these interactions affect the implementation of centrally-designed policies and allow for the emergence of informal 
HRH practices which ensure a better fit between the NGOs agenda and the HWs incentive package. These 
practices take the form of selective supervision, salary supplementations and per diems paid to HWs and lead to 
differences in HWs’ remuneration across districts (Bertone and Witter, 2015b). Building on that finding and taking 
it further, the analysis of the factors influencing the activities of HWs (Chapter 10) reveals the mechanisms by 
which external actors shape local health priorities to be in line with their own priorities, through the provision of 
selective technical and material support to facilities. Such support strongly influences what HWs (can) do, beyond 
their formal accountability relations. Critically, the activities that HWs carry out define, in turn, the HWs 
remuneration structure and level, and explain the significant differences that I observed in HWs’ income between 
districts in Chapter 9 (Bertone and Lagarde, 2016; Bertone et al., 2016a).  
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Finally, the study illuminates important features of the different payment streams, and how they are perceived by 
the HWs in relation to one another within the complex remuneration. It points to the fact that the non-financial 
features of the incomes such as regularity, reliability, ease of access, linkage to performance, fairness in sharing 
practices, etc., matter beyond the monetary value. In their daily lives, primary HWs enact a series of 
compensating and coping strategies, such as spending different incomes differently (mental accounting), hiding 
income to shelter it from family pressures, and re-investing certain incomes to stabilize earnings over time. Each 
of these strategies takes advantage of the fact that the remuneration is complex and composed of different 
incomes, each with own specific financial and non-financial features (Bertone and Lagarde, 2016). Additionally, 
this study finds that design issues and implementation challenges that influence the non-financial features of the 
remuneration, such as those found for the PBF scheme in Sierra Leone, have important consequences for the 
motivation of HWs (Bertone et al., 2016a).  
 
It is important to note that the overall findings presented above challenge the original conceptual framework 
(Chapter 3) and call into question the causal path it hypothesized to explain how complex remuneration 
influences the allocation of time on different activities and, in turn, health service delivery and use. Indeed, a 
modified conceptual framework is now needed (Figure 11.1). The new framework incorporates the key findings in 
two key ways. First, it recognizes that the translation of the official incentive package available for HWs into 
elements of their actual remuneration is mediated by the implementation of informal HRH practices at local level, 
influenced by the dynamic interaction between DHMTs and NGOs. As described above, this is done by external 
actors through the provision of selective technical and material support to facilities and HWs. In turn, this support 
influences which activities HWs can or should do and, in turn, defines the elements of their complex 
remuneration. Therefore, while the original framework hypothesized that the complex remuneration of HWs would 
define their choice of activity, through their utility maximization strategies, the new framework reflects the finding 
that, in fact, it is rather the activities available to HWs, driven by external actors and their priorities, which 
contribute to define the HWs’ remuneration structure and level. Secondly, the revised conceptual framework 
recognizes the importance of financial and non-financial features of the different income streams within the 
complex remuneration for the HWs’ financial coping and livelihood strategies. The fact that incomes are 
perceived and can be used differently (for reasons beyond their face monetary value) affects the potential that 
each income has to motivate HWs, which in turn impacts on the quality and type of service delivered.  
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Figure 11.1: Revised conceptual framework 
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11.3 Limitations 
 
The analysis carried out in this thesis presents some limitations. A number of limitations have already been 
described in each of the relevant finding chapters. Here, I present some overall limitations, which have 
implications for the conclusions that can be drawn from the body of work presented.  
 
11.3.1 Limitations related to sampling  
 
The analysis was carried out in three of the fourteen districts of Sierra Leone, selected purposefully, rather than 
randomly. Moreover, all three districts are mostly rural, and the sample did not comprise the Western Area district 
around Freetown, where patterns in HWs’ remuneration are probably different. As a consequence, while this 
choice limits the external validity of our results, it is probably broadly representative of rural Sierra Leone and 
frontline HWs (non-clinician physicians, nurses and nursing aides) and facilities (public, primary facilities). This 
may also explain the fact that I found overall limited variability between HWs incomes based on individual 
features or characteristics of the facility, as shown for example by the absence of a strong rural/urban divide, 
discussed in Chapter 9 (Bertone and Lagarde, 2016).  
 
The sampling strategy for the HWs survey has two main limitations. First, because it was envisaged that 
enumerators start administering the survey to highest cadres, our sample may slightly over-represent in-charges 
compared to staff HWs. Second, as sampling was done at facility level, rather than HW level and only those 
present at the facility on the day of the visit were included in the survey, there is a risk of selection bias. This is 
because HWs with higher levels of absenteeism were more likely not to be present on the day of the survey. This 
bias is likely to lead to the underestimation of income from and time spent on activities outside of the health 
sector, private practice, etc. 
 
HWs included in the qualitative sample were selected purposefully as a sub-sample of those who were 
administered the survey and logbooks. The selection aimed to reflect a wide variety of views and situations in 
terms of cadre, but also rural/urban, male/female, type of facility, in-charge/staff and districts, in line with the 
principle of ‘fair dealing’ (Mays and Pope, 2000). However, as shown in Table 5.3, more MCH Aides, female HWs 
and those posted in MCHPs were interviewed, while CHOs, man and those working in CHPs are under-
represented in the final sample. The choice was made for convenience reasons (as there are very few male HWs, 
CHOs and CHP facilities, it was unpractical to reach them). Importantly, it also closely reflects the actual mix of 
HWs in the districts and all different groups are represented, in the interview sample, by at least one, if not more, 
individuals.  
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11.3.2 Data limitations  
 
In terms of quantitative data collection, several innovative techniques have been used to collect data on the 
different HWs remunerations, as explained in Chapters 5 and 8. As there exists no ‘golden standard’ for the 
collection of data on HWs’ incomes, these were estimated using methods with varying levels of reliability, 
because of both recall and normative bias. In particular, it is possible that certain revenues, and in particular the 
most sensitive ones such as those derived from user fees, illicit sale of drugs or under-the-table payments, were 
underreported for fear of consequences or because of the negative perceptions of the public around them. 
Similarly, normative bias is also a potential limitation of the self-reported data collected on HWs activities 
(Chapter 10). Additionally, the inconsistency of the activity reporting in the logbooks did not allow for a more 
disaggregated analysis of what HWs do. 
 
Finally, it is also possible that HWs attempted to provide normative or biased answers also during the in-depth 
interviews, by stating what they thought the researcher would like to hear or by depicting issues in a certain light 
to obtain improvements to their conditions. The latter could be, for example, the case of HWs complaining of their 
low income and requesting me to act, at national level or in other ways, to obtain an increase. Such applications 
could be increased by the fact that, because of my appearance, background and position (and despite the efforts 
to clarify my role of independent researcher), I could be easily likened to NGO workers or donors, who do have 
indeed some power to directly influence HWs incomes. To limit this issue as much as possible, the interviews 
focused on asking pragmatic and contextually-grounded descriptions of the HW daily life and of their habits, both 
concerning the income use and financial coping strategies, as well as the organization of the activities. Especially 
towards the beginning, questions on HWs’ broad opinions (e.g. on the fairness of salary, etc.) were avoided. 
Moreover, as explained in Chapter 5, reflexivity was exercised during the interviews as well as during the analysis 
of the data to critically consider how my presence could have influenced the responses of the HWs, but also how 
my perspectives and personal biases may have affected the interpretation of the data. Iterative discussion with 
my supervisor and other advisors, some familiar with the context of Sierra Leone and other outsiders, was 
essential to actively reflect on my positionality as a researcher, as well as the role of my personal views in 
influencing the analysis (Walt et al., 2008). 
 
11.3.3 Limitations to external validity 
 
The results of the work carried out in this thesis are certainly valid within the context of the study districts in Sierra 
Leone, at the time of the research. However, because of the specificity of the setting, their generalizability could 
be limited. For example, the findings relating to the design and implementation of the PBF scheme are closely 
related to the context of Sierra Leone and may not be valid for other settings (Bertone et al., 2016a). Also, the 
efforts to promote HRH reforms and harmonize HWs incentives in parallel to the launch of the FHCI are 
exceptional among the countries which introduced fee exemptions around the same time (Bertone et al., 2014; 
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Witter et al., 2016), while the relatively high number of NGOs operating directly within facilities (Chapter 7 - 
Bertone and Witter, 2015b) may be a specificity of Sierra Leone’s health system. It is also important to stress that, 
as further explained in the second part of section 11.4.3, the context in Sierra Leone and in those same study 
districts is now substantially different because of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak, the changes it caused 
in the health system and at socio-economic level, and the emergency response it triggered, which modified the 
mapping of the external actors present at central and district levels, and the dynamics between them and with 
state actors. 
 
However, notwithstanding the context-specificity of some of the findings, the health system and the HRH situation 
and challenges in Sierra Leone before Ebola were not substantially different from those in many countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and low-income countries. These contexts are often characterized by the fragmentation of the 
health system, even within the public sector and, due to its weak regulation and under-funding, the existence of 
an ‘unofficial’ healthcare sector (Ensor and Witter, 2001), which gives rise to the issue of the complex 
remuneration of HWs. Additionally, as it is the case for numerous countries over the 2000s decade, a targeted fee 
exemption policy had been launched in Sierra Leone, which reduced incomes from user fees for health staff 
(Ridde and Morestin, 2011; McPake et al., 2013b). Similarly, a PBF scheme including individual HW bonuses had 
been introduced in Sierra Leone, as it is currently the case, whether at pilot stage or national level, in 34 countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa (Fritsche et al., 2014). Finally, the key role of donors in providing funds to the health 
system, as well as the presence of donors and implementing agencies (NGOs) at sub-national level is a common 
feature to many countries in the region, in particular in fragile, post-conflict settings (Brinkerhoff, 2008; Witter, 
2012).  
 
11.3.4 Limitations of the conceptual framework and theoretical approach 
 
Although the conceptual framework defined at the beginning of the research (Chapter 3) proved a useful tool to 
guide and structure the different components of the analysis in this thesis and to provide a common theoretical 
approach (i.e., agency theory), the limits of the framework became evident as the research progressed. This is 
illustrated, for example, by the need to update the framework and review the hypotheses on the causal path 
which determines the complex remuneration of HWs and defines its consequences, as shown in section 11.2.2 
above.  
 
In particular, agency theory proved unsuitable to the issue and context of study. Concerning the latter, at 
individual level, the agency model and the assumptions on which it hinges (and in particular that of unconstrained 
labor supply choices) did not prove valid for HWs employed in the context of Sierra Leone. Moreover, at higher 
level (district), while a number of principal-agent relations are found (between Ministry of Health and DHMTs, 
between donors and NGOs, and between DHMTs and NGOs, and heath facility staff), the relations between 
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these actors are revealed to be more complex than what modelled by agency theory. The adoption of agency as 
the underlying theoretical framework of this thesis is therefore one of its limitations, and the analysis could benefit 
from extending beyond agency theory and applying concepts and tools drawing from the field of political science. 
In this sense, the insights provided by implementation theory, exploring the role of politics, power and practices in 
processes at meso and micro levels (Erasmus and Gilson, 2008; Gilson et al., 2014) could be useful. Among 
these theories, street-level bureaucracy, for example, could offer a possible alternative framework to interpret the 
practices of HWs at facility and individual level. A particularly useful conceptualization of it views street-level 
bureaucrats as policy co-makers surrounded by context-specific ‘micro-networks of relations’, i.e. a web of 
multiple, vertical and horizontal relations, in which their work and interactions are embedded (Hupe and Hill, 
2007). Such model could be fruitfully applied to extend the findings of Chapter 10.   
 
Concerning the issue of study, i.e. the remuneration of HWs, simple agency models consider it, alongside effort 
levels and power of incentives, as the key variable in defining HWs’ behavior. However, some have successfully 
argued that professional norms, intrinsic motivation and self-selection of agents into a public sector jobs also 
contribute to shape the agents’ behaviors and mitigate the predictions of the standard agency model (Perrow, 
1986; Burgess and Metcalfe, 1999; Kiser, 1999; Burgess and Ratto, 2003; Shapiro, 2005). In this sense, it is 
important to remind that the research carried out for this thesis focuses exclusively on the financial incentives of 
HWs and does not take into consideration non-financial incentives, such as access to training, social recognition, 
supervision, although their relevance has been shown in the literature (Buchan et al., 2000; Lehmann et al., 2008; 
Willis-Shattuck et al., 2008; Chandler et al., 2009; Lagarde and Blaauw, 2009). Given their importance, omitting 
non-financial incentives from the analysis represents a limitation of the research. However, this choice was 
explicitly made since the early stages of the research (Chapter 2 (Bertone and Witter, 2015a), and section 3.2.1) 
and is dictated by the need to contain the amount of work and ensure the feasibility of the research as a PhD 
project. 
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11.4 Contribution of the thesis 
11.4.1 Methodological contributions  
 
From a methodological perspective, this thesis contributes to developing and testing a range of approaches to 
data collection and analysis on the issue of the complex remuneration of HWs, which are useful to build on for the 
proposed research agenda (Chapter 2 - Bertone and Witter, 2015a). In particular, the methodological contribution 
refers to (i) the challenge of capturing the multiple remunerations of HWs, and (ii) the analysis of the complex 
remuneration to explore the causes of the variability of income between HWs. 
 
Methodological approaches to the collection of data on HWs incomes 
 
The traditional approach to collect data on HWs incomes adopted in most of the existing literature is by the use of 
a survey, and several studies report the results of that type of surveys (Macq and Van Lerberghe, 2000; Witter et 
al., 2007, 2016; McCoy et al., 2008). Additionally, different approaches to indirect questioning have also been 
attempted in the literature, such as asking what other HWs (rather than the interviewee) do in terms of financial 
coping strategy (Roenen et al., 1997) or by using the Randomized Response Technique (RRT) with binary 
answers (yes/no) (Akwataghibe et al., 2013). In other studies, qualitative methods (direct observation, interviews, 
focus groups) were adopted to elicit information on certain incomes, although this did not always lead to a precise 
quantification of the remuneration(s) (McPake et al., 1999; Stringhini et al., 2009; Witter et al., 2011; Vian et al., 
2013).  
 
Building on these approaches and attempting to improve each of them, the quantitative component of this 
research includes a direct survey, indirect questioning for sensitive incomes and self-administered prospective 
logbooks. The comparison of the results, carried out in Chapter 8, highlights the advantages and disadvantages 
of each of these methods. It confirms that direct, cross-sectional surveys remain a useful tool, apt to provide 
income estimates in an inexpensive manner. However, the research contributed to explore new techniques of 
indirect questioning which had not been yet applied to the study of HWs income, such as the RRT in the variant 
design for quantitative estimates. The negative results highlight the limits of this type of technique in the context 
of Sierra Leone and point to the fact that other, indirect techniques could be explored in the future to increase the 
reliability of answers on sensitive incomes, such as for example the ‘unfolding bracket’ approach used in DR 
Congo (Bertone et al., 2016b). Additionally, knowledge of specific context and culture is essential to assess which 
are the most sensitive income questions and how likely they are to the answered truthfully in a direct survey.  
 
Although the use of self-administered, longitudinal logbooks had been attempted to collect data on HWs’ daily 
income and expenses in a study in Uganda (McPake et al., 1999), logbooks were completed by only 20 HWs for 
one month and results were not used in the final analysis. In this research, despite the potential bias of the self-
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administered approach (of which I was aware from the beginning, but was inevitable because of the costs and 
unpracticality of observational approaches), it seems that the logbooks proved useful to provide an estimate of 
HWs’ incomes, including the most sensitive ones. Logbook data were used in the final estimate for the sensitive 
incomes and, although likely to be lower-end estimates, they are far from negligible for many respondents. 
However, unfortunately, in the case of sensitive incomes the comparison of logbook estimates with data collected 
with a different method is not possible. 
 
While collecting reliable estimates, especially on sensitive incomes, remains a challenge and other approaches 
could be tested in the future, this work contributes to the preliminary testing and comparison of some of the 
possible approaches, which will be useful to build on for future research on the complex remuneration of HWs. 
 
Analysis of the determinants of the complex remuneration of HWs 
 
The multivariate regression analysis applied to the quantitative data on each of the remuneration of the HWs and 
their total income is also an innovative approach introduced by this research. By looking at the determinants of 
the HWs, at individual, facility and district level, the analysis allows to explore some of the causes of the variability 
of incomes between HWs. Results are useful to investigate the features at different levels which entail higher 
earning opportunities for the HWs and identify the type of income which may increase. This analysis also has the 
potential to illuminate on whether the income levels for individual HWs are in line with the policies in place to 
address the HRH challenges of availability, distribution and motivation (e.g. higher official incomes for those in 
rural areas), or there are unacceptable inequalities between HWs, which could be policy-amenable. Both 
elements are of key policy relevance, as described in section 11.4.3. 
 
11.4.2 Contribution to knowledge 
 
The research carried out for this thesis provides one of the first case studies coupling a mapping the HWs’ 
complex remuneration with an in-depth exploration of its causes and consequences. In doing so, this thesis 
effectively brings together different bodies of literature (agency theory, literature on HRH, on HWs’ incentives and 
motivation, and on power, governance and accountability in the health sector), pertaining to a range of disciplines 
(such as health economics, policy analysis, political economy), under the field of health policy and systems 
research.  
 
Beyond the specific findings of each of the research papers, this thesis provides an original contribution to the 
current knowledge on how we conceptualize and analyze HWs’ incentives in low and middle income countries 
(LMICs). This contribution is not only consistent with, but also expands some of the most recent theoretical 
developments in the HRH literature. Indeed, while I was working on this thesis, a series of articles and books was 
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published arguing for the adoption of a ‘health labor market’ (HLM) approach to understand HRH challenges and 
health workforce policies (McPake et al., 2013a, 2014; Soucat et al., 2013; Sousa et al., 2013; Araujo et al., 
2016), moving beyond the traditional HRH literature which tends to focus on workforce planning (i.e., estimating 
the quantity of HWs needed based on a given population’s health needs), supply-side interventions (e.g., scaling 
up training of HWs) and HRH management. In contrast, the HLM framework pays increased attention to the 
dynamic nature of the labor market for HWs and the interaction between the supply of HWs (defined by the 
number of HWs willing to work in the health sector) and the demand of HWs (partially derived from health needs, 
but also depending on the willingness and ability to hire and pay of HWs of the public, private and non-for-profit 
sectors), looking at the role of incentives, employment preferences and labor market failures (McPake et al., 
2014; Araujo et al., 2016).  
 
This thesis is in line with the theoretical arguments of the HLM approach, as it moves beyond HRH management 
approaches to focus extensively on the financial incentives available to HWs, how they are established and how 
they affect HWs, their motivation and activities. As recommended by McPake et al. (2013), it provides an in-depth 
understanding of the absolute and relative levels of all sources of remuneration, which is preliminary to the 
analysis of the HLM and the reflection on workforce policies and reforms. Critically, however, this thesis also 
represents an extension of the HLM approach and a more contextualized application to low-income countries. 
Indeed, the HLM approach, as conceptualized so far, only partially takes into account the specificity of the health 
system and HRH organization in many LMICs, and the substantial difference with high-income settings. In 
particular, as well explained by Ensor and Witter (2001), this concerns the way in which, in LMICs, low incomes of 
staff, lack of resources for material supplies, unstable labor markets and difficulties in regulation of unofficial 
private activity, can generate hidden ‘internal’ market behavior. Although some HLM publications acknowledge 
that the “pay of health professionals, especially in middle and low-income countries, consists in multiple 
components, including salaries, informal payments, bonuses and allowances that can vary considerably among 
individual health workers [and] health professionals often hold multiple jobs” (McPake et al., 2013: p.844, see also 
McPake et al., 2014), and refer to the issue of the multiple remuneration of HWs in LMICs (Araujo et al., 2016), 
the general HLM framework tends to consider the wage rate (normally understood as the average HW salary) as 
the market clearing point, which is the salary level which would ensure the right number, quality and productivity 
of HWs, given the health needs of the population covered by an health system. However, as shown in this thesis, 
the practices that influence the HWs’ remuneration include also dual practice (private health practice, or non-
health activities) or informal activities (such as, sale of drugs, payments from patients, etc.) and are affected by 
the presence of external actors who contribute to the financing of the health sector, including the direct funding of 
the health workforce through salary supplementations and per diems. A focus of health labor market analysis 
exclusively on salary ignores a large part of the remuneration of HWs, which is important for them in different 
ways (i.e., not only because of the extra amount of income they provide, but also because of their non-financial 
features) and ensures their participation to the health labor market, as well as their retention and motivation.  
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This thesis extends, theoretically and empirically, the HLM approach to incorporate more explicitly the relevance 
of the phenomenon of the complex remuneration of HWs and the fact that HWs receive a range of formal and 
informal incomes, each entailing a different type of contract, a varying ‘power’ of the incentive and a range of 
different non-financial features which affect HWs’ satisfaction and motivation. By reflecting all these elements of 
the HWs’ remuneration, it provides a more adapted perspective to analyze the reality of low-income settings and 
offer pertinent policy recommendations.  
 
Moreover, this research also points to the role that disciplines other than health and labor economics can play in 
the understanding of the health labor market. These include policy analysis and political economy analysis for the 
investigation of the dynamics defining HRH policy design and implementation at central and district level, as well 
as qualitative health system research for the analysis of non-financial aspects of income and of HWs’ views and 
perceptions. In the case of the latter, some evidence exist on the importance of the non-financial features of HWs’ 
incomes. For example, a study in the DR Congo found that receiving a salary is seen by HWs as a recognition of 
their role as agents of the state (Fox et al., 2014). In Tanzania, the perceived unfairness of salary, allowances 
and access to training (and therefore, per diems) is found to be a key demotivating factor (Songstad et al., 2011) 
and the availability of deferred income through a pension scheme a critical element for remaining in public 
employment (Songstad et al., 2012; Zinnen et al., 2012). Finally, recent literature on PBF schemes finds that non-
monetary factors (such as clarification of responsibilities, supervision and improvements in the work environment) 
influence the HWs’ perceptions of being paid based on performance, but on the other hand HWs may be 
demotivated by design and implementation issues (Bhatnagar and George, 2016; Ogundeji et al., 2016). This 
research adds to this body of work by looking at all of the HWs’ incomes and their respective features in relation 
to each other, and reveals the compensating and coping strategies of primary HWs, as highlighted in the main 
findings (section 11.2). Additionally, in line with the multidisciplinary perspective adopted, the thesis confirms the 
value of mixed-method approaches for the research agenda on HWs’ remuneration, already used in another 
study (Akwataghibe et al., 2013).  
 
In this sense, this research contributes more broadly to the field of health policy and system research. The 
multidisciplinary approach embraced throughout the thesis is not limited to the methods adopted, but also 
reflected in the recognition of the health system as a complex system, where the ‘hardware’ (e.g., the functional 
or instrumental elements which compose it, including HRH) dynamically interacts with the ‘software’ (e.g., ideas, 
interests, relations, power, values and norms), within the broader socio-economic context of the study districts in 
Sierra Leone (Sheikh et al., 2011). Accordingly, the type of analysis performed allows to explore both sets of 
features at multiple levels, including the central, sub-national (district and facility) and individual level, and to 
reflect on how they influence the remuneration of HWs and, ultimately, service delivery. 
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11.4.3 Policy implications 
 
Policy implications for financial incentive strategies in low-income settings 
 
The analysis and findings of this research have important policy implications for how we go about (re)thinking 
financial incentive strategies, in terms of how policies and reforms can be devised to address HRH challenges, 
through the design and implementation of effective incentive packages. 
 
First, the findings call for an increased attention by national policy-makers as well as donors and external 
technical advisers (such as, for example, those working within the HRH Technical Working Group in Freetown), to 
components of the HWs remuneration other than those usually looked at, i.e. government salary and official 
allowances. This is essential in order to have a better and more comprehensive understanding of the incentives 
available to HWs and, therefore, be able to establish or modify them through health workforce reforms which 
effectively address HRH challenges, such as retention, motivation and distribution. Gathering comprehensive 
information on HWs remunerations does not necessarily entail new research or expensive ad-hoc surveys. 
Indeed, at least some of the key information could be collected through routine systems, both by improving the 
existing or creating new ones. For example, government’s salary payrolls could be designed to also include 
information on payment execution, and donors and NGOs could be mandated to inform the Ministry of Health or 
the DHMTs of the payments made to individual HWs, in the form of top-ups or per diems. Existing HR 
management systems, such as iHRIS1 could be adapted to allow the inclusion of both these data. Also 
supplementary information could be calculated through the current OpenRBF platform2 used to manage PBF data 
in many countries, to keep track of bonuses paid to individual HWs (at the moment, the system allows tracking 
payments to facilities, but not to individuals). Information on informal incomes such as payments from patients 
and income from private practice, is undoubtedly more difficult to obtain, but households and patients’ surveys 
could be used to obtain estimates of them. 
 
Once the information is available, the analysis of all the remunerations of HWs should be built into the ongoing 
health labor market analyses and would allow policy-makers and advisers, first, to explore the characteristics 
(such as, the cadre or gender of the HWs, the location (urban/rural, district) and size of the facility where they 
work, etc.) that entail better earning opportunities for HWs in the form of informal incomes, private practice, or 
payments from external agencies. An understanding of which HWs (and where) have higher remunerations is 
necessary to address income inequalities by, for example, harmonizing opportunities for payment by NGOs and 
donors across districts and facilities, as well as better regulating private and dual practice. Secondly, information 
on all of HWs’ remunerations can contribute at central level to the definition of the amount of the official 
payments, so that it is set up to a level which is effective to address HRH challenges. For example, if a remote 
                                                          
1
 https://www.ihris.org/  
2
 http://www.openrbf.org/  
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allowance is introduced, does it contribute to increase the income level of those posted in rural areas above that 
of urban HWs? Or, does a PBF bonus provide a sufficient incentive to induce behavioral change, and for which 
HWs? (e.g. for the in-charges only, or also for staff HWs, etc.). Finally, this information is also necessary to 
monitor the effective implementation of HRH incentive policies and verify whether these policies are actually 
reflected in the remuneration of HWs.  
 
The availability of information on the HWs’ remuneration also has the advantage of diminishing the reliance on 
anecdotal evidence and on the perceptions of actors at central level which can be misled. For example, as 
discussed in Chapter 9 (Bertone and Lagarde, 2016), most of the actors working at central level in Sierra Leone, 
and in particular donors and NGOs, overestimated the relevance of salary supplementations paid to HWs by 
external agencies, possibly because their views did not reflect the most recent collective efforts made towards 
incentive alignment. Interestingly, many NGO representatives reported that, while their organizations had 
eliminated top-ups, they suspected others of continuing the practice. Similarly, many stakeholders supposed that 
the large majority of HWs were not receiving their salary or receiving it with long delays. However, this research 
found that 15% of the HWs do not receive salary (largely, those trained or retrained after 2010)3 and salaries are 
generally paid on time into the bank accounts. It is possible that the views of some stakeholders reflect the 
complaints of a vocal minority of HWs. 
 
Secondly, the findings of this thesis expose some of the potential reasons of the income variation between HWs, 
as driven by factors concerning implementation processes. It shows that the alignment of policies and incentive 
packages at central level may not be sufficient to ensure effective incentive packages at HW level. This is 
because the dynamics between actors at district level play a key role in influencing the incomes of HWs, as well 
as the activities they perform, thus effectively modifying incentive packages and service delivery. From a policy 
perspective, this calls for better monitoring of implementation practices and for further coordination, both at 
national as well as at sub-national level. In order to do so, it will be essential to ensure the empowerment of 
DHMTs as lead in the stewardship, coordination and priority-setting processes, as further explained in Chapter 7 
(Bertone and Witter, 2015b). This will require, from donors and NGOs, the provision of additional financial and 
technical support to the long-term efforts of capacity building of district-level staff, possibly through pooled district-
level basket funds, as detailed in Chapter 7 (Bertone and Witter, 2015b). At the same time, it would be essential 
that national governing bodies at central level establish a legal framework that strengthen decentralization and 
allows for the shifting of key roles and powers to the DHMTs, as well as provides them with the necessary human 
and financial resources. Development partners also have a role in reducing the fragmentation of the health 
system at local level, which directly affects inequalities in HWs’ income as well as what HWs do. Such 
fragmentation is often introduced by the disjointed support that donors offer to NGOs operating directly within the 
districts, and bypassing the central level and its coordination role. Additionally, there is room for improvement by 
                                                          
3
 This is in line with the finding from operational research carried out in 2013-2014 which found that 14.5% of HWs did not receive their 
salary (Narayan and Gage, 2015). 
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donors and NGOs towards coordination and alignment of remunerations from top-ups, by reducing or halting 
them altogether (as effectively done in the study districts at the time of the research), as well as per diems by 
harmonizing their levels across donors/NGOs and limiting their use, in order to reduce unfair differences among 
HWs deriving from those payments (Chapter 9 – Bertone and Lagarde, 2016). Finally, ensuring the regular 
provision of basic inputs by increasing donor funding to, and NGO use of, uniform and reliable supply-chain 
mechanisms rather than parallel ones or, at least, making sure that the material and technical support that NGOs 
provide to facilities and individual HWs is in line with national and local health priorities, would also contribute to 
enable a full and balanced package of services to be offered across facilities and districts (Chapter 10).  
Finally, the findings of this thesis call for more attention to the HWs’ own perspectives on their remunerations. It is 
found that the non-financial features of incomes, ingrained in the design and implementation of HRH incentives, 
lead to a series of compensating and coping strategies of HWs. These strategies do not concern each single 
income separately, but influence how HWs perceive and value their revenues in relation with one another and 
within the broader incentive environment. Importantly, from a policy perspective, this questions the assumption of 
income fungibility, so that the marginal effect of increasing one income source may not necessarily be equivalent 
to the marginal effect of increasing another source. Moreover, while some of the coping strategies of HWs are 
undoubtedly predatory and generate perverse effects (e.g., absenteeism, and distorted incentives, abuse, 
neglecting/privileging some areas of work caused by moonlighting and per diems respectively - Van Lerberghe et 
al., 2002; Vian et al., 2013), they emerge in parallel as essential for the financial survival of HWs and should be 
carefully considered, and dealt with, by policy-makers. Specifically, with reference to the above examples, 
attention of policy-makers and their advisers should focus on the introduction of health workforce reforms that 
address the low level of salaries, but also that provide an explicit regulation of dual practice and strengthened 
efforts to channel per diems as effectively as possible, by harmonizing rates, improving NGOs coordination to 
avoid duplications and to ensure that activities are in line with health priorities, and enforcing rules to limit abuse 
by some individuals (see also Vian et al., 2013).  Concerning PBF schemes, which are increasingly implemented 
in sub-Saharan Africa, the findings of this research highlight the fact that income from such schemes is 
considered differently by HWs and stresses the different behavioral impact of these incomes compared to other 
types of remuneration (for example, related to their timing, ease of access, knowledge by others of their amount, 
etc.). HRH and financing technical working groups at national level should be aware of these issues and explicitly 
take them into account , when designing and implementing PBF schemes. 
 
Policy relevance in the current context in Sierra Leone 
 
Fieldwork for this thesis was carried before the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) epidemic which profoundly modified 
the context in Sierra Leone4. The EVD epidemic has caused so far a total of almost 4,000 deaths in Sierra Leone 
(WHO, 2016), and has engendered deep changes in the socio-economic situation of the country (Himelein et al., 
                                                          
4
 Data collection was carried out between October 2012 and May 2014. The last few interviews in the district of Kenema were carried out 
just weeks before the first official EVD case. 
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2015). For what concerns the health sector, the outbreak has evidenced the problems of the health care system 
in Sierra Leone and in the aftermath the gains in terms of population health outcomes made in the post-conflict 
years may be partially offset (Evans et al., 2015). Concerning the health workforce, recent evidence shows that 
HWs have been disproportionally affected by the epidemic. 11 of the 136 doctors of Sierra Leone died during the 
outbreak, and HWs were 21 to 32 times more likely to get infected than the general population. Additionally, the 
epidemic caused increased absenteeism and low morale among HWs (WHO, 2015; McMahon et al., 2016).  
 
In terms of incentive environment available to primary HWs, the outbreak entailed substantial changes. Official 
payments available to HWs increased as a substantial hazard pay of 196–495 USD per month had been added to 
the remuneration of those working on EVD-related posts (NERC, 2015). Later on, with the decrease in EVD 
cases, the incentive was discontinued, which raises issues about the potential demotivating effects on HWs. 
Moreover, because of the influx of aid, the distribution, characteristics and focus of external interventions, in 
terms of donors and NGOs supporting health facilities and individual HWs, has considerably changed and (for 
what concerns HWs incentives) many of the external projects often include salary supplementations and top-ups 
for HWs posted in certain sites. These allowances, their level and prevalence, are currently unknown to the 
Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS). 
 
Despite the challenges of a weak information base, HRH issues have emerged as prominent in the ongoing 
debates in Sierra Leone and have gathered much attention and funding, because of key role that the health 
workforce, or rather its low availability, uneven distribution, and the lack of trust between communities and HWs 
as frontline representatives of the state (Witter et al., 2015), is recognized to have had in the EVD outbreak 
(Denney and Mallett, 2015). As HRH issues are high on the political agenda of government and donors, it will be 
important to capitalize on the lessons learned from this research to put in place effective HRH incentives and 
reforms, within the broader health system strengthening process. In order to do so, the main findings of this 
research have been shared with stakeholders from both government and partner organizations in Sierra Leone, 
and presented at a workshop organized in Freetown in January 20165. Moreover, I have been in contact with the 
Ministry of Health and in particular the Department for Human Resources for Health since leaving Freetown in 
May 2014, with the purpose of sharing findings and data to respond to questions raised by the Department (for 
example, on HWs’ income from per diems and time spent in workshops, as a means for the MoHS to advocate 
for a reduction of NGO-funded in-service training). 
 
In particular, in the current context of Sierra Leone, findings from this research point to the urgent need for 
renewed efforts in terms of coordination, at central and sub-national levels. Coordination is essential not only to 
                                                          
5
 Policy briefs available to stakeholders can be found at: 
 https://rebuildconsortium.com/media/1101/rebuildconsort-aspecialbrief.pdf  
 https://rebuildconsortium.com/media/1268/rebuild-sl-policy-brief-3-hrh-practices-at-district-level.pdf 
 https://rebuildconsortium.com/media/1267/rebuild-sl-policy-brief-2-hw-incomes.pdf  
The first policy brief was prepared by ReBUILD’s communications team, while the others by myself. 
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better understand the payments available and the remuneration structure of individual HWs, but also to ensure its 
rationalization and the alignment of incentives and avoid the perverse effects in HRH distribution, motivation and 
performance caused by the arbitrary geographical distribution of external aid (and its legacy in the next decades), 
or by vertical priorities such as the current infection prevention and control (IPC) focus. The strengthening of 
existing coordination mechanisms and the establishment of new ones must take place under the strong 
leadership of the MoHS and of the DHMTs as its decentralized representatives. Their will to take up this role and 
their capacity to do so are therefore essential, and must be supported in a systematic way and seizing the 
opportunity of the current health system’s reconstruction to build up sustainable data infrastructures and 
coordination mechanisms and fora. However, donors and NGOs must also actively contribute to the coordination 
by putting in place procedures that allow and/or force them (and, in the case of donors, the NGOs they fund) to 
collaborate with central and district authorities, by sharing information and budgets, participating in meetings, 
aligning their objectives to national policies and priorities. This is particularly relevant for humanitarian NGOs, 
whose operations procedures are usually more adapted to emergency situations and require little accountability 
to national structures, often bypassing them altogether.  
 
Secondly, this research points to the importance of a broader consideration of the entirety of the remunerations 
available for HWs, beyond their salary. For post-EVD Sierra Leone, this translates in a reflection on critical 
reforms in the incentives available to the HWs. Such reforms include for example (i) the reinstatement of the 
remote allowance, which is essential to address concerns about the distribution of the health workforce and the 
motivation of rural HWs, but whose funding had come to a halt in early 2013 with no clear explanation to the 
workers; and (ii) the continuation of the PBF scheme (whose future is uncertain as external funding is set to end 
by December 2016), which this research has shown, although perfectible especially in its implementation, plays a 
key role in the motivation of HWs through the financial and non-financial features of the bonus. Instead, the 
current discussions in Freetown are (externally) driven by the preference of donors and implementing agencies to 
fund and carry out simple and discrete activities, such as modelling HRH needs or running payroll clear and HR 
headcount (both took place post-EVD despite being two similar exercises), rather than engaging in complex 
policy discussions or in reforms requiring long-term technical and financial commitment. 
 
Additionally, as well argued by Denney and Mallett (2015), a radically new approach to capacity building is 
needed in order to take advantage of the current opportunity for reform. Such approach must look at the health 
system, including in dealing with HRH issues, in a less technocratic and modular way and instead adopt a 
comprehensive perspective, recognizing that rebuilding and strengthening the health system “does not happen in 
a linear fashion, but is ultimately a product of deeply social and political processes” (Denney and Mallett, 2015: 
p.8). This will require building on the past experiences and evidence, rather than repeating the same discrete 
activities (such as, in the case of the current discussions in Freetown, supporting yet another costly and time-
consuming payroll clean, without ensuring the presence of lasting capacity to manage it in the central and 
decentralized structures in charge of it), as well as paying attention to the relations and linkages between the 
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different pillars of the health system. For what concerns HRH incentives, this translates, for example, in a more 
health labor market-oriented approach to addressing the challenges of availability, retention and deployment of 
HWs, but also in an increased attention to the ‘software’ defining HRH incentives, such as the interests and 
power of key stakeholders and their interplay, as well as the views, values and norms of the HWs.  
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11.5 Areas for further research  
 
This thesis proposes a new research agenda on the complex remuneration of HWs, its causes and 
consequences, and provides a first empirical application of it to a case study. However, the focus of this thesis is 
limited to one country (and three districts within it) and the research would undoubtedly benefit of an extension to 
other settings. Future analyses would also have the advantage of potentially testing and comparing other data 
collection methods and improve the tools available for the collection of reliable income data. A first step for 
extending both methods tested and study setting was taken with the research I carried out in the DR Congo in 
2014-2015 (Bertone et al., 2016b). Building on these initial case studies, further research focusing on the 
complex remuneration of HWs could be carried out in other contexts and countries.  
 
Even more importantly, the rigorous and systematic comparison of the case-study results across settings could 
further improve the generalizability and analytic generalizability of the findings (Gilson et al., 2011). Such cross-
country research agenda is essential to explore the relevance of the phenomenon of the complex remuneration of 
HWs in different contexts and assess the extent and the determinants of variability of income(s) between HWs in 
multiple LMICs. As indicated in Chapter 2, questions such as ‘do HWs in some countries have more complex 
incomes than in others? And if so, why?’, are relevant (Bertone and Witter, 2015a). Furthermore, the comparison 
may reveal interesting patterns or differences about how different are the remunerations for HWs of the same 
cadre across countries, and whether the income variability is higher in some settings rather than others (and 
why). Such cross-country analyses are not only useful to look at HRH incentive issues in a comprehensive and 
comparative way, but also to examine the health system at large, the degree of its fragmentation, the role of 
external actors and of the private sector (including the relevance of dual practice). In this sense, it will be useful to 
extend the analysis carried out in Sierra Leone to include other cadres (doctors, pharmacists, technicians, 
administrative and managerial personnel) and facilities (public, private and non-for-profit, but also secondary and 
tertiary hospitals, and district teams). 
 
A related issue that deserve further analysis concerns the potential consequences of the complex remuneration 
of the activities that HWs do and how they organize their time. It would be interesting to carry out in other settings 
and for other cadres (including managers at district or higher level) a similar study to that presented in Chapter 
10, perhaps adopting alternative methods where possible (e.g. observational approaches), to reflect on the 
influence of remuneration and/or of other factors, such as the material and technical support from external actors 
in order to test the hypothesis of whether giving priority to activities that enabled the earning of per diems is a 
deliberate strategy of HWs to maximize income or rather a consequences of the constrained set of choice that 
they have.  
 
Finally, in line with this last point but also as an independent set of questions, the role of external actors and 
dynamics at district level in influencing HWs activities and shape service delivery also deserves further research 
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for its potential to shift local health priorities and establish new (informal) lines of upward accountability for HWs, 
beyond the formal ones which are usually considered (Cleary et al., 2013). While the role of external actors for 
the governance of health system and their impact on the stewardship role of the Ministry of Health has been 
relatively well studied since the seminal study of Buse and Walt (1997), there is a dearth of evidence on these 
dynamics at the sub-national level, with few exceptions (for example, Conn et al., 1996; Devahive et al., 2015). 
Such analysis could benefit from extending beyond economic agency theory and applying analytical frameworks 
drawing from the field of political sciences, including insights from (both top-down and bottom-up) implementation 
theory, exploring the role of politics, power and practices in those processes at meso and micro levels (Erasmus 
and Gilson, 2008; Gilson et al., 2014). 
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Appendix 2 - Information sheets and consent forms 
Appendix 2.1 - Information sheet and consent form for key informant interviews at 
central level 
 
Policies to attract and retain health workers in Sierra Leone particularly in rural areas-a review of 
policy drivers, implementation and effectiveness in post-conflict Sierra Leone 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
The College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences (COMAHS) is conducting a study on “Policies to 
attract and retain health workers in rural areas-a review of policy drivers, implementation and 
effectiveness in post-conflict Sierra Leone”. This study has received Ethical Approval from the Sierra 
Leone Ethics and Scientific Committee (National Ethical Committee) and the Liverpool School of 
Tropical Medicine Ethical Committee. 
You have been identified as someone who could make a valuable contribution to this study. We 
hope that you will be willing to participate. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully.  
What is the purpose of the study? 
The study aims to obtain your perceptions with regard to human resource for health policies from 
the post conflict period to the present. 
What are the possible benefits of the study? 
The results of the study will provide valuable information for the Ministry of Health and Sanitation 
about its human resources policy in Sierra Leone.  
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate because you have experience of either implementing human 
resource policies or the effects of these policies on your career.  It is important that we gain the 
views of a wide range of people from across the health care sector.  
Do I have to take part? 
It is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide. We will be happy to go through this information 
sheet with you. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without giving a reason. If you 
choose not to participate this will not affect your work or career. You do not have to answer any 
question with which you do not feel comfortable. 
What will I have to do? 
You will be asked to take part in an interview that will last approximately 40 minutes. You will be 
asked about your experiences and perceptions of policies related to health workers incentives and 
how these have changed over time.    
Confidentiality 
All the information you give us during the course of this study will be kept strictly confidential.  Only 
you will have the right to access the data you provide in order to check its accuracy and correct any 
errors.  Your personal details will be destroyed at the end of the study. The data will be stored in an 
anonymous form. The data will only be analysed by researchers from COMAHS and its partner 
organisations on the ReBUILD project. These include the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and 
Queen Margaret University, both based in the UK. Any data transferred outside COMAHS will be 
anonymised and unidentifiable. 
Appendices | 209  
Will you participate in this study? [_____] Yes or  [_____] No 
If yes, please complete two copies of the consent form attached. Keep one copy for your records and 
give one copy to the COMAHS staff member who explained the study to you. 
For further details, contact Dr. Mohamed Samai at COMAHS on 033-841262 
 
Policies to attract and retain health workers in Sierra Leone particularly in rural areas-a review of 
policy drivers, implementation and effectiveness in post-conflict Sierra Leone 
CONSENT FORM 
Participant Identification Number: [ ___ ___ ___ ___]
  
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for 
the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason.  
 
_____________________  ________________   ___________________ 
Health Worker Name   Date     Signature 
 
Would it be possible to have a phone number to call you, in case of any gaps in the 
answers and also to assist in auditing of interviews? Thank you. 
Phone number: ____________________________ 
When completed, 1 for participant; 1 for researcher site file 
 
 
3. I understand that the personal information obtained during the 
course of this study, may be seen by researchers from the COMAHS 
but no-one else. I give permission for these individuals to have 
access to my responses. 
 
 
 
4. I understand that personal information will be destroyed at the 
end of the study but that data held against a Confidential 
Identification Number will be stored for future use by other 
researchers.  
Please initial box 
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Appendix 2.2 - Information sheet and consent form for key informant interviews at 
district level 
 
Health Workers’ remuneration and its implications in Sierra Leone 
Key informant interviews 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
 
Hello, 
 
My name is Maria and I am a PhD student at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in 
the UK. I am conducting a research project on the remuneration of Health Workers (HWs) in Sierra 
Leone. The project aims to understand the different sources of income for doctors and nurses, and 
what it means for the activities they undertake in their job. For this research, I will of course interview 
HWs, but I am also interested in understanding what the policies about HWs remunerations are. You 
have been identified as someone who could make a valuable contribution to this study component. I 
hope that you will be willing to participate. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully and feel free to ask any questions you may have regarding it.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This part of the study aims to obtain your insights and views on how decisions regarding the pay of 
doctors and nurses in Sierra Leone are taken and who are the actors that contribute in making these 
decisions. Overall, the research project aims at better understanding the different components of the 
HWs remuneration in Sierra Leone and its implications on the performance of the health workforce. 
 
What are the possible benefits of the study? 
The results of the study will provide valuable information for the Ministry of Health and Sanitation 
about its human resources policy in Sierra Leone.  
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate because you have experience of the decision-making processes on 
human resources policies and on activities that involve human resources in the field. It is important 
that we gain the views of many different actors from across the healthcare sector. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not you want to be interviewed. I will be happy to go 
through this information sheet with you, before the interview. You are free to withdraw from the 
interview at any time, without giving a reason. You do not have to answer any question with which 
you do not feel comfortable. 
 
What will I have to do? 
You will be asked to respond to some questions on your experience on what are the activities that 
involve health workers that you/your organisation contributes in, and on how the pay of health 
workers in Sierra Leone is determined and by whom, both within your organisation and outside. The 
interview should last approximately 1 hour to 1.5 hour.  
 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
All the information you give us during the course of this interview will be kept strictly confidential.  
Only you will have the right to access the data you provide in order to check its accuracy and correct 
any errors. Under no circumstance, this information will be passed on to any of your colleagues or 
superiors, or others you collaborate with. 
 
The interview will be recorded and transcribed, but transcripts will be stored in an anonymous form, 
which means that no name will be included there, but only a code or fictitious name. Recordings will 
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be destroyed after transcription. We may use quotes from your interview in publications about the 
study, but they will not include any personal information other than the type of organization you work 
or worked for. To make sure this will not lead to your identification, we will use broad categories of 
“government agency”, “donor”, “NGO”, “consultant”. 
 
Transcripts will be read and analysed only by researchers from the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, based in the UK. In case you have questions, the contacts details for the main 
researcher and the study supervisor are provided in the consent form.  
 
Ethical approval 
This research study has obtained ethical approval from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, as well as from the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee. You can contact 
the SL Ethics and Scientific Review Committee to report any issues you may have with the 
researchers. 
 
If you are willing to participate in this study, please complete two copies of the consent form 
attached. Keep one copy for your records and give one copy to the researcher who explained the study 
to you. 
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CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
Health Workers’ remuneration and its implications in Sierra Leone 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
 
 
 
 
1. I have read the information sheet concerning this study and I understood what will be required of 
me and what will happen to me if I take part in it. 
 
 
2. My questions regarding this study have been answered by:     Maria Bertone  
 
 
3. I understand that at any time I may withdraw from the study without giving a reason and without 
affecting my professional position. 
 
 
4. I agree to be quoted anonymously in any publications arising from the study     
  
       
5. I agree to the type of organisation for which I worked to be named 
 
 
6. I agree to take part in the study 
 
 
 
 
________________________       ________________             ____________________________ 
Name of Participant      Date              Signature 
 
 
 
 
 
ì 
CONTACT DETAILS 
Researcher: Maria Bertone (maria.bertone@lshtm.ac.uk, +232.76445353) 
Supervisor:  Dr Mylene Lagarde (mylene.lagarde@lshtm.ac.uk)  
SL Ethics and Scientific Review Committee (williettav@yahoo.com)   
 
 
When completed: leave 1 copy for participant; 1 for researcher site file. 
 
Participant identification number:   [ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ] 
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Appendix 2.3 - Information sheet and consent form for cohort study (cross-sectional 
survey and logbooks) 
 
 
Health Workers’ remuneration and its implications in Sierra Leone 
Cohort study 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
 
Good morning, 
 
My name is [                                                       ] and work for a study undertaken by Maria Bertone 
from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in the UK. The project is about the 
remuneration of Health Workers in Sierra Leone. It seeks to understand the workload and different 
activities undertaken by health workers, as well as the different sources of income they have.  
 
We hope that you will be willing to participate. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully and feel free to ask any questions you may have regarding it.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The research project aims at better understanding the remuneration of health workers in Sierra Leone 
and its implications on the performance of the health workforce. This part of the study aims to obtain 
information on the different daily activities, workload, responsibilities, as well as the related payments 
of nurses and doctors working in public facilities in Sierra Leone.  
 
What are the possible benefits of the study? 
The results of the study will provide more information on the activities, workload and payment of 
nurses and doctors in Sierra Leone, and the challenges they face in their professional life. This could 
help design better human resources policies in the future. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. Your participation is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide. I will be happy to go through this 
information sheet with you. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without giving a 
reason. You do not have to answer any question with which you do not feel comfortable. 
 
What will I have to do? 
You will be asked to take part in three types of activities: 
 
1- Respond to a survey which I will carry out right now. It will last about 30 minutes and would first 
ask you some personal information (such as your age, gender, diploma, etc.). A second set of 
questions focuses on the income you make from different activities.  
 
2- Fill in a logbook or diary (I will show it to you) on your own every day for 8 weeks. In the 
logbook, you will report your activities in broad categories, such as clinical activities or 
administrative work, meetings, etc. You will also state for how long you did them every day, and 
where (in the health centre, at the District Office, elsewhere). It should not take you more than 10 
minutes every day to fill in the logbook. Finally, at the end of the logbook there is a question 
about the different payments you may have received during each week, such as for example an 
allowance for a night shift, or a PBF bonus, or a DSA for a meeting, etc. 
 
3- We will regularly come to collect the logbooks and help you fill them in. After 9 weeks, we will 
ask you some short questions on how much effort you think each activity requires. This should last 
about 20 minutes. We will also answer any remaining questions you may have. 
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Will I be paid for this? 
We understand that, although the completion of the logbook takes only a few minutes if done daily, 
this may add to your daily work. So every three weeks, we will give you a token to compensate for 
your time, if you have completed the three weekly logbooks. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
Data will be stored in an anonymous form, which means that there will be no name attached to them, 
but only a code. No-one else other than the researchers from the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, will have access to your personal details and these details will be destroyed at the 
end of the study. Data will be analysed in an aggregated way, for example, by presenting the average 
salary for all nurses of a certain cadre in a district, so that individuals will not be identifiable. 
 
All the information you give us in the diary and the questionnaire will be kept strictly confidential, 
which means that, under no circumstance, information will be passed on to any of your colleagues or 
superiors. If you have any questions after you have finished the diaries and interviews, you can still 
contact the main researcher. Contacts details for the main researcher and the study supervisor are 
provided in the consent form. 
 
Ethical approval 
This study has obtained ethical approval from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 
as well as from the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee. You can contact the SL 
Ethics and Scientific Review Committee to report any issues you may have with the researchers. 
 
If you are willing to participate in this study, please complete two copies of the consent form 
attached. Keep one copy for your records and give one copy to the researcher who explained the study 
to you. 
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CONSENT FORM 
 
Health Workers’ remuneration and its implications in Sierra Leone 
COHORT STUDY 
 
 
1. I have read the information sheet concerning this study and I understand what will be required of 
me  
and what will happen to me if I take part in it.    
 
 
2. My questions regarding this study have been answered by .......................................  
 
 
3. I understand that at any time I may withdraw from the study without giving a reason and without 
affecting my career. 
 
 
4. I agree to provide my contact mobile number, so that the researchers can send me reminder texts, 
can contact me to schedule the collection of the logbooks.  
 
 
Phone number: _________________________________________ 
 
 
 
5. I agree to take part in the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________       ______________                _________________________ 
Name of Participant      Date              Signature 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CONTACT DETAILS 
Researcher: Maria Bertone (maria.bertone@lshtm.ac.uk, +232.76445353) 
Supervisor:  Dr Mylene Lagarde (mylene.lagarde@lshtm.ac.uk) 
SL Ethics and Scientific Review Committee (williettav@yahoo.com)   
 
When completed: leave 1 copy for participant; 1 for researcher file. 
 
 
Participant identification number:   [ __ __ __ __ ]  
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Appendix 2.4 - Information sheet and consent form for in-depth interviews with HWs 
 
Health Workers’ remuneration and its implications in Sierra Leone 
HWs qualitative interviews 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Hello, 
 
My name is Maria and I am a PhD student at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in 
the UK. I am conducting a research project on the remuneration of Health Workers (HWs) in Sierra 
Leone. As you know, the project aims to understand the different sources of income for doctors and 
nurses, and what it means for the activities they undertake in their job. For this reason, I have asked to 
some nurses and doctors to fill in diaries and questionnaires on this. Now, I want to better understand 
the information you provided us. So I am asking a smaller number of health workers to participate to 
an interview on their activities, workload, payments, as well as the challenges in their professional life. 
 
I am grateful for your help with the previous phase of this study and I hope that you will be willing to 
participate to this second one too. Please take time to read the following information carefully and feel 
free to ask any questions you may have regarding it.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
As you may remember from the previous phase of the study, this research project aims at better 
understanding the remuneration of nurses and doctors in Sierra Leone and its implications on the 
performance of the health workforce. Following up on the diary on activities and the questionnaire on 
remuneration that you filled in, we are now trying to go beyond numbers and better understand your 
professional experience, how you organise your day and what are the activities you carry out, what are 
the challenges you face, who supports you, etc.  
 
What are the possible benefits of the study? 
Together with the other parts of the study, this study would help to have a better view of the real 
situation and the professional challenges of health workers in Sierra Leone. This may help design 
better human resources policies in the future. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide. I will be happy to go through this information sheet 
with you. You are free to withdraw from the study at any time, without giving a reason. You do not 
have to answer any question with which you do not feel comfortable. 
 
What will I have to do? 
You will be asked to take part in an interview that will last approximately one to two hours. It will not 
be based on a precise questionnaire, but you will be able to talk in a free and open way of the issues 
that the researcher will ask about. 
 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
All the information you give us during the course of this interview will be kept strictly confidential, 
which means that this information will never be passed on to any of your colleagues or superiors, or 
others you collaborate with. 
 
The interview will be recorded and transcribed, but transcripts will be stored in an anonymous form, 
which means that no name will be included there, but only a code or fictitious name. Recordings will 
be destroyed after transcription. We may use quotes, such as a sentence that you said in the interview, 
for publications about the study, but we will not include any personal information about you other than 
perhaps the district you work in and your general qualification (nurse, doctor). Transcripts will be read 
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and analysed only by researchers from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, based in 
the UK. In case you have questions, the contacts details for the main researcher and the study 
supervisor are provided in the consent form. 
 
Ethical approval 
This study has obtained ethical approval from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 
as well as from the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee. You can contact the SL 
Ethics and Scientific Review Committee to report any issues you may have with the researchers. 
 
If you are willing to participate in this study, please complete two copies of the consent form 
attached. Keep one copy for your records and give one copy to the researcher who explained the study 
to you. 
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CONSENT FORM 
 
Health Workers’ remuneration and its implications in Sierra Leone 
HWs QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
 
 
 
 
1. I have read the information sheet concerning this study and I understood what will be required of 
me and what will happen to me if I take part in it. 
 
 
2. My questions regarding this study have been answered by     Maria Bertone  
 
 
3. I understand that at any time I may withdraw from the study without giving a reason and without 
affecting my career. 
 
 
4. I agree to be quoted anonymously in any publications arising from the study   
 
                   
5. I agree to the district where I work and my general qualification (e.g., doctor, nurse) to be disclosed 
    
 
6. I agree to take part in the study 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________       ________________                _________________________ 
Name of Participant      Date              Signature 
 
 
 
 
Ì 
CONTACT DETAILS 
Researcher: Maria Bertone (maria.bertone@lshtm.ac.uk, +232.76445353) 
Supervisor:  Dr Mylene Lagarde (mylene.lagarde@lshtm.ac.uk) 
SL Ethics and Scientific Review Committee (williettav@yahoo.com)   
 
 
When completed: leave 1 copy for participant; 1 for researcher site file. 
 
Participant identification number:   [ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ]  
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Appendix 3 - List of all documents retrieved for documentary review 
 
(Documents in bold are those with some reference to HRH policies) 
ACC & HFAC. (2012). MoU between the Anti-Corruption Commission and Health for All Coalition. Freetown: 
Memorandum of Understanding. 
AHWO. (2011). HRH Country Profile - Sierra Leone. Freetown: African Health Workforce Observatory. 
Awareness Times. (2011). 2011 State Opening of Parliament - Address by HE the President. Freetown: Awareness 
Times - Sierra Leone News and Information. 
Canavan, A., & Coolen, A. (2010). Assessment for a District Based Performance Incentives Approach for MRC in 
Sierra Leone. Amsterdam: KIT. 
Canavan, A., Rothmann, I., & Coolen, A. (2009). Assessment of readiness for a Sector Wide Approach for Health in Sierra 
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Appendix 4 - Topic guide for key informant interviews at central level 
 
Objectives: To obtain the perceptions of key stakeholders on the policies relating to health worker retention which have 
been introduced in the post-conflict period, why they were introduced, how they were implemented, how they are connected 
and what impact they have had. 
 
A. Note details of participants before interview: 
 
1. Interviewee ID  
2. Date of Interview  
3. Gender Male  Female   
4. Title interviewee  
5. Institution/facility  
6. Region & District  
 
Ask some general questions about how long the person has been in post etc, to help with adapting the questions. 
 
Questions (tailor according to background of KI) 
1. Context and challenges 
Looking back to 2000, during the conflict, what was the situation of health workers in Sierra Leone?  
 
What were the main challenges in relation to the workforce? 
Probes: 
 Particularly focus on challenges relating to: 
i. Ability to recruit enough staff 
ii. Ability to post enough staff to rural areas 
iii. Ability to keep them in those areas 
iv. Ability to manage them and motivate them to work effectively  
 Which staffs were most challenging? 
 
How did the challenges vary across the period (2000 to present day)? What are the main challenges now? 
 Same probes: 
 Particularly focus on challenges relating to: 
i. Ability to recruit enough staff 
ii. Ability to post enough staff to rural areas 
iii. Ability to keep them in those areas 
iv. Ability to manage them and motivate them to work effectively  
 Which staffs are most challenging? 
 
 
2. Responses to challenges 
Can you explain to us what main changes have come in since, which have affected the main groups of health workers? 
(Focus on period of which the KI has direct experience) 
Probe for changes relating to policy and practice in relation to: 
 Recruitment policies 
 Management of staff 
 Workload and working hours 
 Remuneration (of all kinds, including rules about private practice, for example) 
 Working conditions of staff and other non-financial benefits 
 Systems of promotion and career progression 
 Training opportunities 
 Job security 
 Retirement benefits etc. 
 
3. Drivers of changes (high-level informants only) 
1. What were the main factors which influenced the changes in policy? (Discuss for each main policy change described) 
2. Which factors do you think are most influential in policy change? Please explain how and why 
a. Specific people? 
b. Specific organisations? 
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c. Funding? 
d. Political factors? 
e. Evidence? 
f. Other factors? 
3. Have these factors changed over the period?  
a. If so, describe how, and why? 
4. Who were the main actors involved in the process of developing policies on HRH? 
5. Describe how the main players are positioned  
a. How did and do the actors (government, experts, donors, researchers etc.) relate to one another? 
b. What is their focus of work and interest? 
c. How much influence do they have? 
d. How has this been used? 
e. Describe how this has changed or not over the post-war period 
 
4. Implementation/operational issues 
Taking each of the responses in turn, can you describe to me how they were implemented? 
o What were the mechanisms? 
o Over what areas of the country? (high-level KI only) 
o Focussed on which health workers? 
o Implemented by whom? 
What were the implementation challenges? 
o Were they overcome? How? 
What were the strengths and weaknesses in relation to implementation?  
Overall, how effective was the implementation? 
 
5. Effects of the policy or practice change(s) 
(1) Health worker remuneration 
 What was the effect of the policy/intervention/programme on the remuneration of health workers? 
 Did it succeed in boosting pay (if that was its aim)? 
 If so, how?  
 If not, why not? 
(2) Health worker recruitment  
 What was the effect of the policy/intervention/programme on the number of health workers taking up posts in public 
service? 
 Did it succeed in boosting numbers (if that was its aim)? 
 If so, how?  
 If not, why not? 
(3) Health worker retention  
 What was the effect of the policy/intervention/programme on the number of health workers staying in public service? 
 Did it succeed in reducing attrition (people leaving the public services) (if that was its aim)? 
 If so, how? 
 If not, why not? 
(4) Distribution 
 What was the effect of the policy/intervention/programme on the distribution of health workers across the country and 
across the different facility types? 
 Did it succeed in attracting people to work in areas which are underserved (if that was its aim)? 
 If so, how? 
 If not, why not? 
(5) Performance 
What was the effect of the policy/intervention/programme on the way that health workers work? 
o Did it affect the way that they provide care to patients? If so, how? 
o Did it affect their motivation? If so, how? 
o How about their working practices – how have they changed as a result of the policy?  
(6) Improved access to services 
 Has the policy enabled people, especially in poorer areas, to access services at reasonable cost and quality (or had the 
opposite effect)? 
 Explain your answer 
(7) Systems effects 
Has the policy affected the wider health system? 
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o How? 
o Any positive or negative effects (whether intended or not)? Please describe them 
6. Your recommendations 
 What are the lessons which were learned during these experiences? 
 Based on these experiences, what do you think should be done to improve the situation and work of health workers in 
Sierra Leone? 
 Which strategies should be adopted in the future to address the current challenges for health workers in Sierra Leone? 
 
Thank you for your time! 
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Appendix 5 - Topic guide for key informant interviews at district level 
 
 Introduction  
 
 General description of interviewee’s (and his/her organization’s) work in relation to HRH. 
 
 HRH activities of the interviewee’s organization: 
- What type of HRH-related project and activities does your organisation funds/carries out? (including details over 
disease/program/service specific activities) 
- Did you organize any in the past month? 
- Are you planning any for the next two months? 
 
- Do these activities entail payment for HWs?  
 If so, what are the level of payment, type of contract and payment methods, and the activities required for 
them? 
 What are the accountability obligations for HWs involved, in terms of demands for answers (e.g., reporting 
mechanisms, oversight, supervision, etc.) and possible sanctions? 
- How are the HWs participating to those activities and/or receiving remuneration selected?  
 
- What are the internal decision-making processes on HRH activities to support? 
 How are decisions on HRH-related activities to support, fund and/or organize made within your organization?  
 Who sets the priorities and takes decisions?  
 What constrains do you face? (e.g., lack of information and data, HQ’s policies and directives, IMF cap on 
salary, etc.) 
 How effective do you think this internal decision-making process is? Do you have any positive or negative 
examples? 
 
- What is the impact of your organization’s HRH activities on HWs and on the health system? 
- How could the impact of your organization’s HRH activities be improved? 
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Appendix 6 - Topic guides for in-depth interviews with HWs 
 
 Introduction 
 General questions on the interviewee’s role in the health centre and overview of his/her tasks and remuneration 
structure (based on the logbook) 
o what are the day-to-day challenges that they face in their practice,  
o how they feel about their professional role,  
o what influences shape what they do in their professional role,  
o what are their perceptions around supervision, reporting, sanctions, ... 
 
PICKING UP FROM POINTS FROM THE PREVIOUS QUESTIONS, discuss some of the following questions in relation with 
the possible actors/principals to which HWs may be accountable: 
- Government/MoH 
- Other payers (NGO, donors, etc.) 
- Public / patients 
- Others  
 
 Accountability: answerability 
- Do you have written Terms of Reference for your job?  
 Do you know clearly what you are supposed to do (tasks and responsibilities) in your post?  
- Who do you report to about the activities/tasks you perform, why and how? Who checks that you accomplished the 
tasks you were supposed to? (one or more than one person/agency) 
 How does this reporting take place (e.g., written, orally, through direct supervision or written reporting)? 
Where (in a separate room, in the wards, etc.)? How often? 
- Who supervise your works and provide guidance and advice on your tasks and the choice of tasks? 
- Is anyone else entitled to ask you explanations on what tasks/activities you did and how? 
 How and how often do they ask you for explanations and results?  
- Do you go to anyone to discuss about your work and receive guidance and advice? 
 
 Accountability: sanctions 
- What happens if you don’t perform the tasks/activities you are required to?  
- What happens if you don’t provide explanations when asked to?  
- Are there any sanctions envisaged within your contracts? [discuss for each ‘contract’] 
- Do you ever incurred in such sanctions? Or heard of anyone who did? 
 
 Multiple accountabilities: 
- Do you feel like you have a choice on the type of task/activities you can perform over the day? 
 [Probes: examples based on the different possibilities: activities inside or outside of the health centre (e.g., 
trainings/workshops, private practice, etc.); choice of activities within the health centre (e.g., provision of 
services included in PBF payments, paid by patients, etc.)] 
 Ask for examples 
- How do you make your daily choice about which tasks/activities to perform? What factors do you take into 
consideration?  
 [Probes: formal answerability and sanctions requirements, accountability for results/PBF, 
management/division of tasks within the facility, earning possibilities, less demanding activities, patients 
needs or personal needs (including training needs), mentoring and guidance, ...]  
 Can you provide examples? 
 
- Does it ever happen that you have to report about the activities you performed to more than one person/agency? 
 Are these person/agencies requesting you to report on the same activities or different ones? 
 Are their reporting requirements similar, or in conflict? 
 Ask for examples 
 
- What happens when different persons/agencies (under different contracts or agreement with you) ask you perform to 
different tasks during the day? 
 Can you describe how do you go about to prioritize them (i.e. decide which activity to perform) when they are 
conflicting? 
 Can you provide examples of positive or negative experiences? 
Appendices | 228  
 
- Do you ever feel that you should have given priority to certain activities/task, but it was not possible in practice? 
 Can you provide example 
 Why was it not possible to do what you felt you should? 
 
Revised topic guide - April 2014 
 
1. Remuneration structure and individual financial coping strategies / livelihood strategies. 
 
Level of income and sources 
 What is your main source of income?  
 What are other sources? (use logbook and survey data to start the conversation) 
 Are these incomes sufficient to support you and your family?  
- Do you receive a salary?  (how long without a salary?) 
- Is your salary sufficient to support you and your family? (ask if there are other income sources in the household etc) 
- Do you have other sources of income? What are they? (ask for examples) – remind them the income earned within 
the facility (use logbook) 
- Probe: within facility; remote allowance, PBF, DSA, share of User Fees, gifts. Outside of the facility: private 
practice, other IGA (ask examples for each and to elaborate) 
 
Strategies to maximize income 
 How do you balance your incomes and expenditures?  
 What happens when your salary doesn’t cover your expenses? What other incomes you get, how and when? (for 
example, in terms of time you spend on different income-generating activities).  
 How do you feel about having to find a balance between the different activities? 
- how important are these sources compared to the salary? (see list) 
- [again, another way of asking for more] What else do you do to earn money? When do you do it? (ask for examples, 
use logbook to facilitate discussion) 
[hint: do HWs immediately think of activities outside of the facility? Remind them of sources of income other than salary 
linked to their work WITHIN the facility] 
- How do you balance the time dedicated to these activities? Time in facility and time out? Ask for examples (use 
logbook). 
- How do you feel about the different tasks and having to find a balance between them?  
 [bottom line is: do the income maximizing strategies have an impact on the time you spend in the facility and in the tasks 
you do?] 
 
Spending your income  
 How do you use your different incomes? (e.g. do you “earmark”/keep some incomes for some expenditures?)  
 Do you keep the salary separate from day-to-day incomes (gifts, DSA, IGA, etc.)? 
- Where do you get your salary? Where is your bank account?  
- How often do you have access to it?  
- What else is paid into your bank account? (if any – RA should be the only one) 
- What are your first expenditures, once you have access to it out of the bank? (e.g. first you spend on food, on family) 
- Are you living with your family/household? if not, do you send them a regular part of your salary? How do you do 
this? (e.g. send all salary) 
- What about the other incomes? What do you do with them? Ask one by one what they do with them: PBF, DSA, gifts, 
IGA, private practice, etc 
- What do you live on while in the facility? What is the role of the community around the facility regarding the support to 
PHU staff? 
- Can you save money sometimes? What do you do with your savings? 
[what comes out of the first interviews is that HWs send their salary home and live only out of the other incomes or 
gifts/food from the village] 
 
Strategies to deal with variability 
 Does your income vary from month to month?  
 Does this have an impact on the way you spend or plan your expenditures? 
- Do you know when your income is the highest? and the lowest?  
- Can you plan expenditures on the basis of the income you will have at the end of the month? For example, how do 
you plan recurrent expenditure that you can foresee (school fees, etc.). What about emergencies / exceptional 
expenditures? 
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- Do you have to incur in debts sometimes? What for? In some months in particular? Ask for examples. What do you 
do to earn extra income to repay debts? 
 
Internal dynamics about income redistribution and share of workload 
 How is the money received in the facility shared among the team (user fees, PBF, DSA)? Are you happy with this? Do 
you think it’s fair? 
 Are you allowed to leave the facility for dealing with private matters (including IGA)?  How do you organize this with your 
colleagues? 
- Do you receive user fees from patients? For which services? How much by type of service and in total? 
- How are these revenues used? Are they shared between the team?  
- How? and how often? who decides about this division? 
- Do you think this process is fair or not? Do you have complains or positive examples? 
- Have you ever received a PBF bonus? What do you think of it? Is it helping or not? Could it be improved? 
- How is PBF money used? How is it shared within the facility? (ask for examples). 
- Do you think this process is fair or unfair? Do you have complaints? Or positive examples?  
- Do you often go for training/workshop? Do you receive DSA? 
- Who decide who goes to the training/workshops? Do you have a say in this  
- How are the DSA spent? Is there any left for you to spend as you want/save? 
- Probe if necessary: does it ever happen that you share DSA with your co-workers at the facility? (ask for examples).  
- Are you happy to do it? Do you think it’s fair or unfair? (probe for kickbacks) 
- Are you allowed to leave the facility for dealing with private matters? (including IGA – if the HWs have mentioned 
them). 
- What happens when you or your colleague are out of the facility? Who takes up the work?  
- Do you take turns to leave? (for MCHPs) // who is allowed to leave and when (for CHC/CHPs)? 
- Do you think this is fair or unfair? 
 
HIV clinics 
Some of the CHCs included in the study are also HIV clinics. In some of these clinics, staff working on HIV is not included in 
the MoHS payroll and paid separately – although, because of the 2010 salary increase and other allowances, they seem to 
be paid less than MoHS staff. It would be interesting to analyze the internal dynamics between the different staff in these 
larger clinics. 
 
 Are there HWs paid by NAS? how is the work shared in the facility?  
 How is income shared (PBF, UF, DSA)? 
- Is there any staff not on MoHS payroll in this clinic? What about HIV staff? (other staff: family planning, TB, etc…) 
- Is the HIV clinic separate from the rest of the PHU? Is the staff different? 
- Do you work/collaborate with them? How? do you have good relations? Or bad? Or none at all? 
- Is the PBF bonus shared also with them? Is this fair? 
- Does HIV staff only go to HIV workshops and meetings? Do they get DSA?  
- What do you think of the money they are making?  
 
2. Internal and external (f)actors and service delivery  
 
Service delivery 
 How is your week organized? [Ask for the schedule (often posted on the wall)]. Can you tell me a bit about what you do 
every day / describe each day work schedule? 
 When during the day/week do you do admin work / paperwork? 
- Who decided about this schedule? 
- How is the work shared between the team within the facility? Who does what? 
- When is it the busiest for you and when is less busy for you? Why?  
- Are you happy with this schedule and organization of work? Does it allow you to carry out all the work you want 
within and outside of the facility? 
- Where does the admin work fit in? is it an extra burden for you, or ok? Do you have enough time off clinical activities 
to do  it, or do you struggle to balance the two? 
- Do you have an annual or monthly work plan? How do you prioritize activities and how do you decide to spend the 
funds available? 
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Actors and “accountability requirements” 
 Do you receive visits from DHMT, NGOs and others during the week? When (if regular)? [ask for guestbook and 
discuss the following questions with reference to the entries in it] 
 What do they do? What do they provide you (supervision, training, inputs, funds, etc.)? what do they ask you to do 
(reporting, monthly meetings, supervise other facilities, specific tasks/service delivery, etc.)? (what happens if you don’t 
do it?) 
- Who comes and visits you in the facility? How often? Is it always the same person(s) that come? 
- What they do? What they provide you?  
- What do they ask you to do? (for both, see list in bullet points above) 
- Does your work depend on them? How? (e.g. do you have to wait for them for some activities?) 
- What could they do if you/your colleague have not done what they asked you to? (sanctions) 
- Do they ever carry out joint visits? Who does? How do these take place? 
- When and where do you go for the monthly meetings? (i.e. in district capital or sub-district) Who coordinates them? 
(probe: role of DHTM. Do they hare staff at sub-district level? Are CHOs in charge of supervising some PHUs) 
 
Consequences of the network of actors, influences and accountabilities 
 Do you have a good relationship with each of them? (ask for each of the visitors mentioned) Do you appreciate their 
support? (Does it motivate you?) 
 How do these visitors help you respond better to the needs of the patients/community (if at all)? How does their support 
change the way you work? Do you depend on them for your work? (ask for examples)  
 
At individual level:  
- What is your relationship with these people? Are you in good terms with them? (do you know them by name or by 
organization)? 
- Do you think you receive enough support? Who is the most helpful?  
- Who do you call in case of need? For example, for a complicated case or a referral? (if anyone) 
- Are they timely in their support, provision of support/advice, inputs and funding? (e.g. providing drugs, vaccines, etc.) 
Do they do what they promised to do? 
- Do you have enough discretion/autonomy or do you depend on others to carry out your work? Are these actors of 
help or hindrance for you to carry out your work? how would you do without them? (give examples) 
- Do they and the support that motivate you? does it give you better reason to work or just more workload? 
- How do you feel about their requests (reporting, other admin work, etc.)? Do you ever have conflicting demands / did 
they ever asked you to do two different things? 
 
For service delivery: responsiveness to patients and communities 
- How do these actors and elements influence your work? in a positive or negative way? give examples. 
- Have any of these ever changed the way you provide services? 
- How do these visitors help you respond better to the needs of the patients/community? (if at all) 
- What is your relation with the community? 
- Do you feel you provide the services they need, in the way they need? 
- Is your work appreciated? How? (give examples)  
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Appendix 7 - Coding frameworks for analysis of in-depth interviews 
 
Appendix 7.1 - Coding framework for Chapter 9 
 
General topic Themes Sub-themes/codes  
Personal details 
Individual 
Sex  
Marital status 
Age 
District of origin 
Level of education 
Cadre  
In-charge or staff 
Facility 
Name of facility 
Type of facility 
Number of staff 
Ruralness  
District District  
Income 
categories 
Salary 
Features of income 
Level / Satisfaction 
Timeliness / Regularity 
Effort 
Motivation gained 
Income max strategies 
Income max strategies in facility 
Income max strategies in HH 
Other/outside 
Dealing with variability 
Views / feelings on income max strategies  
Income use / livelihoods 
Access to income 
Spending vs. saving 
HH redistribution dynamics 
Facility redistribution dynamics 
Other coping strategies 
Views / feelings on livelihoods 
Remote allowance 
   
Share of user fees 
   
PBF 
Features of income 
Level / Satisfaction 
Timeliness / Regularity 
Effort 
Motivation gained 
Income max strategies 
Income max strategies in facility 
Income max strategies in HH 
Other/outside 
Dealing with variability 
Views / feelings on income max strategies  
Income use / livelihoods 
Access to income 
Spending vs. saving 
HH redistribution dynamics 
Facility redistribution dynamics 
Other coping strategies 
Views / feelings on livelihoods 
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Top ups 
   
DSA / per diems 
Features of income 
Level / Satisfaction 
Timeliness / Regularity 
Effort 
Motivation gained 
Income max strategies 
Income max strategies in facility 
Income max strategies in HH 
Other/outside 
Dealing with variability 
Views / feelings on income max strategies  
Income use / livelihoods 
Access to income 
Spending vs. saving 
HH redistribution dynamics 
Facility redistribution dynamics 
Other coping strategies 
Views / feelings on livelihoods 
Income generating 
activities (non-
health) 
Features of income 
Level / Satisfaction 
Timeliness / Regularity 
Effort 
Motivation gained 
Income max strategies 
Income max strategies in facility 
Income max strategies in HH 
Other/outside 
Dealing with variability 
Views / feelings on income max strategies  
Income use / livelihoods 
Access to income 
Spending vs. saving 
HH redistribution dynamics 
Facility redistribution dynamics 
Other coping strategies 
Views / feelings on livelihoods 
private practice 
   
sale of drugs 
 
Incl. the possibility of it (extra drugs) 
Gifts from patients 
Features of income 
Level / Satisfaction 
Timeliness / Regularity 
Effort 
Motivation gained 
Income max strategies 
Income max strategies in facility 
Income max strategies in HH 
Other/outside 
Dealing with variability 
Views / feelings on income max strategies  
Income use / livelihoods 
Access to income 
Spending vs. saving 
HH redistribution dynamics 
Facility redistribution dynamics 
Other coping strategies 
Views / feelings on livelihoods 
Total income Features of income 
Level / Satisfaction 
Timeliness / Regularity 
Effort 
Motivation gained 
Appendices | 233  
Income max strategies 
Income max strategies in facility 
Income max strategies in HH 
Other/outside 
Dealing with variability 
Views / feelings on income max strategies  
Income use / livelihoods 
Access to income 
Spending vs. saving 
HH redistribution dynamics 
Facility redistribution dynamics 
Other coping strategies 
Views / feelings on livelihoods 
Income-generating activities 
Type of activity 
e.g. routine/specific, campaign, training etc. 
Who does it? 
e.g. take turns, always one 
Feelings/views  
about it   
Non-financial motivation and demotivation factors 
Career prospects  
Views on future 
Other (non-financial) motivation factors 
Other (non-financial) demotivation factors 
 
 
Appendix 7.2 - Coding framework for Chapter 10 
 
General topic Theme/code 
Personal details 
Sex 
Marital status 
Age 
Cadre 
In-charge or staff 
Type of Facility 
Ruralness  
Districts 
Weekly schedule 
MONDAY 
TUESDAY 
WEDNESDAY 
THURSDAY 
FRIDAY 
SATURDAY 
SUNDAY 
Who decides the schedule 
Visits and purpose of visits 
Who visits the facility 
Answerability (supply information: e.g. reports, records etc) 
Sanctions 
Supervision / support / clinical guidance / coaching 
Direct support to service delivery  
Inputs (drugs, equipment, nutritional supplements, fuel, etc) 
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Appendix 8 - Cross-sectional survey on remunerations 
 
INITIAL QUESTIONNAIRE – COHORT STUDY 
 
Respondent code:  
                                 [ __ __ __ __ ]   
(District code + enumerator code + HW number according to sequence of interviewing) 
District: 
 
Type and name of facility: 
 
Date of interview:  
                                    
 
1.  RESPONDENT DETAILS:   
I would like to start by asking some general questions about you: 
 
1.1 Mark respondents’ sex 01 [___]   Male                    02 [___]   Female 
1.2 What is your marital status? 
01  [___]   Single                           02  [___]   Co-habiting                03  [___]   Married  
04  [___]   Divorced                      05  [___]   Widowed 
1.3 How old are you? [ ___ ___ ] 
99 = Don’t Know 
1.4 What is your district of origin?  
[______________________________________]   
1.5 What is the last grade of formal education you completed? 
01  [___]  MCH Aide certificate                           02  [___]  Certificate in Nursing         
03  [___]  Diploma in Nursing                              04  [___]  Degree in Nursing 
05  [___]  Certificate in Midwifery (SRN)           06  [___]  Certificate in Midwifery (SECHN) 
07  [___]  CHO Diploma                                      08  [___]  CHA Certificate 
09  [___]  Other. Specify:  [__________________________________]                 
1.6 What type of facility do you work in? 
01  [___]  CHC                   02  [___]  CHP                       03  [___]  MCHP                                     
04  [___]  Other. Specify:  [_____________________________________] 
1.7 What is your professional title? 
01  [___]  CHO                            02  [___]  CHA 
03  [___]  Nurse (RN)                  04  [___]  Midwife (RN) 
05  [___]  Nurse (SECHN)          06  [___]  Midwife (SECHN)                                                         
07  [___]  MCH Aide/Nurse        08  [___]  Other (specify:)                                  
[_____________________________________] 
1.8 What is your Grade?    
[ should be between 2 and 5]      [ ___ ]        [ don’t know = 99 ] 
1.9 What is your post or title within the facility?                     
01  [___]  In-charge                    02  [___]  Staff member                                   
03  [___]  Other. Specify: [_________________________________________] 
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1.10 Do you have a specific role or duty within the facility? For example, you focus on specific 
services or wards? 
01 [ __ ] No, I work on all services/wards every day                   go to question 11 
02 [ __ ] I rotate between services and wards                               go to question 11 
03 [ __ ] Yes, I work ONLY on some specific services / wards  go to question 10b 
1.10b If you work only on SOME specific services / wards, please list them: [tick all relevant] 
[ __ ] HIV/AIDS 
[ __ ] Malaria 
[ __ ] TB 
[ __ ] Family Planning 
[ __ ] ANC / PoNC (antenatal care and post-natal care – pregnant and lactating women) 
[ __ ] IMCI (integrated management of child illnesses – children) 
[ __ ] EPI (vaccines) 
[ __ ] Nutrition 
[ __ ] Other. Please, specify: [ __________________________________________________ ] 
1.11 How many professional health staff work in this facility (ie. do not count the 
guards/helpers/cleaners)? 
[fill in the number]               [ __ __ __ ] 
 
2. INCOME COMPONENTS 
 
  When? 
(mm / yyyy) 
Amount received 
(Le.) 
For which period? 
 
2.1 Salary (last received) 
  
 
 
 
 
2.2 Remote Area 
Allowance 
(last received) 
  01 [ ___ ] One off   
02 [ ___ ] Previous week 
03 [ ___ ] Previous month      
04 [ ___ ] Previous quarter     
05 [ ___ ] Other (specify): 
 
2.3 Performance-based 
Financing  (PBF) 
[individual bonus!] 
(last received) 
  01 [ ___ ] One off   
02 [ ___ ] Previous week 
03 [ ___ ] Previous month      
04 [ ___ ] Previous quarter     
05 [ ___ ] Other (specify): 
 
2.4 Payment from facility 
revenues distributed 
to staff 
(last received) 
  01 [ ___ ] One off   
02 [ ___ ] Previous week 
03 [ ___ ] Previous month      
04 [ ___ ] Previous quarter     
05 [ ___ ] Other (specify): 
 
2.5 Top-up / salary 
supplementations 
(last received) 
  01 [ ___ ] One off   
02 [ ___ ] Previous week 
03 [ ___ ] Previous month      
04 [ ___ ] Previous quarter     
05 [ ___ ] Other (specify): 
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Amount received (last month) - 
Le. 
2.6 DSA for training, workshops, etc.  
(received last month) [entire amount received] 
 
 
2.7 Income-generating activities outside the health 
sector (received last month) 
[for ex, trading or selling business, farming, etc.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. INDIRECT QUESTIONING WITH THE DICE 
Questions (all questions refer to last month):   
  Number as given by respondent 
(does not correspond to real amount) 
3.1 How much did you receive in gifts in kind and cash 
from patients? (convert in Le. all gifts) 
 
[ ____________________________ ] 
3.2 How much did you make selling drugs or other 
items to patients within the health facility? 
 
[ ____________________________ ] 
3.3 How much did you earn from private practice last 
month? (can be in a private clinic or at your home, 
or patients’ home) 
 
[ ____________________________ ] 
 
 Thank the respondent. Now introduce and explain the logbook.  
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Appendix 9 - Self-administered longitudinal logbook on remunerations 
and activities  
WEEKLY LOGBOOK - COHORT STUDY 
 
Respondent code:  
 
(District code + enumerator code + HW number according to sequence of interviewing) 
District: 
 
Type and name of facility: 
 
Date when logbook was left with the respondent:  
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
 
We are interested in better understanding your work management (i.e., the way you divide your time between 
activities) and workload throughout the day. 
Don’t forget this is an anonymous questionnaire and all information you provide will be kept confidential – for 
more information on this ask the enumerator (contact below). 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
1. Begin filling in this logbook today and continue to record your activities and income until the end of the 
week.  
 
2. Fill in the table daily, at the end of each day of work. 
 
3. Once finished a booklet, use a new one. Use one logbook per week and record activities and income over 
the next 9 weeks. 
 
4. For each time period you worked on an activity, you should fill in the logbook detailing the activity, the 
time spent on it and the amount earned (if any). The list of activities is below. Use it as a reference when 
filling in the logbook. 
-----------------------------    There is an example overleaf to guide you   --------------------------------------- 
 
5. If you have any queries or doubt, do not hesitate to call us or send a text (you will be called back) to : 
  
[ _______________________________]                                   Add name and phone num of enumerator   
 
LIST of TYPES OF ACTIVITIES 
 
Activities WITHIN the health facility 
 General (integrated) clinical activities (covering different problems of a patient. For ex: outpatient visits, 
visits of children or pregnant women) 
 Disease/service/program specific activities (for ex: Family Planning, TB, HIV/AIDS, etc)  Please, 
specify in the logbook which disease/service/program. 
 General administrative work (for example HIS reports, pharmacy records, etc.) 
 Disease/service/program specific administrative work (for example, HIV or other disease specific 
information reports). Please, specify which disease/service/program. 
 Meetings within the facility (for ex: meeting with the staff to agree on shifts, etc.) 
 Night guards 
 
Activities OUTSIDE the health facility 
 Outreach activities in the community 
 Meeting outside of the facility. Please, specify type/topic of meeting, organiser and meeting place 
 Training, workshop, etc. Please, specify topic of workshop, organiser and place 
 Private practice (health-related work that you do in a clinic, at home or at the home of a patient) 
 Other non-medical activities that generate income (for ex: trading, business, farming). Please, specify. 
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EXAMPLE                                Daily activity logbook – WEEK # 1      EXAMPLE 
 
Fill in the date on which you started recording: Monday, September 16th___________________________________ 
 
TIME Monday Amount earned Tuesday Amount earned 
7am  
 
   
8am  
 
   
9am  
 
   
10am  
 
   
11am  
 
Gifts: 20,000 Le.    
12pm  
 
  DSA:  50,000 Le. 
1pm  
 
   
2pm  
 
   
3pm  
 
   
4pm  
 
30,000 Le.   
5pm  
 
   
6pm  
 
10,000 Le.  5,000 Le. 
7pm  
 
   
 
 
Meeting in facility: 
planning of week 
Private practice 
Training: 
- Family Planning 
- Funded by UNFPA 
- at DHMT Office 
Work in shop 
Work in shop 
Outpatient  consultations 
(integrated) 
Consultations: Family 
Planning 
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Daily activity logbook – WEEK #______ 
Date on which you started recording:_____________________________________ 
 
TIME Monday Amount earned Tuesday Amount earned 
Early 
morning 
    
7am     
8am     
9am     
10am     
11am     
12pm     
1pm     
2pm     
3pm     
4pm     
5pm     
6pm     
7pm     
8pm     
Night  
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TIME Wednesday  Amount earned Thursday Amount earned 
Early 
morning 
 
 
   
7am  
 
   
8am  
 
   
9am  
 
   
10am  
 
   
11am  
 
   
12pm  
 
   
1pm  
 
   
2pm  
 
   
3pm  
 
   
4pm  
 
   
5pm  
 
   
6pm  
 
   
7pm  
 
   
8pm  
 
   
Night   
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TIME Friday Amount earned Saturday Amount 
earned 
Sunday Amount 
earned 
Early 
morning 
    
 
  
7am       
8am     
 
  
9am     
 
  
10am     
 
  
11am     
 
  
12pm     
 
  
1pm     
 
  
2pm     
 
  
3pm     
 
  
4pm     
 
  
5pm     
 
  
6pm     
 
  
7pm     
 
  
8pm     
 
  
Night   
 
    
 
